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The Land Matrix Initiative and
the scope of this report
The Land Matrix Initiative (LMI) is a partnership between 
the Centre for Development and Environment (CDE) at the 
University of Bern, Centre de cooperation Internationale 
en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement 
(CIRAD), German Institute for Global and Area Studies 
(GIGA), Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ), and International Land Coalition (ILC) at global level, 
and the Asian Farmers’ Association for Sustainable Rural 
Development (AFA), Centre for Environmental Initiatives 
Ecoaction, Fundación para el Desarrollo en Justicia y Paz 
(FUNDAPAZ), and University of Pretoria at regional level. 
Established in 20091  to address the gap in robust data 
on the real extent and nature of the “global land rush”, 
the LMI has evolved into an independent land monitoring 
initiative that promotes transparency and accountability 
in decisions over large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) 
in low- and middle-income countries in response to the 
need to monitor such complex investment flows. We 
do this by collecting, capturing, and sharing data about 
LSLAs at global, regional, and national level on our online 
open access platform. Our four Regional Focal Points 
(RFPs), located in Africa, in Asia, Eastern Europe, and 
Latin America, as well as our National Land Observatories 
(NLOs) in Argentina, Cameroon, Philippines, Senegal, 
and Uganda are responsible for data collection in their 
respective regions. Generally, we collect data for deals 
targeting agricultural production, timber plantations and 
extraction, carbon trading, industry, renewable energy 
production, conservation, and tourism in low- and middle-
income countries. Specifically, we record transactions 
that entail a transfer of rights to use, control, or own land 
through sale, lease, or concession; that cover 200 hectares 
or more; and that have been concluded since the year 
2000. We also mostly consider land deals that imply the 
potential conversion of land from smallholder production, 
local community use, or important ecosystem service 
provision to commercial use. In this report, however, we 
also include those deals targeting land formerly used 
for commercial agriculture in order to ensure that LSLAs 
in Eastern Europe and parts of Latin America are not 
under-represented. To allow for meaningful comparisons 
across regions, we focus on transnational deals in the 
agricultural sector. While there has been an increase 
in the number of domestic and non-agricultural deals 
recorded in the database, the coverage of these data are 
not yet sufficiently developed. In addition, as intended 
and failed deals are inherently difficult to verify, unless 
specified otherwise, most numbers presented in this 
report only refer to concluded deals, given their high 
level of reliability. Concluded deals are defined as deals 
where we have credible reports about an oral agreement 
or a signed contract. Nevertheless, since other stages of 
the negotiation process do impact communities and have 
socio-economic and environmental effects, we dedicate 
certain parts of the report to the analysis of the evolution 
of LSLAs, including intended and failed deals.
Finally, deals are only included in our public database if 
the country is listed and there is information on at least 
one investor name, one data source, and either the 
intended, contracted, or operational size. This explains 
why our database is not exhaustive, although we strive to 
get much more precise and complete data on each deal 
where possible. We discuss data coverage limitations 
further in Chapter 1, Box 1.
This report is based on a snapshot of the data available 
in our database taken on 20 August 2020. Since the 
database is continuously updated and data quality 
improved, the exact numbers and information available 
in this report will differ from the information available on 
the website currently. Our data is open-access and can 
be accessed through www.landmatrix.org. Please refer 
to our frequently asked questions at www.landmatrix.
org/faq for a list of the countries we actively monitor, or 
to find out more about how we capture, analyse, verify, 
and use the data. 
1The first version of the database was launched in 2012.




More than 10 years after the surge in large-scale land 
acquisitions (LSLAs) in developing countries following the 
spike in agricultural commodity prices in the late 2000s, the 
Land Matrix Initiative has taken stock of the “global land 
rush” and its socio-economic and environmental impacts. 
Our findings draw on evidence from the Land Matrix 
database as well as a literature review in order to analyse 
and better understand the wide-ranging effects of LSLAs. 
The results of our review and complementary analyses are 
sobering, in part alarming. Compliance with the principles of 
responsible business conduct is rare, and scant consultation 
with the affected communities is common. The non-
consensual and uncompensated loss of land often comes 
with only little socio-economic benefits – be they employment, 
positive productivity spillovers, or infrastructure. “Business-
as-usual” continues to destroy rainforests, natural habitats, 
and biodiversity on the agricultural frontiers of the Amazon, 
Southeast Asia, and the Congo Basin. Although progress has 
been made with regard to land governance, a lack of policy 
implementation in this area is evident. This is particularly 
apparent from our assessment of the application of the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure (VGGTs) and the transparency of land acquisitions.
While the development community has different views on 
desirable or feasible patterns of rural development and 
which instruments, policies, and priorities are required to 
achieve this in a sustainable way – views which are echoed 
within the Land Matrix Initiative and among the authors of 
this report, based on the evidence we have collected, we 
have reached a consensus that, by and large, LSLAs have 
not delivered on their promises for rural development. 
As the ongoing implementation of LSLAs continues to pose 
significant threats to rural livelihoods and natural habitats, 
swift and decisive action is needed to protect both. To 
address the failings of LSLAs to date, we recommend policy 
changes in five priority areas: 
1. Land governance reforms and their effective 
implementation, based on the VGGTs, should be pursued 
and fast-tracked by governments. Implementation of and 
follow-up on the VGGTs should be made a prerequisite 
imposed by all donors and investor countries for land- and 
agricultural-related financial support or investments. In 
this way, key risks associated with LSLAs can be addressed 
and effective land policy reform assured. Policy compliance 
and effective implementation should be secured through 
national and local multi-stakeholder engagement platforms. 
Importantly, these platforms need to be strengthened and 
supported by governments and donors. 
2. Local development should take centre stage, with a 
focus on spillovers to and the inclusion of smallholder 
farmers. Not only do LSLAs need to comply with the 
principles of Responsible Investment in Agriculture and 
Food Systems (RAI), but host governments also need to 
develop and implement a strategic approach to rural 
development that pays more attention to local endogenous 
growth patterns and to positive spillovers for broad-based 
rural development. In particular, targeted measures 
should enhance benefits for smallholder farmers, and local 
development in affected areas should be prioritised. 
3. International investment treaties must integrate 
human rights and environmental provisions, and human 
rights due diligence should be mandatory. To change the 
conduct of businesses, human rights and environmental 
provisions that reflect the specific risks of LSLAs should be 
included in international investment treaties. Further, we 
support the introduction of mandatory sustainability due 
diligence legislation. However, such legislation can only lead 
to more responsible land-based investments if the affected 
populations are able to use it effectively in the context of 
LSLAs. Relatedly, it is of the utmost importance that the 
participation of citizens, parliaments, and civil society 
in discussions about the treaties and frameworks that 
concern human and other basic rights in LSLA contractual 
arrangements is supported and encouraged. 
4. LSLAs that lead to deforestation, the conversion of 
other valuable natural habitats, or damage important 
carbon stores such as peatlands need to be stopped. 
Host governments must develop comprehensive landscape 
plans that address the trade-offs between environmental, 
economic, and social objectives. Drastic action is urgently 
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required – for example, through moratoria. Such measures 
can be incentivised by the international community with 
benefits such as climate funding. Environmental governance 
around the risks associated with LSLAs, including the 
emergence of zoonotic diseases and declining water 
resources, also needs to be improved through stricter 
environmental impact assessments, broader planning 
approaches, and new methodologies. 
5. Binding commitments to increase transparency are 
needed, for all stakeholders. Transparency should be 
increased by, firstly, making it mandatory if public capital is 
involved; secondly, supporting independent transparency 
and monitoring initiatives; and thirdly, monitoring land 
ownership, land transactions, and land-use change at 
the local level. We call on all stakeholders to step up their 
efforts. Target countries should draw up transparent land-
based contracts guided by the VGGTs and RAIs; commodity 
fora should apply transparency requirements to their 
members; and donor countries should support independent 
transparency and monitoring initiatives, including those at 
the local level.
Main findings of the report
After a decade of gradually declining LSLAs, is a new 
land rush in the making? The analysis of the Land Matrix 
data presented in this report clearly reflects a surge in LSLAs 
in the wake of the commodity price hike of 2007/08, which 
saw investors hastening to secure land worldwide. This 
rush for land plateaued after 2010, and since 2013, deals 
totalling approximately 3 million hectares (ha) have been 
captured in the database compared to the total volume 
of 33 million ha for the 1 865 deals recorded by 2020 (of 
which 1 560 deals with 30 million ha are concluded). More 
moderate price expectations could be one reason for the 
slowdown in additional LSLAs after 2013, but policies have 
also changed. These include land moratoria in important 
target countries, dwindling support for first-generation 
biofuels, and restrictions on selling land to foreign investors in 
some cases. 
However, the pendulum may well swing back again as 
economies try to recover from the pandemic-induced 
economic crisis. Restrictions could be lifted and more 
favourable economic conditions – possibly a new “commodity 
super-cycle” driven by the post-COVID economic recovery 
– could once more accelerate global LSLAs. Indeed, some 
countries, including Indonesia and India, have already 
liberalised their land markets to attract foreign investments.
Land Matrix Analytical Report III
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Figure 0.1: Cumulative global contract size of concluded deals over time and size under production (left axis) and share of 




















Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. The lines show the upper and lower bound of the share of contract size (excl. failed deals) in production. The bars 
show the absolute size per negotiation status per year. Note that in addition to the accumulative size in production by 2020 there is an additional size in production 
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The slow but steady implementation of land deals can 
be observed, with many also being (re)negotiated, transferred, 
or abandoned. The report has also uncovered huge regional 
variation in implementation rates. Since 2012 – taking into 
consideration an upper- and lower-bound estimate due to 
incomplete information on the exact size of the area under 
production and the additional area under production without 
year information – we estimate that between 30% and 73% 
of the contracted land has been put into production. These 
figures show that the LSLAs documented by the Land Matrix 
since the year 2000 had, by 2020, put an area of somewhere 
between 8 million ha, comparable in size to Sierra Leone 
or Austria, and 21 million ha, equivalent in size to Ghana or 
Great Britain, into agricultural production. They also imply that 
between 9 million and 22 million ha of the 30 million ha of 
land currently acquired by investors have not yet been used 
for production. In many world regions, especially sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and Central Asia, deal 
implementation has been slow in the 10 years following the 
global land rush. 
Delays in land deals often result from long negotiation 
phases, while deal implementation proceeds quickly 
following deal conclusion. Although land deals remain in 
the negotiation phase for 6.6 years on average, once a deal 
is concluded, investors (in 64% of the cases) generally start 
production in the same year. The effects of the different 
timing and trajectories of land deals are not known, and 
the reasons for the delays are not always clear. In some 
cases, delays occur because careful consultation with local 
communities draws out the process, but in others, they are 
due to technical and management challenges on the part 
of investors.
Deal failures are significant and grounded in the 
jatropha hype and other ill-conceived investments. 
The hasty acquisition of land (often that which is used by 
local farmers and pastoralists) for ill-planned projects in the 
aftermath of price spikes led to a significant number of project 
failures, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which accounted 
for half of all failed deals. Failed deals may cause lasting harm, 
especially if they involve conflicts over land. The reasons for 
failed deals vary, from miscalculations and misconceptions in 
planning and management to “realities on the ground”, which 
include financing problems, the underestimation of set-up 
costs, and agronomic difficulties. However, one crop stands 
out as “attracting” such problems: 50% of the deals intended 
for jatropha cultivation, again mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, 
have failed to date. 
LSLAs are related to big global business that focuses on 
international commodity markets. Oil palm-related LSLAs 
recorded in the Land Matrix database account for more than 
20% of the area currently cultivated with this crop worldwide, a 
share which is also well above the 10% (of currently cultivated 
area) for rubber and sugar beet and the 5% for sugar cane. 
This demonstrates how substantially LSLAs have already 
added or will add to the global production of these crops. For 
staple crops, on the other hand, the shares are much lower. 
Estimates reveal, for example, that fully implemented LSLAs 
for maize, rice, or wheat would make up less than 1% of the 
globally cultivated area. However, in absolute terms these 
crops still cover large tracts of land – approximately 2 million 
ha each for maize and wheat. 
Investors are diverse and truly global, originating from 
the North, the South, and tax havens. In addition to 
hailing from both the global North and the global South, many 
investors operate through investment hubs, many of them tax 
havens, thus obscuring their “real” origin. This explains why 
the top-10 investor origins include countries such as Cyprus 
(in fourth place), Singapore (seventh place), the British Virgin 
Islands (eighth place) and Hong Kong (ninth place). Other top 
investor countries are developing countries with competitive 
agricultural sectors, like Brazil and Malaysia, and high-income 
countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the 
United States. China also features, having climbed up the 
ladder to third place among the top investor nations over 
the last few years. However, contrary to the widely held belief 
that sub-Saharan Africa is the primary target for investors 
from China, only 23% of deals with Chinese investors actually 
occurred in this region. In fact, Chinese investors are far more 
active in neighbouring countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and 
Myanmar, with 54% of deals with Chinese involvement taking 
place in one of these three countries. 
LSLAs occur regardless of the degree of land tenure 
security. While the literature confirms that land tenure 
security clearly plays a role in investors’ interest in specific deals, 
no linear relationship exists between the locational choice 
of investors and land tenure systems at the country level. In 
contrast to the case for other forms of foreign investment, 
land-based investments can frequently be found in countries 
with weak institutions. Indeed, in such contexts, LSLAs may lead 
to increased corruption and competition for land, particularly 
with locals whose land rights are less protected.
The land targeted by investors is often already used 
by smallholders, leading to competition over land and 
displacement without consultation or compensation. 
According to current Land Matrix data, in at least 18% of 
concluded deals, the land (or part of the land) was previously 
or is currently used for smallholder agriculture, pastoralism, 
or shifting cultivation. When combined with weak tenure 
security, this frequently leads to one of the most adverse 
outcomes of LSLAs: the displacement of local communities. 
Such displacement, as well as other forms of conflict, could be 
avoided through proper consultation. However, as the report 
Land Matrix Analytical Report III
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shows, consultation on LSLAs is inadequate in most cases. 
Indeed, for the more than 250 deals globally for which the 
Land Matrix has information on consultation, only 15% report 
that free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) was given, while 
almost 45% report no consultation whatsoever.
LSLAs often exacerbate the weaknesses of land 
governance systems since they affect tenure security and 
the perception of it, particularly with regard to customary 
land and collective land rights. Indeed, the exclusion of local 
communities from their land, as well as from the decision-
making processes and institutions governing the land, are 
putting enormous strain on land rights and governance 
systems. In many countries in Africa, for example, customary 
rights will be lost permanently, often leaving institutional 
voids. LSLAs can also induce institutional, structural, and 
practice-based changes, such as contract farming or tenure 
formalisation, which may reinforce pre-existing inequalities 
that fuel land insecurity and conflicts. 
The emerging evidence on the socio-economic development 
impacts of LSLAs suggests that the rural development 
expectations have remained largely unfulfilled and that 
the promises of jobs, rural infrastructure, and positive spillovers 
to smallholders have been broken, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. There is only limited employment creation due to 
the low labour intensity of production on most large-
scale farms. Depending on the crops and locations, our 
assessment of the effect of LSLAs on the quantity of rural 
jobs highlights that the net employment effects of large farms 
may be relatively small, or even negative, when LSLAs replace 
smallholder farms. Only highly labour-intensive crops, such 
as vegetables and roses, can replicate the labour intensity of 
smallholder farms (estimated at two permanent jobs per ha) at 
scale. In contrast, highly mechanised production – for example, 
in South America – employs one worker on approximately 100 
ha, while semi-mechanised production in India employs one 
worker on approximately 7 ha. 
Only a few crops generate significant employment. 
One such crop is oil palm, the cultivation of which is relatively 
labour intensive. Since this crop covers large tracts of land in 
Southeast Asia in particular, and increasingly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it could potentially create close to one million jobs 
worldwide if the LSLAs are fully implemented. Rubber, another 
relatively labour-intensive crop, could generate up to 200 
000 jobs in Southeast Asia, while in Latin America, sugar cane 
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Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. For the selected crops and regions, the total area is 13 168 545 ha.  
Only concluded deals are included, with the exception of abandoned deals. We only show data for crops with a potential employment creation larger than 















could create a further 300 000 potential jobs. The employment 
impact of other crops is generally lower at the country or global 
level, either due to the relatively small area, as is the case for 
cocoa, coffee, and tea, or due to low labour intensity, as is the 
case for most staple crops such as barley, sorghum, teff, and 
wheat. Most rural labour markets will therefore not benefit 
significantly from transnational LSLAs, except in some less 
densely populated countries – for instance, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Gabon, Laos, Namibia, and Papua New 
Guinea – where LSLAs hold some promise because the job 
creation potential relative to the labour force is high. On 
average, though, less than 0.5% of the national workforce will 
be employed on acquired land in most countries.
LSLAs are not a remedy for precarious labour 
markets since temporary and underpaid jobs prevail. 
The limited evidence focusing on LSLA job quality indicates 
a trend towards less permanent salaried work, except for 
the few management positions, and a greater reliance on 
casual temporary work. While these temporary jobs may help 
diversify the income portfolio of the local population, they can 
only serve as an additional source of income alongside other 
permanent sources of income. Nevertheless, exceptions to this 
rather bleak assessment have been documented, including 
formal work in Kenya’s horticultural sector and in selected 
soya production projects in Mozambique. It is important to 
note that there is often a gender dimension to LSLA labour 
demand. For example, while horticultural production in Kenya 
and Ethiopia predominantly uses unskilled female labour, oil 
palm (Indonesia) and sugar cane production (Liberia) is more 
male labour intensive.
Positive spillovers to smallholders are rare due to the 
inadaptability of capital intensive and scale-dependent 
new technologies. Evidence on spillovers from newly 
established large-scale farms for grains and staples in sub-
Saharan Africa suggests that they are extremely limited, and 
only moderately positive overall. This holds in particular for 
crops with larger yield gaps between smallholders and large-
scale farms, such as maize production in Zambia where 
smallholder yields increased by 20% if farms were located near 
large-scale farms. In the oil palm sector on the other hand, 
smallholders, particularly in Southeast Asia, quickly took up 
the newly introduced oil palm, given that it is highly profitable 
even on a small scale. In Indonesia, smallholders currently 
account for over 40% of the total oil palm area. However, in 
many cases, new technologies are not adaptable to the small 
plots, limited budgets, and traditional skillsets of smallholder 
farmers. Although contract farming arrangements can help 
overcome some of these constraints, such arrangements 
are only found in 15% of the concluded deals captured in 
the database. Moreover, contract farming may not always be 
beneficial for smallholder farmers because of unequal risk-
sharing and high costs. There is also very little evidence on 
spillovers through local land, labour, and product markets, 
such as the depression of local crop prices for staples such 
as maize. Indeed, there is some evidence from West Africa 
on potentially adverse impacts on local smallholder farmers 
through the labour market due to increased wages for 
hired labour.
The expectation that large-scale land-based 
investment would improve social and physical 
infrastructure has remained unfulfilled. 
Just 15% of the concluded deals recorded in the Land Matrix 
have information on the benefits promised in terms of 
infrastructure development, and of these, in only half of the 
cases have these benefits actually materialised on the ground. 
Even so, these data should be interpreted with caution due 
to potential under-reporting. Furthermore, LSLAs bring little to 
no tax revenue. Companies are often exempted from customs 
duties, income, and excise taxes, and sometimes even receive 
subsidies. If at all, tax revenue comes from the one-off sale 
of licenses and concessions. In fact, some companies even 
“optimise” taxes, for example, in Ukraine, where Land Matrix 
data reveals that countries such as Cyprus and Luxemburg, 
which are known for low corporate taxes, are the primary 
location of investors.
Under specific conditions, LSLAs can lead to poverty 
reduction, but the bulk of them do not. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, the evidence suggests that the effects of LSLAs on 
poverty will be very limited, if not poverty-augmenting. In Asia, 
however, empirical evidence suggests that the oil palm sector, 
the primary target of investments according to the Land Matrix, 
has lifted millions of Indonesians out of poverty, while in Laos, 
LSLAs focused on various crops have contributed to poverty 
reduction. Both cases suggest that LSLAs are associated with 
poverty reduction when smallholders are included, farmers in 
the target region have the skillset to adopt the newly introduced 
crops and technologies, , and LSLAs do not compete for 
smallholder and pastoral lands. The latter, however, often 
means that LSLAs encroach on non-agricultural land, such as 
forests, as has been widely documented with respect to the oil 
palm sector.
Local elites often control the redistribution of land, 
thereby reinforcing inequality. LSLAs have, to date, 
received little attention in terms of their inequality effects. On 
the one hand, there is some evidence that local elites can take 
advantage of the redistribution of land or compensation, thus 
reinforcing pre-existing inequalities. On the other hand, recent 
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research indicates that employment and labour market effects 
could favour relatively poor households with little land, which 
may have positive distributional effects. 
LSLAs have a limited impact on food security and 
cause competition for land to increase. Export-oriented 
LSLAs, particularly when related to biofuel production, have 
often been associated with threats to food security in target 
countries as they compete with food production for scarce 
resources. The empirical evidence on such effects is, however, 
ambiguous. For example, at the household level, the effect of 
specialised cash crop production on local dietary diversity is 
negative, but the effect tends to be small in size. In addition, 
positive income effects, such as income from cash crops or 
wage employment, partly counteract the potential losses in 
dietary diversity. Still, in certain settings where food markets 
are not easily accessible and income-generating activities are 
rare, on-farm production diversity may remain important for 
local food security.
LSLAs continue to be a key deforestation threat. LSLAs 
are a core driver of land-use change, contribute substantially 
to deforestation, habitat destruction, and land degradation, 
and, consequently, are associated with massive losses of 
biodiversity and high carbon emissions, particularly when 
tropical rainforests are affected. This grim assessment is 
supported by our own analysis, which combines Land Matrix 
data on international LSLAs with data on forest cover. Looking 
at data from 964 geo-located land deals in tropical regions 
with a total contract area of 19 million ha, we have found, for 
example, that whereas approximately 9.4 million ha were still 
forested in 2000, this area had been reduced by 20.2% (1.9 
million ha) by 2019.
East Asia shows continued forest loss, tropical rainforests 
are at risk in sub-Saharan Africa, and old and new 
agricultural frontiers have emerged in Latin America. 
Some LSLA target countries, including Brazil and Indonesia, 
have been hotspots for deforestation for decades, but LSLAs 
have also created new deforestation frontiers worldwide. In 
East Asia and the Pacific, for instance, approximately 74% of the 
area around the location of the deals was still forested in 2000, 
a share which has declined by 16 percentage points over the 
past 20 years (mainly through oil palm expansions in Malaysia 
and Indonesia, but also through new agricultural frontiers in 
Cambodia, China, Laos, and Vietnam). Although deforestation 
rates have generally been lower in sub-Saharan Africa to date, 
partly due to the slower pace of LSLA implementation, tropical 
rainforests in Africa are presently also at risk. This is particularly 
the case at new frontiers, with huge deforestation threats in 
the Congo Basin and West Africa (specifically in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone) – often supported by deliberate 
government policies.
Of grave concern, many deforestation impacts from 
LSLAs are still expected. Our spatial analysis shows that, 
based on a 50% tree-cover threshold, approximately 39% of 
the total LSLA area was still forested in 2019; however, as many 
LSLAs begin to move into implementation, an imminent threat 
for remaining forests looms. With increasing deforestation 
and damage to other ecosystems, biodiversity is equally 
affected. Our data shows that 87% of LSLAs are located in 
regions of medium-to-high terrestrial biodiversity, of which 
39% fall, at least partially, within biodiversity hotspot areas. 
The current pattern of LSLAs, which generally sees deals 
concentrated in tropical areas (where endemic diversity is 
higher), is harming global biodiversity far more than if these 
deals were located in more temperate climates. The link 
between LSLAs and pandemic risks is another reason 
for concern. Several mechanisms accompanying agricultural 
deals may contribute to the emergence of zoonotic diseases, 
and whole outbreaks of these diseases are seldom, if ever, 
factored in when assessing the benefits and costs of agricultural 
investments. Initial estimates indicate that the costs of a change 
in policies by creating incentives that reduce deforestation and 
wildlife trade – and thus the risk of pandemics – could be low 
compared to the cost of a pandemic.
LSLAs frequently produce crops requiring a large 
amount of water – even in dryland zones. Water resources 
are an important dimension of the potential environmental 
consequences of land acquisitions, as starkly illustrated by 
the fact that 54% of all deals recorded in the Land Matrix 
database are intended to produce water-intensive crops, 
including cotton, oil palm, rubber, and sugar cane. Worse yet, 
34% of these deals take place in dryland zones, with 10% of 
them producing crops that require large amounts of water. 
The intensive use of water for LSLAs can also have negative 
environmental impacts in humid areas due to significant 
changes in the hydrological cycle through the conversion of 
rainforests to agricultural land. However, in many dryland 
areas, such as the Nile region, water-intensive crops like 
cotton, fodder, potatoes, and sugarcane have the added issue 
of being likely to cause increased competition and conflict 
between different users, sectors, and even countries.
This report clearly shows the urgent need to rethink 
LSLAs. The current practices of large-scale agricultural 
investments need to be transformed into responsible and 
sustainable contributions to economic and social development 
that respect human rights and the environment. In addition, 
our report shows the necessity of promoting broad-based 
rural development and endogenous growth patterns with 
clear priority given to smallholder development. In order to 
achieve these goals, fundamental changes in the conduct 
of both domestic and international businesses, as well as 
dedicated and targeted efforts by investor and host-country 
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governments, are required. Although progress has been 
made with the VGGTS and RAIs, much remains to be done at 
all levels, from global to local, to effectively ensure that land 
rights are protected, social development in target regions is 
enhanced, and the environment is respected.
The implementation of the VGGTs and associated 
principles at the country and deal level remains low. Our 
analysis shows that in Africa, for instance, almost one-third of 
the deals assessed do not comply with the VGGT guidelines 
and standards at all, and only 25% are considered to have 
achieved the minimum compliance. Additional analyses 
on the transparency of land deals in other regions show a 
similar picture.
LSLAs remain opaque due to the lack of information 
emanating from the local level in target regions, as 
well as investors, including those from the bigger and 
Figure 0.3: Water demand categories of crops cultivated in LSLAs and dryland zones
Outside 
dryland area

































Notes: Water demand categories based on Johansson et al. (2016) (High: > 8 500 m3/ha; Low: <= 8 500 m3/ha; NA: Crop demand not classified). Map background 
showing different dryland zones (in grey). LSLAs: n=1 568.




All governments need to pursue and fast-track land 
governance reforms and their effective implementation 
based on the VGGTs.
Recommendation 2:
Governments should utilise national and local multi-stakeholder 
engagement platforms to ensure policy compliance with regard 
to land management and investment. 
Recommendation 3:
Land deals and their related projects need to comply with RAI 
principles and put local development centre stage. 
Recommendation 4:
Governments need to develop and implement a strategic 
approach for land-based investments that pays more attention 
to positive spillovers for broad-based rural development, 
particularly through spillovers to and inclusion of smallholder 
farmers. 
Recommendation 5:
Human and other basic rights (right to food, right to water, right 
to land), as well as aspects related to the environment, need to 
be included in international investment treaties. 
Recommendation 6:
Mandatory human and other basic rights due diligence 
legislation should be introduced and affected populations 
should be empowered to effectively use such legislation in the 
context of LSLAs.
Recommendation 7:
LSLAs that lead to (or might lead to if implemented) deforestation, 
the destruction of other valuable natural resources or habitats, 
or damage to important carbon stores need to be stopped. 
Recommendation 8:
Governments should develop comprehensive landscape plans 
that address the trade-offs between environmental, economic, 
and social objectives, and in which the purpose, role, and 
dimensions of LSLAs are clarified. 
Recommendation 9:
All actors engaged in large-scale agricultural investment projects 
must increase transparency; indeed, when public capital is 
involved, it should be made compulsory. 
Recommendation 10:
Donor countries should provide a mandate to and support 
independent transparency and monitoring initiatives.
Recommendation 11:
All countries should, at the local level, continuously monitor 
land ownership and control, land transactions, and land-use 
change.
most developed countries, failing on transparency. 
Even though some publicly accessible information regarding 
LSLAs is provided by companies and governments from G20 
member states, detailed analysis of Land Matrix data shows 
that the operating company is known in less than 20% of deals, 
the exact location of the land investments is communicated to 
the public in only 15% of all G20 deals, and less than 10% of 
investors publish the purchase price or leasing fee. Regardless 
of prior efforts by the G20, to date its member states are no 
more transparent on average than non-G20 investing and 
target regions. Indeed, despite the continuous and rigorous 
efforts of the Land Matrix Initiative over the last 10 years, the 
persistent shortcomings in the data confirm that there is a 
dearth of reliable information around the processes of LSLAs, 
in all countries.
Our report provides 11 specific policy recommendations 
for the road ahead.
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Taking stock:




After 10 years of intensive data collection following the hype 
around large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs), we take stock of 
their impacts across the world.
This chapter provides an important introduction to the 
analytical report, outlining how the land rush unfolded in the 
wake of a spike in the late 2000s. It also lays the ground for 
the chapters that follow, which explore the impact of LSLAs in 
the context of land governance and the effect on wider socio-
economic development and the environment. We conclude 
the report with policy recommendations. 
The extent of the impact of LSLAs depends on various factors. 
Firstly, size matters. How much land is acquired, and how 
much of it is converted into agricultural land, has a bearing 
on the global, national, and local relevance of LSLAs – with 
all their potential opportunities and threats. Opportunities 
can be shaped by local or national development through 
job creation, higher productivity in agriculture, or improved 
environmental efficiency. Threats accrue from increased 
pressure on and competition for land and water, loss of 
livelihoods of disadvantaged populations, or negative 
environmental externalities, all of which directly depend on 
the number and size of LSLAs.
Secondly, the negotiation and implementation paths of land 
deals influence whether they elicit positive or negative effects 
in targeted regions. For example, moving into production 
swiftly following transparent negotiations of land deals makes 
positive development impulses more likely, but only if deals are 
operational. On the other hand, long, arduous, and conflictive 
negotiations or deal failures hamper positive outcomes. It is 
therefore crucial to understand these dynamics, as well as 
the drivers of success and failure. 
Thirdly, the global and local implications of LSLAs largely 
depend on the type of crop production taking place on the 
acquired land. This is because, in principle, LSLAs can lower 
local food prices and improve the access to food, but only if 
the type of production reflects local food baskets, as opposed 
to being targeted at pure production for export markets. 
Finally, the origin and type of investors can influence the 
effects on target regions. For example, some investors of 
certain origins, such as China or Saudi Arabia, show lower 
levels of transparency around land negotiations (Flachsbarth 
et al., 2020); a pre-condition for including local populations 
and, potentially, local acceptance. Similarly, different investor 
types – from different origins – come with different investment 
objectives. While some investors, from global private equity 
firms to domestic urban elites, may have purely speculative 
motives, other investors, some of which are supported 
by development institutions, may focus on creating 
positive spillover effects for affected population groups in 
targeted countries. 
1.1. The land boom that levelled off
The Land Matrix database has captured 1 865 transnational 
agricultural deals globally, of which 1 560 are concluded.  This 
corresponds to a total targeted size of more than 33 million 
hectares (ha), of which 30 million ha are concluded2. The 
10 most important target countries according to contract 
size are, in descending order, Indonesia, Ukraine, Russia, 
Brazil, Papua New Guinea, Argentina, Philippines, Ethiopia, 
Myanmar, South Sudan, and Ghana. As the Land Matrix 
is likely to under-report large-scale land deals in certain 
countries and regions, interpretation of numbers should be 
treated with caution (see Box 1 at the end of Chapter 1 for 
details on under-reported regions in the database). 
The Land Matrix database has captured 1 865 
transnational agricultural deals globally
This corresponds to a total targeted size of 
more than 33 million hectares
2The terminology used by the Land Matrix for, among others, transnational deals as well as the methods applied are defined in Box 1 at the end of Chapter 1.
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A new land rush in the making?
Although the Land Matrix data may somewhat under-report 
transnational deals that occurred in the early 2000s, Figure 
1.1 clearly shows the “global rush for land” (Arezki et al., 
2015; Cotula, 2012) was already underway, triggered in part 
by the food price spikes of 2007/08 and the expectation of 
permanently higher prices for agricultural commodities. It is 
important to note, however, that a significant number of land-
based investment projects that were initiated during this time 
later failed, which we discuss in more detail further in this 
section. Fewer deals have been concluded since 2015, and 
while more moderate price expectations may partly explain 
why, this slowdown is also rooted in the policy sphere, such 
as Brazil’s soy moratorium (2006), Indonesia’s moratorium 
on forest clearance (2011), and dwindling support for first-
generation biofuels (Chiaramonti et al., 2021; Gibbs et al., 
2015). In addition, several countries restricted the selling 
of land to foreign investors, which is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. Even so, these restrictions may well be 
lifted, and some countries, including Indonesia and India, 
have already liberalised their land markets again to attract 
foreign investments (Rights and Resources Initiative, 2020). 
Moreover, more favourable economic conditions – possibly 
a new “commodity super-cycle” driven by post-COVID 
recovery – could accelerate global LSLAs once again. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 1.1, which reveals that, although the 
number of intended deals stagnated in 2019 and the first half 
of 2020, investors still continue to negotiate a considerable 
number (163) of acquisitions.
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. The number of concluded and failed deals are under-reported in this dynamic illustration (as compared to the 
static ‘current’ number of deals per negotiation status) because deals for which information on the specific year relating to the negotiation status is lacking are 
excluded. Conversely, the number of intended deals is slightly over-reported because the few deals which have been concluded in an unknown year are included 
here as ‘intended’. For detailed information on how the dynamics are calculated, see Box 1.
Number intended
Failed (negotiations failed, contract cancelled)
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Figure 1.1: Cumulative number of deals globally in each negotiation status
Fewer deals have been concluded since 2015
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In Figure 1.2, which provides a global overview of the 
implementation dynamics of concluded deals, we see that 
even though many increasingly entered the production phase, 
a substantial number of deals are still not operating or never 
go into production. This is important in view of the fact that 
most potential impacts of LSLAs, both adverse and beneficial, 
hinge on the implementation of deals (the socio-economic 
and environmental consequences of implemented land deals 
are discussed in depth in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively). 
Nevertheless, some impacts of LSLAs already begin to 
emerge in the early phases of projects. For example, opaque 
negotiations commonly pose threats to local communities 
using that land (examined in detail in Chapter 2). 
In order to understand local impacts, it is important to be 
aware of deal dynamics. The following sections therefore 
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Figure 1.2: Cumulative number of concluded deals globally in each implementation status
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Although there are 1,099 concluded deals currently in operation, the number of operating deals in this dynamic 
illustration only adds up to 669 due to missing implementation year information, indicating that this should be interpreted as a lower bound. Likewise, the number 
of abandoned deals is under-reported in the dynamic illustration, but the accumulative number of projects not yet started and in start-up phase are almost 
exactly reflected in the dynamic statistics. For detailed information on how the dynamics are calculated, see Box 1.
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Measuring the land area of LSLAs is not straightforward. 
Land acquisitions are dynamic processes, in which the size 
intended by an investor often exceeds the actual contract 
size once negotiations are complete. Moreover, reliable size 
information is often lacking, especially the size in operation, 
which can change over time, while up-to-date, spatially explicit 
information on implementation size is rarely provided by 
investors or governments. To tackle this information gap, the 
Land Matrix has taken steps to incorporate geospatial data and 
to use remote sensing data more systematically (see Box 2). 
Slow but steady implementation with huge regional variation
BOX 2:
Mapathon and geodata
In 2020, as part of our efforts to constantly improve the 
quantity and quality of deals in the database by using highly 
accurate location information, we conducted a Mapathon to 
refine the delineation of deals using Google Earth. Through 
the Mapathon, we identified all deals in the database with 
high location spatial accuracy, that is, exact coordinates or 
location, amounting to 1 159 deals, of which we were able 
to delineate 34% with high accuracy. More than half of the 
359 delineated deals are located in Africa and almost all are 
currently in operation. 
The Mapathon showed us how initiatives like these have 
the potential to address multiple objectives: improving 
the delineation of deals using accessible satellite imagery 
through Google Earth; evaluating the quality of the spatial 
information within the database; building capacity by 
using software that requires no background in geographic 
information systems (GIS) or cartography; and using it as a 
tool for future data collection. 
The Mapathon also demonstrated useful insights in the use 
of geodata within the Land Matrix. Geodata, particularly 
time-series of satellite images, has the potential to support 
tasks like monitoring of deal implementation status. 







Autumn 2011 Autumn 2013 Summer 2014 Autumn 2016 Autumn 2019
Note: The blue border depicts the contract area of deal #7143.
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The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer 
(MODIS), for example, provides daily satellite imagery across 
the globe at 250 metre resolution since 2001 which can be 
used to monitor vegetation dynamics. Changes that occurred 
within the Land Matrix inventory of deals can also be 
observed retrospectively, verified using anecdotal medium 
to high resolution satellite images, and complemented 
by the data gathered by reporters on the ground. Such 
remote monitoring systems can be especially valuable in 
cases where access on the ground is limited. For instance, 
Figure 1.3 shows persistent vegetation greenness phenology 
anomalies within a deal close to the shore of Lake Victoria, 
Uganda (deal #7143) – an indicator for within-deal dynamics. 
Since operations started in 2013, the Chinese investors’ rice 
farm has continually increased its area of operation into the 
wetlands around the lake as illustrated by the medium to high 
resolution satellite images, which highlight the verification 
potential by comparing statistics and spatial patterns. 
For instance, few anomalies occur before 2013, followed 
by some change in 2013, no dynamics in 2014, and then 
increased dynamics after 2015 – a sign of expansion from 
west (2016) to east (2019).
Using the deal extents derived in the Mapathon, such 
approaches can contribute to a continuous near-real-
time monitoring of deal implementation. The Land Matrix, 
connecting a repository with a large inventory of deals with 
in-country experience on the ground and near-real time 
remote sensing data thus shows new ways of monitoring 
LSLAs across the globe. Furthermore, where political or 
financial interests or other limiting factors have stood in 
the way of Land Matrix reporters, satellite data can fill 
in the gaps.
The area under LSLA-contracts increased most quickly 
between 2006 and 2013, as depicted in Figure 1.4, but since 
then, “only” about 3 million ha have been added to this global 
aggregate – in line with the previous observations. Figure 1.4 
for this share, assuming that all known operational deals were 
under production on their entire contracted area.
The results of this exercise demonstrate that before the 
year 2007, the share of concluded deals in production was 
relatively high. With the land rush, the implementation rate 
drops considerably, possibly because projects were not 
well-prepared or investors were less experienced. Yet, since 
2012, at least one-quarter of contracted land has been 
put into production. Our upper-bound estimate of 45% 
suggests that actual implementation might be substantially 
higher. This means that the LSLAs documented by the Land 
Matrix since 2000 have, by 2020, put an area somewhere 
between 8 million ha, an area comparable in size to Sierra 
Leone or Austria, and 21 million ha, equivalent in size 
to Ghana or Great Britain, into agricultural production4. 
On the other hand, it implies that of the currently 
30 million ha of agricultural land acquired globally by 
investors, between 9 and 22 million ha have yet to be used 
for production.  
also illustrates the implementation dynamics, despite relying 
on incomplete data. Of the 1 099 concluded deals that are 
reported to be under production, 589 provide information 
on the area under production3. We use this information for 
the dotted line in Figure 1.4, which we interpret as a lower 
bound of the share of the contracted area under production. 
We also compute an upper-bound estimate – the solid line – 
3These and the following numbers include the size information we have for 2020 as well as the size information for which we are lacking a concrete implementation year, 
but for which we know that it is the most current status.
4The number of hectares result from the sum of hectares in production in 2020 plus the remaining hectares without exact implementation year information available 
(but known as currently under production).
...of agricultural land acquired globally by 
investors, between 9 and 22 million ha have 
yet to be used for production  
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These global aggregates may conceal important regional 
differences. For example, Figure 1.5 illustrates the regionally 
disaggregated total contract size of concluded deals divided 
into the size in production and the unimplemented size. 
The total acquired area has stagnated around 7.3 million 
ha in sub-Saharan Africa, 6 million ha in Latin America, and 
8.6 million ha in Asia and Pacific since the early 2010s. Only 
in Europe and Central Asia has the aggregate area under 
contract continued to increase by 25% overall in the last five 
years, to 7.3 million ha in total. This also holds for the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, although at a very low 
absolute level. The minor relevance of the MENA region is 
not surprising, since this region is largely water scarce, and 
therefore less suitable for agricultural production5. 
Figure 1.5 also shows that the implementation size – defined 
as the area that is put into agricultural production – varies 
across regions. With 4.7 million ha under production (out of 
6 million ha under contract), the implementation rate (79%) 
is particularly high in Latin America. This corresponds to 
0.7% of the entire agricultural area, including livestock area, 
on the South American continent. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
Asia, and MENA, an increasing number of deals have come 
into operation too. This drives our upper-bound estimates 
for share of the area under production to above 50% in the 
MENA region, 39% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 30% in Asia, yet 
the actual confirmed share of area under production remains 
at roughly 5% in all three regions. In contrast, in Europe and 
Central Asia, the addition of new deals has caused the share 
of area under production to fall in recent years to 20% of 
contract area in production. However, in absolute terms, the 
implemented area size in this region has also increased by 
1.5 million ha over the last five years.
This shows that in many parts of the world, but particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Pacific, and Europe and Central 
Asia, deal implementation has been slow in the 10 years since 




















Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. The lines show the upper and lower bound of the share of contract size (excl. failed deals) in production. The bars 
show the absolute size per negotiation status per year. Note that in addition to the accumulative size in production by 2020 there is an additional size in production 

























Figure 1.4: Cumulative global contract size of concluded deals over time and size under production (left axis) and share of 
concluded size under production (right axis)
Size in production upper bound
Contract size of concluded deals 
Share of concluded area in production  
(lower bound)
Size in production lower bound











































































































   










   
   










   
   
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   





   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
   
   
   
   







   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
   
   
   
   
   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




5The total agricultural land area equals 1.01 billion ha in sub-Saharan Africa, 710 million ha in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1.43 billion ha in Asia and Pacific, 1 
billion ha in Europe and Central Asia, and 370 million ha in the MENA region. This translates into a share of agricultural land targeted by LSLAs between 0.25% and 1%.
In many parts of the world, but particularly 
in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Pacific, 
and Europe and Central Asia, deal 
implementation has been slow in the
10 years since the land rush
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Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. The lower bound share of concluded area under production only considers those deals for which the Land Matrix 
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Figure 1.5: Cumulative contract size of operational deals over time per region 
Area under production (Lower bound) Unimplemented size
Area under production (Upper bound) Unimplemented size
Land Matrix Analytical Report III
26
1.2. From intention to implementation or failure: The pace and dynamics of land deals
The large gap between the upper- and lower-bound estimate 
of share of contract area in production leaves us with some 
uncertainly about the real extent of implementation. One 
reason for the gap is the dearth of information on the exact 
size in production, even though we do know that many deals 
are in operation. However, this gap can also be explained by 
the fact that investors often deliberately do not fully develop 
the entire contract land. This may happen because setup 
and production (operational and input) costs are higher 
than anticipated, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. For 
instance, in Zimbabwe, the lack of stable electricity and water 
supply that hindered production expansion (deal #4924) 
on one grain farm in turn ceased other planned plantations 
elsewhere in the country by the same investor. In Sudan, 
on the other hand, when the 10 000 ha plantation leased in 
2013 by private company Jenaan Investment from the United 
Arab Emirates (of which 2 000 ha are implemented) for the 
production of Rhodes grass, Sudan grass, alfalfa, and corn 
suffered from poor soil composition, thus creating yield 
gaps, a technical advisory group was put in place to improve 
soil quality with the aim of increasing production levels and 
lowering operational costs (deal #2293). Investors often also 
aim for bigger land areas due to high transaction costs in the 
negotiation process. In other words, the relatively low land 
prices are only part of the total costs of land acquisitions. 
Therefore, if the investment turns out to be successful, the 
investors have additional land available at no additional 
transaction costs. At the same times, this setup frequently 
leads to large areas of acquired, but unused, land. 
Another reason for the gap between concluded contracts 
and the area under production is that international investors 
sometimes plan to not produce on the entire contract area, 
but rather set aside some area for conservational purposes. 
This is often the case for large palm oil deals which are 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) certified6. Under 
RSPO certification, land that contains or supports High 
Conservation Values (HCVs) cannot be cleared for production. 
For example, Olam International Ltd has several palm oil 
deals in Gabon which include areas with HCVs. In deal #7626, 
18 323 ha out of the total contract size of 35 354 ha have been 
set aside (52%), while in deal #2236, the investor set aside 
12 482 ha for conservation areas and buffer zones out of a 
total 20 030 ha. However, compliance with these regulations 
may well be imperfect. For example, some investors, such as 
First Resources in Kalimantan, Indonesia (deal #4162), have 
been accused of clearing such conservation areas despite 
RSPO registration7. 
These insights on implementation illustrate that land deals 
go through a range of project phases at varying speeds. 
Some will be implemented quickly, others very slowly; still 
others may fail entirely, sometimes without even a contract 
signed. What these different paths mean in terms of impacts 
is difficult to predict, but they will be related to underlying 
mechanisms. Delayed implementation, for example, may 
result from careful consultation with local communities or 
from technical and management challenges for the investor. 
If the latter explains why a project fails, effects may be less 
severe than a failure rooted in local land conflicts that may 
persist even though the project may never have commenced. 
In other words, failed deals may leave scars. Even rumours 
about the arrival of foreign investors can have real impacts, 
such as on perceived and even actual land tenure security (see 
Chapter 2). Then there are the many impacts that unfold once 
operations are established, and land is put into agricultural 
use. These include the loss of access to land (see Chapter 
2), employment opportunities, access to infrastructure and 
productivity spillovers (see Chapter 3), and environmental 
effects, such as deforestation and water impacts (see Chapter 
4). There is also “reverse causality” at work – that is, how the 
potential and perceived impacts of an LSLA influence a deal’s 
trajectory. For example, early local protests against a “land 
grab” triggered by ill-informed rumours may quickly defy any 
well-intentioned project. 
6Principle 5 of the RSPO principles and criteria for sustainable palm oil production relates to environmental responsibility and conservation of natural resources and 
biodiversity. Criterion 5.2 states that HCV habitats within plantations must be identified and managed accordingly (protected). HCVs are biological, ecological, social 
or cultural values of outstanding significance or critical importance within a landscape (RSPO, 2017). Certain forestry deals which apply the Forestry Stewardship 
Certification (FSC) also conserve HCVs.
7For other examples of HCV deals, see Land Matrix deals #2236, #4162, #4934, #7626, #1393, and #178.
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As demonstrated in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, the majority 
of deals are concluded, but new deals enter the database 
as intentions. In 2020, there were 163 such intended deals 
without an official agreement between the parties.8 On 
average, land deals remain in the negotiation phase for 
6.6 years.9 The median intended time is five years, which 
shows that the mean is biased slightly upwards. Deals are, 
on average, concluded quickest after four years (median 
three years) in Europe and Central Asia, while in Asia and the 
Pacific and the MENA region, deals are on average concluded 
after eight years’ of negotiation (median nine and eight years, 
respectively). In Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, deals 
take an average of six years until they are concluded (median 
four and five years, respectively).
Even after the deal is finally concluded, there is sometimes a 
time lag until the deal is implemented.  Earlier studies argue 
that deal implementation could take years after the deal is 
concluded (Brüntrup, 2014). However, although it may take 
time to mobilise the required capital and the former land use 
does have a bearing, the most recent Land Matrix data shows 
that, by contrast, 64% of global deals are implemented in the 
same year as the contract is concluded (see Table 1.1). For 
instance, only 32 out of 687 concluded deals in production 
needed more than five years to become productive – albeit 
with regional differences. For example, sub-Saharan Africa 
and the MENA region show slower implementation, while 
production starts more quickly on average in Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia, and Latin America. In fact, in the latter two 
regions, production starts immediately after the contract is 
concluded in 80% of the cases. One likely reason for this fast 
implementation is that more land was “ready for cultivation” 
than in other regions, since it was, at least partly, already 
cleared or even under cultivation before. This means that 
the necessary infrastructure was already in place before the 
(new) investor acquired the land (Müller et al., 2021), which 
is also the case if remaining (typically secondary) forests, 
shrubland, or grassland fragments in landscape dominated 
by agricultural uses are being cleared (see Chapter 3). Indeed, 
when we compute the time from contract to implementation 
for different LSLAs with different land used, we find the 
expected pattern. Of those deals that start in the same year 
after contract conclusion, 61% are on land which was formerly 
used for commercial agriculture and 28% on land formerly 
used by smallholders.
Long negotiation phases but quick implementation
8These deals are mainly located in sub-Saharan Africa (93 deals), followed by Asia and the Pacific (45 deals).
9Note that this number also includes deals which stay “intended” and to date have never switched to “concluded”. This may exaggerate the average time a deal is 
“intended” before being concluded because some of those negotiations may have actually failed already. However, even if all those deals are excluded from the 
calculation, the average global “intended” time is still five years. 
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0 439 0.64 70 0.53 119 0.76 165 0.83 7 0.41 78 0.43
1 88 0.13 17 0.13 19 0.12 16 0.08 3 0.18 33 0.18
2 41 0.06 14 0.11 5 0.03 2 0.01 1 0.06 19 0.11
3 38 0.06 12 0.09 7 0.04 4 0.02 1 0.06 14 0.08
4 26 0.04 7 0.05 2 0.01 4 0.02 1 0.06 12 0.07
5 14 0.02 4 0.03 1 0.01 4 0.02 0 0.00 5 0.03
6 15 0.02 3 0.02 2 0.01 0 0.00 1 0.06 9 0.05
>7 17 0.02 1 0.01 2 0.01 4 0.02 2 0.12 8 0.04
Total (N) 687 133 157 200 17 180
Average years until start 
of production
1.17 1.45 0.6 0.61 2.41 1.95
Note: Calculations based on Land Matrix data.
On average, land deals 
remain in this negotiation 
phase, for 6.6 years
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How and by whom the land is used when a deal is initiated 
matters for the socio-economic dynamics which subsequently 
play out, as well as for the environmental impacts. The 
literature provides clear evidence that investors compete for 
land with other land users, in particular smallholders (Lay et 
al., 2021; Messerli et al., 2014; Oberlack et al., 2016). Data on 
former land use, which is presented in Figure 1.6 and Table 
1.2 supports this. Smallholder agriculture is the predominant 
former land use type in sub-Saharan Africa, with 50% of all 
deals in the region being located on land formerly used by 
smallholders. Most of them are found in Ethiopia (18 deals), 
Senegal (15 deals), Ghana (14 deals), and Mozambique (12 
deals), as well as in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda (seven 
deals each). Furthermore, an important share of the LSLAs 
(45%) target land previously used for commercial farming 
before the acquisition took place. Table 1.2 shows that these 
shares are especially high in Europe and Central Asia, with 
over 70%, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 
almost 50%.  
The competition for land: large farms versus smallholders








Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Individual deals list up to six different former uses. The Land Matrix does not provide information on the share of 
area for each type of former use; hence, for this analysis, we have divided the area under contract and attributed equal shares to each former land use. N (deals) 
= 591, N (former land use) = 727. The shares for former land uses are based on the 591 deals for which information is available. For the remaining 969 concluded 









Table 1.2: Former land use by regions
COMMERCIAL CONSER- 
VATION


















































































Total 5660 617 1239 4 761 29 4315
44.8% 4.9% 9.8% 0% 6% 0.2% 34.2%
Note: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Individual deals list up to six different former users. The Land Matrix does not provide information on the share of area 
for each type of former use; hence, for this analysis, we have divided the area under contract and attributed equal shares to each former land user. N (deals global) 
= 591, N (former land user global) = 727. The shares for former land users show the share of the 591 deals for which information is available. For the remaining 969 
concluded deals no former land use information is available. 
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As highlighted earlier, failed deals may still entail permanent 
changes in land ownership and persistent land use change 
from prior land preparation (GRAIN, 2018; Nolte, 2020). 
Figure 1.7 illustrates that sub-Saharan Africa is especially 
prone to deal failures. Globally, 50% of all failures occurred in 
the following countries: Madagascar (28 deals, representing 
80% of the LSLA in the country), followed by Ethiopia 
(23 deals, 25%), Mozambique (22 deals, 27%), Tanzania 
(18 deals, 39%), Senegal (13 deals, 42%), Ghana (13 deals, 
28%), and Zimbabwe (11 deals, 23%).
The underlying reasons for land deal failures vary across 
regions and investors. Project failure typically results 
from miscalculations and misconceptions in planning 
and management, as well as the realities “on the ground”. 
In Africa, for example, earlier studies by Cotula et al. (2014) 
and Burnod et al. (2015) highlighted that some investors 
withdrew from projects due to financing problems and 
underestimation of set-up costs, while other projects 
proved insufficiently profitable due to agronomic difficulties 
(see Box 3). The prominent series of deal failures in 
Madagascar, on the other hand, were due to an unfavourable 
climate, pests, and diseases (Burnod et al., 2015). In addition, 
some investors lacked experience in the agricultural sector 
and others reported issues such as theft and arson (Burnod 
et al., 2015), which was also reported by the investor Sime 
Darby for its oil palm investment (Deal #1388) in Liberia 
(Chain Reaction Research, 2019). 
Deal failures: The jatropha hype and other ill-conceived investments
Figure 1.7: Number of all deals and failed deals across the world
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Countries are shaded in grey tones according to the number of projects they host: the darker the country is shaded 
the more projects are found in this country. Failed projects are displayed using red circles with the circle size being proportional to the number of failed projects in 






























Table 1.3: Frequencies of deal failures clustered by reasons
Deal failure reason Deal IDs in Land Matrix 
database
Target countries Investor countries
Financing problems 1096, 1202, 1290, 3755, 1334, 
3772, 4354, 6621, 1414, 1645, 
1526, 2271, 7651, 1769, 1772, 
2297, 1041
Angola, Ethiopia (3) Ghana (3), 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique (3), Senegal (2), 
Sudan, Ukraine
USA (2), Portugal, Angola, India, 
Switzerland (2), Benin, Canada (2), 
Ghana (2), Denmark (2), Kenya (2), 




1201, 1204, 1306, 1228, 1323, 
229, 1554, 4742, 5632, 1653, 
8134, 1839, 1875
Ethiopia (4), Ghana, Laos, 
Mozambique (3), Namibia, 
Senegal, Tanzania (2)
UK (5), Ethiopia, India, China (2), 
Israel, Italy, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, 




1839, 1877 Tanzania (2) Sweden
Conflicts/protests 3552, 61, 1189, 1228, 3832, 
3925, 188, 1362, 1363, 1365, 
3362, 1397, 1399, 2254, 2253, 
4939, 1474, 1481, 1523, 5104, 
3465, 4269, 3435, 4058, 4524, 
1744, 1866, 1877, 4165, 4295
Armenia, Cambodia, Ethiopia 
(4), Indonesia, Kenya (4), Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar (2), Malawi, 
Mali (2), Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal (2), 
South Africa, South Sudan, 
Tanzania (2), Uganda, Ukraine
Iran, Australia, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Ethiopia, Turkey, Malaysia 
(2), Belgium, Canada, UK, Italy, Libya 
(3), South Africa, Korea (2), India 
(2), Mali, USA (3), Guinea, Mauritius, 
Liechtenstein, Israel, United Arab 
Emirates (2), Spain, South Sudan, 




751, 1308, 3931, 1656, 3333, 
3436, 3797, 1874, 1895, 3739
Brazil, Ethiopia, Guyana, 
Namibia (2), Senegal, Sudan, 
Tanzania (2), Zambia
China, India, India, South Africa, UK, 
Italy, Saudi Arabia, USA / Tanzania, 
Sweden / Tanzania, Zambia / China
Legal difficulties 719, 106, 1348, 1339, 3791, 
3792, 920, 443, 5477, 6041, 
5559
Argentina, Cambodia, Ghana 
(2), Niger (2), Peru, Philippines, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone , South 
Africa
China, Vietnam, USA (2), Ghana, 
Saudi Arabia (2), Korea (2), Morocco, 
China, India, South Africa
Other reasons 1984, 4432, 3826, 3835, 3854, 
2237, 173, 163, 3894, 3167, 
4481, 2039, 3905
DR Congo (2), Ethiopia (2), 
Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia (3), 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia (2)
China (2), South Africa, Congo, India 
(3), Romania, Norway, Korea, UK (2), 
South Africa (2), India, Zambia 
Note: Evidence based on Land Matrix data. A reason for deal failure is given for 96 out of the 253 deals which are currently marked as “failed or abandoned” in the 
Land Matrix database. This means that the target and investor country frequencies are not representative, and are biased towards those countries/investors which 
provide information.
Most deal failures are located 
on the African continent 
The complexity of negotiations, in particular in land matters, 
was also frequently underestimated, as were expectations 
of local populations. In a number of countries, negotiations 
of deals can be complicated by burdensome bureaucracy, 
dysfunctional institutions, or corruption. For example, in 
Madagascar, investors faced an endless and multilevel 
negotiation process with various stakeholders which was time 
consuming and very costly, ranging from formal expenses 
(such as taxes and administrative fees) to informal expenses 
(like corruption) (Burnod et al., 2013). Corruption at the local 
level as well as conflicts with affected populations over the 
lack of consultation, access to land, and potential benefits 
(such as infrastructure and employment) often trigger social 
protest (see, for example, Burnod et al., 2015, and Ahmed et 
al., 2018). From reviewing the Land Matrix data, an overview 
of the frequencies of the discussed underlying reasons for 
deal failures is given in Table 1.3. It reveals that conflicts and 
protest are the most dominant given reason for deal failure, 
followed by financing problems. As already discussed, most 
deal failures are located on the African continent. While in 
absolute terms investors from China, India, the UK, and the 
USA dominate deal failures, there is no clear investor country 
pattern visible regarding the different underlying reasons for 
failure. Furthermore, the numbers in part reflect the total 
investment dominance of those countries (see Figure 1.10) 
and figures thus need to be treated with caution, because 
information is only available for a subset of failed deals.
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Changing policies also contribute to deal failure in some 
countries, while other countries require investors to quickly 
enter the production phase, threatening to withdraw the 
concession if this does not happen. In 2012, for instance, 
following local and international pressure, Laos implemented 
policies that allowed the government to withdraw land 
concessions if the land was left vacant (Oldenburg & Neef, 
2014). Similarly, in Ethiopia, some contracts include specific 
clauses requiring the investor to start production on the land 
within a few years after the contract signature. For example, 
in one deal (#3835) signed in 2011, the Ethiopian government 
demanded that the investor, Indian Saber Group, plant one-
fifth of the land within one year and the entire contract area of 
25 000 ha within five years of the deal conclusion. Due to non-
compliance, the contract was cancelled by the government in 
2015 (see also deal #1202 in Ethiopia which failed and #1304 
which has not failed yet, despite non-compliance). 
All of these cases have specific combinations of factors that 
eventually explain failure. A comparative global study by Nolte 
(2020) using Land Matrix data confirms a general pattern. 
She finds that, on average, larger projects, biofuel deals, and 
projects targeting land formerly used by smallholders or 
pastoralists are more likely to fail. By contrast, projects that 
involve domestic investors or those in countries with better 
existing infrastructure are less likely to fail. These results are 
supported by Table 1.4, which provides an overview of the 
regional distribution of deal failures and how they relate to 
different crop production systems. It is striking that almost 
80% of deal failures occur in sub-Saharan Africa, out of which 
almost 75% were located on formerly smallholder land. While 
there is no clear crop-specific pattern in deal failures, one 
crop does stand out: 50% of jatropha deals – again mostly 
located in sub-Saharan Africa – fail.10
10Of the Jatropha deal failures, 80% occurred in Madagascar (13 deals), Mozambique (9 deals), Ghana (8 deals), Senegal (7 deals), Zambia (6 deals), Ethiopia 
(5 deals), and Kenya (4 deals). In total, 83 of the rice, vegetable, and sugar cane farms have failed in Mali, Tanzania, Nigeria, Senegal, Niger, Vietnam, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Kenya. 

























Jatropha 5 0 0 0 68 73 151 48%
Vegetables (unspecific) 1 0 1 1 17 20 76 26%
Rice 2 0 0 1 31 34 167 20%
Sugar cane 0 0 1 1 27 29 148 20%
Fruit (unspecified) 0 0 1 0 10 11 57 19%
Cotton 0 0 0 0 9 9 51 18%
Sorghum 1 0 0 2 6 9 51 18%
Cassava (maniok) 2 0 0 0 6 8 52 15%
Oil palm 4 0 0 0 32 36 301 12%
No information 3 1 1 1 16 22 187 12%
Corn (maize) 4 8 0 3 33 48 493 10%
Soya beans 0 4 2 1 18 25 360 7%
Sun flower 0 4 0 0 14 18 274 7%
Wheat 0 7 1 4 9 21 378 6%
Rubber tree 4 0 0 0 3 7 169 4%
Rapeseed 0 5 1 0 0 6 149 4%
Sum of all other crops 7 15 0 11 70 103 920 11%
Total 33 44 8 25 369 479 3 984 12%
Note: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Crops are only listed if total number of deals > 50, otherwise deals are listed under the category “sum of all other crops 
with failures”. Deals are counted repeatedly if multiple crops are produced per deal. In total, N failed = 253 deals, out of which 92 are counted multiple times due to 
multiple crops. N total = 1,865, out of which 826 count multiple times.
Given the global relevance of biofuel deals in LSLAs and the 
high failure rates of jatropha, we take a closer look at this 
sector. Figure 1.7 shows that a large number of deals fail in 
Southern and Eastern Africa. It was in these regions where 
investors intended to replicate the ambitions of biofuel 
production in other regions of the world. For instance, in 
2010, Brazil planned to replace about 10% of the world’s fossil 
fuels by 2025 with ethanol made of sugar cane. At the same 
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Figure 1.8: Deal failures in the biofuel sector
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Country colours show the number of deals where one of the intentions of production was biofuels. The pie chart 
shows in blue share of failed deals associated with jatropha, in green the share of failed deals not associated with jatropha. 
−
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Share of failed deals not associated with jatropha
In countries such as Madagascar, Zambia, 
and Mozambique, about half of all failed 
deals are associated with jatropha 
time, Malaysia and Indonesia intended to supply 20% of the 
biodiesel consumed in the European Union with their large oil 
palm sector (Borras et al., 2010). This trend is also apparent in 
the Land Matrix data.
Figure 1.8 shows a large number of (“unfailed”) biofuel deals 
in Brazil and Southeast Asia driven by the sugar cane and oil 
palm sector, respectively. Similarly, in Africa, different crops 
are used for biofuel production, but jatropha was the crop 
that was hailed as Africa’s ticket to biofuel production with 
promises of high yields, low water demand, and its adaptability 
to marginal lands (Von Maltitz et al., 2014). In particular, 
the adaptability to semi-arid areas with limited potential 
for food crops was seen as crucial to mitigate the trade-off 
between biofuel production and the preservation of tropical 
rainforests, as well as the trade-off between biofuel and 
food production. In the end, these expectations were rarely 
realised. Yields were overestimated, while the management 
costs were underestimated due to malfunctioning institutions 
and the absence of the necessary infrastructure (Ahmed 
et al., 2017; K. Singh et al., 2014; Von Maltitz et al., 2014). As 
shown in Figure 1.8, in countries such as Madagascar, Zambia, 
and Mozambique, about half of all failed deals are associated 
with jatropha.
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BOX 3:
Biofuel development in Ghana:
Policies of expansion and drivers of failure in the 
jatropha sector
In Ghana, biofuel production for the domestic market was 
the primary driver of the recent surge in LSLAs following 
the announcement by the Ghanaian government of a 20% 
blending target by 2020. Since then, the trajectories of 
large-scale land investments have been dynamic. In 2003, 
the initial government strategy was to acquire 1 million 
ha to pilot smallholder-based projects in 53 districts 
across the country. This strategy was abandoned by a new 
government in 2008 due to challenges in land acquisition 
for smallholders. The new government instead provided 
incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDIs) 
for LSLAs. 
Studies have reported mixed results about the total number 
of companies, deals, and land sizes. Findings suggest 31 
biofuel-related LSLAs, totalling 950 131 ha of land, were made 
between 2006 and 2011, with a verified 15 foreign and two 
Ghanaian companies (Ahmed et al., 2017). Foreign companies 
are mostly from Europe, with some from Asia, America, and 
other parts of Africa. The size of land deals varies considerably, 
from 202 ha to 400 000 ha. Jatropha and oil palm were the 
dominant crops. 
Some of these projects have provided employment, 
increased rural income, and served as a major source of 
livelihood, especially in the rural areas. However, community 
resistance through agitation and protest has been common 
in most areas due to lack of consultation, non-payment of 
compensation, use of illicit processes of acquisition, and 
lack of employment for the youth. Furthermore, many local 
communities lost their lands and were left with small pieces 
of land for subsistence farming, which negatively affected 
fallow periods and food availability. In addition, both seasonal 
and permanent employment offered by these investments 
have affected household labour and time allocation for 
subsistence farming. 
As a result of these interrelated factors, over 21 of these 
projects, amounting to 482 311 ha, have been abandoned 
or collapsed at different stages. The main reasons for 
these failures are low productivity of feedstock (especially 
jatropha), weak business planning, community resistance, 
conflicts over land ownership between communities, and 
civil society opposition. However, since most of the land for 
these abandoned projects is leased, ownership rights are 
still held by the investors. In spite of this, local communities 
have encroached on most of these lands for small-scale 
subsistence farming. Even so, some deals have seen a change 
of ownership, some investors have changed from biofuel 
crops to food crops, and other investors have reduced their 
activities or have left the land altogether. The trajectory of 
land investment is therefore characterised by rapid dynamics 
as manifested in a shift from smallholder-based to large-scale 
land investments and then, finally, to smaller deals. Aside from 
the dynamics in land sizes, the trajectory is also characterised 
by changes in investors and land transfers between investors.
1.3. LSLAs are related to big global business 
In principle, LSLAs can address problems of food supply in 
developing countries, thus lowering local food prices and 
improving the access to food. Yet most land deals are not 
focused on providing food for local markets, but rather on 
crops for export markets, as already documented by other 
studies using Land Matrix data (Mechiche-Alami et al., 2021; 
Nolte et al., 2016). Figure 1.9 substantiates these findings 
by comparing the potential production of LSLAs to global 
production. The figure shows that – from a global production 
perspective – LSLAs are a key driver of increased commodity 
production: oil palm-related LSLAs documented in the 
Land Matrix account for more than 20% of the global area 
cultivated with this crop. This share is well above the 10% 
for rubber and sugar beet and the 5% for sugar cane. For 
Most land deals are not focused on 
providing food for local markets, but rather 
on crops for export markets
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11When interpreting the numbers, especially for crops like maize and wheat, bear in mind that the data coverage of the Land Matrix is limited to countries of the 
Global South, thus, excluding important production regions of those crops. For details see Box 1.




































































































































































staple crops, on the other hand, the shares are much lower. 
Estimates suggest, for example, that fully productive maize, 
rice, and wheat deals would make up for less than 1% of the 
global production area of the respective crop if the entire 
area under contract came into production. Thus, these 
numbers again present an upper bound as not all deals will 
become fully productive, and some may even fail. It should be 
noted, however, that the Land Matrix data is unlikely to be a 
full inventory of global LSLAs.
As for the share of global production area, oil palm comes 
first, with a contract area of around 6 million ha reflecting its 
importance on the global market with its multiple uses like 
food, fuel, and cosmetics (Figure 1.9). In contrast, the global 
market for rubber and sugar beet is comparably small, which 
explains why the high share in global production area does 
not translate into a large total contract area. Nevertheless, 
these crops cluster in certain regions and still cover large 
areas of land. Rubber is most prevalent in Southeast Asia, with 
1.3 million ha, while sugar beet cultivation is concentrated in 
Eastern Europe, with 600 000 ha. Other crops, such as sugar 
cane, are also highly regionally concentrated, with 1.2 million 
ha in Brazil alone. Conversely, in line with the estimates 
above, deals focusing on staple crop production, such as 
maize, rice, and wheat are comparably less relevant from a 
global production perspective. However, in absolute terms, 
they still cover large tracts of land, with around 2 million ha 
for maize and wheat each. LSLAs producing these crops 
remain, therefore, important drivers of the land use changes 
described in Chapter 4.11 Furthermore, as explained above, 
demand for global land may accelerate again in the near 
future due to more aggressive biofuel policies to combat 
climate change, fear of food inflation, geopolitical tensions, 
and post-COVID demand stimuli. 
Along with hailing from both the global North and South, 
many investors operate through investment hubs, many of 
them tax havens. Already widely documented, and as seen 
in Figure 1.10, which shows the top 20 investor countries 
in terms of the area under contract, developing countries 
with competitive agricultural sectors, such as Brazil and 
Malaysia, as well as high-income countries, such as Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, and the USA are among the top 
investor countries. However, China is making up ground, 
having climbed up the ladder to third place among the top 
Diverse investors: From the North, South, and through tax havens
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12This increase in China’s relevance can in part be explained by eight new deals that were concluded since 2016. However, a number of deals had already started 
before 2016 but were missing in the older versions of the database. This means that the rise is also due to a time lag in deal reporting (Nolte et al., 2016).
13No information available for 24% of the investors. Governments, state-/government-owned companies, and semi state-owned companies make up 9% of the 
investors.
investing nations over the last few years.12 Chinese investors 
are particularly active in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, with 
54% of the deals with Chinese involvement taking place in 
one of these three countries. Despite the widely held believe 
that sub-Saharan Africa is the primary target for investors 
from China, only 23% of deals with Chinese investors actually 
occurred in this region. Less prominent countries are on the 
list as well, for example, Kazakhstan, where one investor was 
involved in a single but very large deal in Russia. For many 
LSLAs, the “real” origin of the investor remains obscure as 
the parent company has set up shop in financial hubs and 
tax havens.  This explains why the top 10 investor origins 
include Cyprus (in fourth place), Singapore (seventh place), 
British Virgin Islands (eighth place) and Hong Kong (nineth 
place) (see Figure 1.10). Cyprus in particular hosts numerous 
companies and holdings that serve as investment vehicles for 
individuals and companies from other countries, as well as 
multilateral investment banks such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (Flachsbarth et al., 2020). 
These financial hubs are also home to institutional investors, 
such as investment and pension funds (Ducastel & Anseeuw, 
2018), and that were found, for instance, to invest in land 
deals in South Africa. These investors aim to diversify their 
portfolio through investments in agriculture, as seen in one 
case study from Papua New Guinea, where Hambloch, (2018) 
describes the changes of investor types. Over time, land-
based investments by the Australian government and the 
World Bank shifted to entirely private investment projects by 
companies with complex financial structures, starting around 
the late 2000s.
This shift in the type of investors has implications for 
local livelihoods as well, as governments and international 
organisations often also engage in the agricultural sector 
to improve local living standards. For example, Hambloch 
(2018) shows that in Papua New Guinea, public investors 
often involved in contract farming schemes that source 
50% of production from smallholder farmers. In contrast, 
many private companies in the country focus on short-term 
profits from logging activities, which often entail only limited 
employment generation (see Chapter 3). On the island of New 
Britain of Papua New Guinea, for instance, most investors, 
such as Gilford Ltd (deals #3653, #3652, #3654, #3687), are 
or were subsidiaries of large Malaysian logging companies, 
like the Rimbunan Hijau Group (Hambloch, 2018). The 
dominance of the private sector matches our data across 
all regions, which shows that many investors are private 
companies (35%), stock-exchange listed companies (17%), 
investment funds (10%), or individual entrepreneurs (5%).13 
Overall, although some common trends can be identified, our 
data documents large regional variations in the speed and 
status of implementation, crop types, and investors. These 
differences play a crucial role in determining the impacts of 
LSLAs on socio-economic indicators, the environment, and 









Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. In case of multiple investors per deal, the full contract size of each deal is attributed to each investor to indicate the 
countries’ total involvement in LSLAs.




















































































Data preparation, assumptions, definitions and 
biases
Deal dynamics: Land deals in different negotiation and 
implementation phases
The Land Matrix differentiates between key stages in the 
negotiation and implementation process each deal passes 
through over time. LSLAs start with an expression of interest 
by investors and/or when parties are in the phase of contract 
negotiations (intended deals). This status continues until 
negotiations either fail (failed deals) or the parties reach 
an oral or written agreement (concluded deals). After deals 
are concluded, we further track the implementation status. 
Initially, the status of deals will reflect as “not started” because, 
for example, banks and financial investors often wait for land 
acquisition before they make funding available, which can 
cause time lags until concluded deals move into production 
(Brüntrup, 2014).
A “start-up period” follows, in which the land is prepared 
and first processing steps are established if necessary. Only 
afterwards does actual production start on the land. However, 
deals are sometimes abandoned after the start-up phase 
or even after production. Deals are considered abandoned 
when the contract gets cancelled or production ends (even if 
the contract is still in place).
The different stages of the negotiation status are defined 
as follows:
• Intended: Expression of interest
 Under negotiation
 Memorandum of Understanding
• Concluded: Oral agreement
 Contract signed
 Change of ownership
• Failed: Negotiations failed
 Contract cancelled
The different stages of the implementation status are defined 
as follows:
• Project not started
• Start-up phase (no production)
• In operation (in production)
• Project (production) abandoned
Methods and assumptions for capturing deal dynamics
The Land Matrix has information on the described negotiation 
and implementation statuses per deal and captures changes 
over time, thus making it possible to not only ascertain 
the current deal status, but also to analyse deal dynamics. 
Since the data often shows missing entries in either the 
implementation or negotiation status or in the exact time 
dimension, we worked with the following assumptions for our 
dynamic analysis in this chapter to increase the number of 
observations over time:
· If the year information of the negotiation status is missing, it 
 is replaced by:
 - the given year information for the contract size (if available);
 - the year information given for the implementation status 
  if the deal is concluded and the implementation status 
  is anything but “project abandoned”.
· If the year information of the exact contract size – which can 
 change over time due to change in investors or an 
 expansion or contraction in size – is missing, it is replaced 
 by the year information given for the negotiation status 
 if contract concluded.
· If the year information of the exact size in production is 
 missing, it is replaced by the year information given for the 
 implementation status if “in production”. In this case, the 
 size in production is assumed to be constant over time.
· If the implementation status of a deal indicates that a 
 deal is in production and the negotiation status is missing, 
 the deal is set to being “concluded” in the same year as 
 production is known to have started.
· Sometimes deals move from one negotiation or 
 implementation stage within one year. To avoid double 
 counting of deals within one year, we keep only the “more 
 progressed” negotiation or implementation status in that 
 same year, respectively.
· Some deals show the negotiation status “intended” after 
 they have been concluded. In these few cases, the 
 negotiation status is kept as concluded only to avoid 
 double counts in different negotiation stages within one 
 deal. This may happen in large conglomerates when the 
 original investor negotiates with new investors who plan 
 to enter the deal. 
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Despite our attempt to fill the missing time information, 
various deals remain for which specific time information 
on changes in negotiation or implementation status is not 
available. This leads to a discrepancy in numbers of those 
deals considered in the dynamic analysis and the number of 
deals considered in the static analysis. This means that for 
several deals, the exact time information is lacking, but we 
know that the given negotiation or implementation status is 
“current”. For the data used in this report – downloaded on 
20 August 2020 – this results in the following shortcoming of 
the dynamic analysis:
· The total number of deals marked as “currently concluded” 
 in the database is 1 560. In this dynamic illustration, only 
 1 471 appear in 2020. As such, the number of concluded 
 deals is slightly under-reported here because we lack specific 
 year information on the negotiation status for some deals. 
 Equivalently, the number of failed deals is under reported 
 (compared to 141 deals “currently failed”) due to lacking 
 year information on negotiation failures. Likewise, the 
 number of intended deals is slightly over-reported in the 
 dynamic illustration (compared to 152 “currently intended”), 
 because few deals are already concluded without knowing 
 the year of contract signature.
· The described limitations only hold for the dynamic analyses 
 presented in Chapter 1. For all remaining chapters (and those 
 figures provided in Chapter 1 without year dimension) all 
 deals are included in the analyses for which we have a 
 “current” negotiation status.
Multiple crops, multiple former land cover and former 
land use
Individual deals list up to six different former uses, four 
different former land covers, and multiple crops in the 
database, but we do not provide information on the share 
of area for each type of former use or former land cover or 
crop. Throughout this report, we have thus divided the area 
under contract and attributed equal shares to each former 
land use or former land cover or crop, respectively. It should 
be noted, however, that this method may lead to over- or 
underestimation of area shares for certain forms of land use 
or cover or crop areas. 
Investor countries
Given that the ownership structures of firms are often 
complex, verifying the country of origin of the investors is not 
so straightforward. We therefore define the investor countries 
as those from which the top parent companies originate, 
that is, the countries in which the investors are registered. 
Where it is not possible to determine the locations of 
registration, the countries in which the companies’ 
headquarters are based are listed as investor countries. 
While we also endeavour to consider the complex (and often 
opaque) structures of investor chains, whereby numerous 
intermediary companies are commonly registered in different 
locations, since it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable 
information on these investor chains, we abstain from 
using this information in this report. Nevertheless, for 
selective deals, this information is provided on the website at 
https://landmatrix.org/list/investors.
A second issue arises when dealing with investments in 
which multiple investors are engaged. For these cases, 
the full size of the deal is attributed to the country of 
origin of each of the international investors involved to 
indicate the countries’ total involvement in LSLAs. This 
results in a degree of double-counting and thus a higher 
number of deals and a larger area than the total number of 
unique deals.
Geographic regions
For this report we follow the definition of the United Nation’s 
geographic region classification, which can be found at 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/. We further 
aggregate the following world regions:
· Asia and Pacific: Melanesia, South-eastern Asia, Eastern 
 Asia, Southern Asia
· Europe and Central Asia: Eastern Europe, Northern 
 Europe, Southern Europe, Central Asia, Western Asia
· Latin America and the Caribbean
· Middle East and North Africa
· Sub-Saharan Africa
Data biases: Under-reported regions and countries in the 
Land Matrix database
The Land Matrix systematically collects information on 
LSLAs in all low- and middle-income countries according to 
the World Bank classification as of 2010. The data collection 
process is not, however, equally successful for all countries, 
economic sectors, and indicators. As such, a number of 
data biases are inherent. Although these are addressed and 
largely countered in this report by limiting the analyses to 
transnational LSLAs in the agricultural sector, data biases 
from under-reporting in certain countries or regions remain, 
leading to inaccuracies in our absolute and relative numbers 
across regions.
The reasons for under-reporting are manifold, but can 
roughly be divided into external and internal causes. The main 
external causes include the varying degree of transparency 
in the host countries’ land sector and among the investors 
involved in LSLAs (Flachsbarth et al., 2020), as well as our 
access to data being dependent on the information provided 
by civil society organisations (CSOs), research institutions, 
and the media in the host countries, which is not always 
forthcoming.  In line with this, the main internal cause, is the 
location of Land Matrix partners, networks, and Regional 
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Focal Points (RFPs) in relation to certain world regions, with 
data coverage generally decreasing the further away they are. 
This could often be exacerbated by language barriers as well. 
For example, Central Asia is likely to be under-represented 
not only as a result of the lack of transparency in the region 
on the whole, but also because the Land Matrix lacks local 
partners and networks in this area. Nevertheless, after many 
years of data sourcing and networking, the RFPs have made 
significant strides in developing their own local knowledge 
base and networks of country experts, which enable them to 
at least assess the likelihood of substantial under-reporting 
for most of the countries in our focus regions, as follows:
• Africa: Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, 
 and Togo
• Europe and Central Asia: Belarus and North Macedonia, 
 and all countries in Central Asia 
• Latin America: Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
 Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Venezuela
• Asia: India and China
In response to the data collection shortcomings, a number 
of internal data initiatives by the Land Matrix made a 
concerted effort to uncover new land transactions (see 
for example Box 2). This cannot, however, completely 
compensate for the inherent lack of transparency in the 
sector. Consequently, unbalanced data coverage across 
countries is unavoidable and, therefore, the absolute 
numbers and direct comparisons between countries 
and regions should be interpreted with some caution 
throughout this report.
Despite these caveats, the Land Matrix database 
represents the most used and complete dataset 
on international large-scale land acquisitions that is 
currently available. 
Land Matrix Analytical Report III
40
LSLAs and land tenure security:




As competition over land due to LSLAs intensifies, the need 
for strong land governance systems becomes increasingly 
important to ensure that the rights and tenure security 
of local land users are protected. The importance of land 
tenure security – a landholder’s perception that rights will 
be respected by society (Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000) – for 
agriculture, land use, and rural livelihoods more generally has 
long been recognised (Bruce & Migot-Adholla, 1994; Otsuka 
et al., 2001). In the worst-case scenario, weak tenure security 
implies that LSLAs cause local land users, often smallholder 
farmers, to lose access to land, be it to their own farmland or 
communally used common-pool resources, such as forests 
or grazing land, without consultation and compensation. In 
addition, more vulnerable groups with particularly insecure 
tenure, including migrants, young people, women, and poorer 
people who rely more on common-pool resources, may be 
most affected.
While weak land governance systems that tend to 
disadvantage certain groups are not new, their problems and 
adverse impacts are often exacerbated because of LSLAs. 
Moreover, LSLAs sometimes directly affect land governance 
and tenure security. The induced changes, for example, an 
increased formalisation of land rights, may or may not be 
beneficial for local landowners. Beyond that, tenure security 
is important for the agricultural performance of smallholders 
and investments in agriculture, such as through increasing 
access to credit, participation in land rental markets, land 
productivity, and women’s empowerment (Abdulai et al., 
2011; Fenske, 2011). 
2.1. Competition for land under weak land governance
A number of studies from across the globe suggest that 
investors exploit weaknesses in land institutions in the Global 
South (Bottazzi et al., 2016; Fonjong et al., 2016; Friis & Nielsen, 
2016; German et al., 2013; Kenney-Lazar, 2012; Nolte & Väth, 
2015). However, there is no linear relationship between the 
locational choice of an investor and land tenure systems 
at country level: indeed, LSLAs occur regardless of low or 
high land tenure security. In fact, contrary to other forms of 
foreign investment, land-based investments do not appear 
to avoid countries with weak institutions (Arezki et al., 2015; 
Lay & Nolte, 2018). In such contexts, LSLAs may actually take 
advantage of corruption and compete for land, in particular 
with locals whose land rights are less well protected. It is also 
important to stress that land tenure security may vary at the 
subnational level, also conditional on the form of prevalent 
tenure arrangements (Boone, 2014; Giger et al., 2020). For 
instance, Giger et al. (2020) observe that only a few LSLAs 
took place in Kenya’s Nanyuki area, where land was gradually 
subdivided and privatised after independence, and those that 
did take place focused on smaller areas which were generally 
purchased or leased from private landowners as land tenure 
rights are relatively secure.
LSLAs occur regardless of low or high land 
tenure security


























Figure 2.1: Global Index of the Governance Context for Land Tenure Security (GC-LTS) and number of LSLAs
Notes: Countries are depicted in shades of blue according to the GC-LTS; the darker the shade the greater the land tenure security. The size of the red circles 
corresponds to the number of deals per country. Calculations based on Land Matrix data (concluded deals) using the GC-LTS (Kelly et al., 2017).
A number of recent studies based on more comprehensive 
data cast doubt on frequent claims that investors largely 
acquire “idle land”, and in fact show that investors often target 
land that is being used by smallholders, thus forcing local 
land users to compete with commercial large-scale investors. 
For instance, looking at the spatial patterns of LSLAs in 
Zambia, Lay et al. (2021) find that the targeted land typically 
lies in relatively well-connected and populated rural areas, 
potentially creating pressure on smallholders’ access to land. 
This is in line with an earlier analysis by Messerli et al. (2014) 
of the land cover of 139 geo-referenced deals from the Land 
Matrix, which found that 35% of these deals targeted densely 
populated and easily accessible croplands. Furthermore, 
according to current Land Matrix data, in approximately 40% 
of the deals with information on former use, the land (or part 
of the land) was previously or is currently used for smallholder 
agriculture, pastoralism, or shifting cultivation. Besides 
smallholder farmland, LSLAs appropriate water resources, for 
instance, by blocking access to rivers (Zaehringer, Wambugu, 
et al., 2018), and target forests and grasslands, which are 
important sources of livelihood for selected communities 
which may be highly dependent on these local resources. 
Both a review of case studies by Vedeld et al. (2007) and a 
more recent cross-country study on the relative forest income 
of selected rural households in developing countries (which 
includes households’ subsistence extraction and production) 
by Angelsen et al. (2014) report that, on average, 22-28% 
of the total income of surveyed households stems from 
resources from forests or wildlands without forest cover. This 
demonstrates that LSLAs indeed pose a considerable threat 
to such livelihoods, as also highlighted by a meta-study of 66 
case studies , which found that the loss of access to land and 
natural resources was the most frequently reported negative 
livelihood impact (Oberlack et al., 2016; see also Chapter 4). 
Land targeted by investors is often already used by smallholders 
2.2. Displacements, minimal consultation, and the lack of compensation
While strong land tenure security ensures that local 
communities are consulted prior to an acquisition and receive 
adequate compensation thereafter, weak tenure security, in 
contrast, is often associated with the displacement of local 
communities and diminishing access to land. Even though 
information on displacements is lacking for most deals, the 
Land Matrix has still recorded a significant 82 deals for which 
there are reports of original land users facing displacement. 
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Moreover, the lack – or even complete absence – of adequate 
consultation and compensation, an important symptom of 
weak land tenure security, is common (Nolte & Voget-Kleschin, 
2014; Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010), and frequently leads to the 
overriding of landholders’ rights. For example, of the more 
than 250 deals for which the Land Matrix has information on 
consultation, only 15% report that free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC) took place; almost 45% report no consultation 
whatsoever, and the remaining cases report limited forms 
of consultation. Likewise, complete compensation for the 
initial loss of access to land appears to be rare (Aisbett & 
Barbanente, 2016; Anseeuw et al., 2012; German et al., 2013). 
This is evident in the case of Laos, where only 52 of the 152 
villages where land losses were reported received monetary 
compensation (Nanhthavong et al., 2020). The very few cases 
of effective compensation that can be found in the Land 
Matrix database highlight this, with compensation promised 
in only 90 cases, and just 27 cases of actual compensation 
reported.
Box 5 provides further examples of how inadequate 
consultation and compensation in different contexts across 
Africa have led to rejection by the respective communities 
and sparked conflicts between the investors and the local 
land users.
BOX 4:
Displacements in Latin America 
Displacement of people as a result of land acquisitions occurs 
frequently in Latin America, with tenure insecurity, which is 
still common in the region, as one of the main reasons. Of the 
12 cases of LSLA-related displacement recorded by the Land 
Matrix for Latin America, one in particular has gained global 
prominence in recent years: the investments in agricultural 
land in Brazil between 2007 and 2008 by Harvard University 
(deal #6868) through the Harvard Management Company 
(HMC), the university’s USA-registered endowment fund. 
Involving more than 400 000 ha of land and intended primarily 
to produce food crops and biofuels, the deal led to several 
conflicts with local dwellers. There were not only reports 
of displacement and harassment of rural communities, 
but also of a number of restrictions on their access to 
natural resources, such as water and forests, and severely 
detrimental ecological impacts connected to deforestation of 
the fragile Brazilian “Cerrado” ecosystem. According to media 
reports, the HMC is now attempting to reduce its share of 
agricultural land in the region, while local community leaders, 
together with Harvard University students, have called for 
the resolution of the social conflicts connected with these 
investments.
Similarly, in Colombia, the purchase of 3 000 ha of land for a 
palm oil plantation by the company Aportes San Isidro S. A. y 
C. I. Tequendama (deal #802) in 2007, allegedly illegally since 
the land had been legally claimed by the peasants who were 
using it, resulted in 600 people (123 families) being displaced. 
The dispute with the evicted peasants continues, with legal 
and judicial proceedings still unresolved. 
Of the more than 250 deals for which the 
Land Matrix has information on consultation, 
only 15% report that free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC) took place
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BOX 5:
Differences in consultation and compensation in 
African LSLAs  
The level of consultation and compensation undertaken by 
investors in Africa is mixed. In Gabon, for example, Olam 
Palm Gabon SA (deal #2236) made a substantial effort to 
ensure that the community was satisfied, even obtaining 
FPIC. Together with community representatives, the investor 
adopted procedures for consultation and assessed which 
community members were entitled to compensation. Besides 
providing compensation to individuals, Olam Palm Gabon SA 
invested in significant community infrastructure, including 
the building and refurbishing of 14 schools and distribution 
of 5 000 school kits, establishment of worker health centres, 
drilling of 60 village wells, installation of over 2 200 solar 
lamps for streets and homes, building of two village cassava 
mills, and training of small farmers to produce better yields. 
In Cameroon, in contrast, SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon 
(deal #1159) did not carry out any actual consultation with 
community members, but used the contract signed by the 
community chiefs – who did not understand what they were 
signing – as “proof” of consultation. Community members 
subsequently rejected the project and have protested on 
several occasions, which has led to some of them being 
arrested by the police. In February 2012, the Cameroonian 
NGO Centre for Environment and Development (CED) 
published a report raising concerns about the displacement 
of small-scale subsistence farmers from arable lands, food 
insecurity, a lack of adequate jobs to compensate for the 
loss of farmland, environmental damage, a lack of access to 
water, and inconsistency or complete lack of transparency in 
environmental and social impact assessments. Locals and 
farmers have since sued SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon for 
trespassing and damaging their livelihoods, however, the 
outcome of this process is not known.
In another case in Nigeria, the Great Northern Agribusiness 
Ltd (deal #5465) did not give community members any 
option to comment on the investor plans at all. In fact, the 
community was not even aware of the project until land 
surveyors arrived on the communal land and announced that 
a sugarcane plantation was in the process of development. 
As a result, the community members rejected the project and 
formed an association to seek justice from the High Court of 
Jigawa State. In 2017, the court issued a restraining order 
against further encroachment by the investor and the state 
government. 
2.3. Customary and community land rights under pressure
The risks of weak land tenure security when investors acquire 
land, that is, displacements and inadequate consultation 
and compensation, are not evenly distributed across and 
within countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 48% 
of women report feeling tenure insecure when faced with 
widowhood or divorce, as do 24% of young people (aged 
18-25 years), especially those with basic levels of education and 
low incomes (Prindex, 2020). Migrants’ land tenure security 
is particularly weak, and even more so when land pressure 
increases (Boone & Duku, 2012; Ghebru & Lambrecht, 2017). 
Certain population groups also tend to bear particularly high 
costs if their land is under customary tenure. Even so, the 
form of tenure may not necessarily imply tenure security. 
For example, titled land does not automatically translate into 
strong land tenure security (Robinson et al., 2014), nor does 
it guarantee protection from losing access to land (Boone, 
2015). Nevertheless, in the context of LSLAs, the evidence 
suggests that customary tenure is frequently associated with 
weaker tenure security (Lund, 2008), and more so where 
customary tenure regimes coexist with statutory tenure and 
weak local institutions – as is the case in many sub-Saharan 
African countries (Alden Wily, 2011; Boone, 2014). In such 
circumstances, LSLAs not only often target insecure land 
tenure systems, they also further weaken them. For instance, 
Herrmann (2017) finds that investments implemented on 
former village land in Tanzania are likely to exhibit more land 
LSLAs often exacerbate the weaknesses of land governance systems
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conflicts compared with investments on former government 
land. In the case of Laos, the Sino-Lao Rubber Company 
acquired a 7 000 ha concession for rubber production 
in Luang Prabang in 2004 (deal #4013), claiming 328 ha of 
land as part of its land concession that was privately held by 
farmers without any formal land titles. While village authorities 
successfully negotiated the claim down to 100 ha, recall data 
shows that the number of farm households who perceived 
their land tenure as insecure increased by 27% between 2005 
and 2016 (Keovilignavong & Suhardiman, 2020). 
LSLAs often target community land as well, posing a threat 
to tenure security, which is likewise typically held under 
customary or traditional forms of tenure (Dell’Angelo et 
al., 2017; Giger et al., 2019) as formal recognition of these 
tenure systems is still rare. While these systems have 
been found to be resilient to endogenous factors (Agrawal, 
2001; Ostrom, 1990), they may still be unable to cope with 
external pressure such as LSLAs. It is also not uncommon 
for LSLAs to involve the recognition of individual claims to 
former communal land by a village authority before the land 
is transferred to the investor from said individuals. With this 
initial change in tenure, communal village land is then sold 
as individually-held plots to companies as cases in Indonesia, 
for example, document (McCarthy & Zen, 2016). In so doing, 
customary rights may be lost for many generations, or even 
permanently. Furthermore, such processes are prone to 
power misuse and corruption (Lund & Boone, 2013; Nolte, 
2014), often leaving institutional voids (German et al., 2013). In 
Ghana, for instance, the leasing of land to external investors 
by traditional chiefs led to a decrease in trust in customary 
institutions (Nolte & Väth, 2015).
These examples illustrate that LSLAs can induce changes in 
land tenure arrangements that affect tenure security and 
may reinforce previous inequalities, in particular with regard 
to access to land. Bottazzi et al. (2016), for instance, show how 
a large-scale sugar cane project in Sierra Leone embarked 
on a process of land registration and tenure formalisation 
aimed at increasing land tenure security of land users who 
typically held some part of communal land under customary 
tenure. Instead, however, this led to reinforced inequalities 
and the fuelling of conflicts over land. In fact, the tenure 
formalisation increased the entitlements of local landowners 
while simultaneously exacerbating exclusion from access to 
land by “traditional non-owners” such as women, youth, and 
migrants. Similar dynamics can be observed in Indonesia, 
where LSLAs in the oil palm sector have been accompanied 
by contract farming and migration programmes. However, 
because the contract farmers received land titles, this 
created communities (often transmigrants) with a high share 
of land titles versus autochthonous communities that still rely 
on customary – and less secure – tenure (Krishna et al., 2017). 
Overall, this evidence suggests that LSLAs can deepen pre-
existing inequalities, for instance between men and women, 
migrants and locals, and different ethnic groups, by both 
changing land tenure arrangements and weakening existing 
institutions, in particular in regions where customary and 
communal tenure still exist. 
LSLAs can deepen pre-existing inequalities 
by both changing land tenure arrangements 
and weakening existing institutions
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Socio-economic development impacts of LSLAs: 




The potential for LSLAs to foster local rural economic 
development – in particular through creating employment 
and raising agricultural productivity (Collier 2008; Deininger 
and Byerlee 2011) – was widely touted in the early 2000s, as 
land-based investments started to accelerate in developing 
countries. Over a decade later, however, emerging evidence 
suggests that they have only had limited positive, if not 
negative, impacts, in particular in Africa. In fact, as this chapter 
reveals, LSLAs have significantly altered rural development 
and livelihoods with, at times, dramatic consequences.
This is borne out in numerous qualitative case studies and 
news reports which have highlighted the adverse effects 
of LSLAs on smallholders’ access to land. In Chapter 2, for 
example, we demonstrate that LSLAs have restricted the 
access of rural populations to cultivable land, forests, and 
pasture, which has in turn severe negative consequences 
on local economic development. While such adverse effects 
could be mitigated by direct compensations (see Chapter 
2.2), in general, complete compensations of the initial loss of 
access to land seem to be rare (Aisbett & Barbanente, 2016; 
Anseeuw et al., 2012; German et al., 2013). This then raises 
an important question: under which circumstances – and to 
what extent – are the negative effects of LSLAs on land access 
counterbalanced by positive effects, such as employment 
generation, knowledge spillovers to smallholder farmers, and 
infrastructure development?
A number of recent studies from sub-Saharan Africa point 
to limited employment generation and wage gains and few 
positive technology spillovers to smallholders from LSLAs. 
These studies, unlike some earlier studies, are based on 
comprehensive repositories of LSLAs at country or regional 
level, as well as representative household surveys (Ahlerup & 
Tengstam, 2015; Ali et al., 2019; Deininger & Xia, 2016; Lay et al., 
2021). While more or larger positive spillovers to smallholder 
farmers would have been expected, the employment effects 
were anticipated to be limited given that the studies focus 
mostly on grain crops, where mechanised cultivation does 
not require much labour per hectare.14 These studies also 
illustrate a more general point: The effects of LSLAs on 
local economic development and smallholder livelihoods 
strongly depend on the cultivated crop, the former land use, 
and the nature of the links between large and small farms, 
including contract farming (Nolte & Ostermeier, 2017). This 
implies that LSLAs only turn into “success stories” for broader 
and inclusive rural development when certain conditions 
– usually in combination – are met. For example, the rapid 
and ongoing development of the oil palm sector in Southeast 
Asia, an important driver of land acquisitions in this region, 
significantly contributed to rural income growth and poverty 
reduction due to, among other reasons, a strong involvement 
of smallholder farmers (Edwards, 2019; Kubitza et al., 2019).15 
Similarly, in Africa and Latin America, although the scale of 
employment gains is more limited, investments in high-value 
and labour-intensive horticulture projects have spurred local 
development, resulting in income gains and rural poverty 
reduction (Korovkin, 2003; Maertens et al., 2011; Suzuki et al., 
2018; van den Broeck et al., 2017).
In this chapter, we review the evidence on the local 
development and rural livelihood impacts of LSLAs over the 
past 10 to 15 years, with a specific focus on their localised 
socio-economic effects. In other words, we examine their 
impacts in terms of geographical proximity to the land 
acquisition, including job creation on large-scale farms and 
local economic spillovers. To do this, we first revisit the 
evidence on the effects of LSLAs on rural labour markets, 
putting local employment creation into a national context. 
We then assess what is known on spillovers on smallholder 
farms and discuss the current evidence on social and physical 
infrastructure. Lastly, we examine the net effects of LSLAs 
on livelihood outcomes like poverty, inequality, and food 
security. To complement the review, we present case studies 
and in-depth insights from the Land Matrix RFPs to better 
understand the ambiguous impacts by analysing the context 
conditions and different transmission channels.
14This includes maize (in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zambia), sorghum (in Ethiopia and Mozambique), teff and wheat (in Ethiopia), cassava and rice (in 
Mozambique), but also peanuts and sugar cane (in Mozambique).
15The broad-based rural development effects of oil palm expansion can partly be attributed to the hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers that adopted oil 
palm, either independently or with the help of contract farming arrangements. In 2018, around 2.7 million smallholder farmers cultivated oil palm in Indonesia 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2020). On the other hand, oil palm expansion also led to significant land-use changes, such as deforestation, which will be further 
discussed in Chapter 4.
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3.1. Employment effects: Few and temporary jobs with some exceptions
While large-scale farms do require labour to operate, which in 
turn may generate gainful wage employment over time, critics 
of LSLAs point out that they are usually more capital-intensive 
and use less labour than smallholder farms. Recent evidence 
from Africa, which shows only limited employment effects 
of LSLAs (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2019; Deininger and Xia 
2016), seems to corroborate this.16 In Asia, Anti (2021) likewise 
finds little evidence of additional employment from a study 
in Cambodia, only observing a shift away from independent 
smallholder farming towards agricultural employment. Such 
general conclusions, however, should be viewed through 
a more nuanced lens, since the employment effects of 
LSLAs depend on multiple factors, including the former 
land use, crop type, and production methods applied (Nolte 
& Ostermeier, 2017). Nevertheless, the evidence on land 
competition between large-scale farms and smallholders 
does suggest that the former may at least partially replace 
smallholder farms. This implies that the net employment 
effects of large farms might be smaller, or even negative, 
compared to the jobs directly created on large-scale farms.
For Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique, Mercandalli et al. 
(2021) estimate that an average smallholder farm creates 
about 1.5 to 2 permanent jobs per hectare. With suitable 
agroclimatic and ecological conditions, LSLAs with highly 
labour-intensive crops like roses and vegetables could create 
a similar number of jobs per hectare, or even higher in the 
case of roses. However, other crops such as grains, and even 
tea, are less efficient than smallholder farming in terms of job 
creation. The research by Ali, Deininger, and Harris (2019) and 
Deininger and Xia (2016), which concentrated on the farming 
of grains and staples, also confirms the critics’ assertion that 
large-scale farms tend to be much less labour-intensive than 
smallholder farms. For instance, large sorghum farms in 
Ethiopia employ 3.7 temporary workers per hectare and large 
wheat farms employ around 1.3 temporary workers, while 
one permanent worker is on average responsible for 254 ha 
of wheat, 83 ha of sorghum, and 32 ha of teff (Ali, Deininger, 
and Harris 2019). Although directly comparable figures are 
difficult to come by, the size of land needed for one permanent 
worker is relatively large in relation to the typical farm size of 
one hectare that sustains the average smallholder household 
in the country (FAO, 2018; Headey et al., 2014). 
Even though LSLAs often create less jobs per hectare 
compared to smallholder farms, land-based investments 
can generate wage jobs for the local population which could 
help to diversify the income portfolio of local communities. 
Box 6 presents the number of actual jobs created by seven 
land deals recorded by the Land Matrix, ranging from 3 300 
workers for a 1 670 ha plantation in Uganda (deal #1963) to 
24 jobs for a 3 000 ha farm in Romania (deal #4412). 
Little employment creation due to low labour-intensive crops on most large-scale farms
16Unlike studies that only account for direct employment effects from working on large-scale farms, these studies are closer to the net employment effects of LSLAs as 
they account for indirect employment effects as well. Indirect employment effects can be positive if the LSLAs increase income and local demand, creating further jobs 
outside the large-scale farms. The expectation that, despite low labour intensity, higher wages and infrastructure investments from large plantations spark the creation 
of jobs outside the plantation sector thus also seems doubtful, at least for similar study contexts.  
The net employment effects of large 
farms might be smaller, or even negative, 





Best- and worst-case scenarios for employment 
generation   
Employment generation and quality of employment varies 
widely between land deals. Some deals report dismal numbers. 
In Russia, for example, only 45 workers are employed to work 
on 5 500 ha of food crops and livestock (deal #1014), while in 
Romania, 3 000 ha of soya beans, sunflower, and wheat yielded 
only 24 jobs (deal #4412). Similarly, timber concessions, where 
large swaths of land are often handed to investors, generally 
provide only limited employment per hectare. For instance, 
although Alpha Logging and Wood Processing Corporation 
(Woodmann Group from Malaysia) signed a contract for 119 
240 ha in 2008 for timber extraction in Liberia (deal #1392), 
as of 2019, only 75 workers were employed, and of these, only 
15% were full-time employees. Most workers had short-term 
contracts for up to six months as the heavy machinery could 
only be used during the dry season, and the wages for some 
of these workers were even lower than the official minimum 
wage. In addition, measures to ensure work safety were mostly 
missing. While it is expected that timber concessions create 
little employment on the whole since no frequent harvesting 
and maintenance work is needed, perennial crops such as oil 
palm, on the other hand, cannot be completely mechanised, 
which explains the relatively high employment numbers per 
hectare, as seen in Sierra Leone, where Goldtree (S.L.) Ltd. 
employed 300 workers for a 2 424 ha oil palm plantation in 
2019 (deal #1817). The company also cooperates with about 
8 000 to 10 000 farmers for around 30 000 ha of smallholder 
oil palm plantations, who benefit from an outgrower support 
programme on best practices in farming as well. Furthermore, 
the company implemented a programme to upgrade and 
maintain local road networks and supported communities 
during the Ebola crisis.
A similar pattern can be observed for other perennial crops 
such as coffee, such as in the case of Uganda, where the Kaweri 
Coffee Plantation Ltd. (Neumann Group from Germany) 
employed about 800 permanent workers on only 1 670 ha 
of land (deal #1963), of which almost 50% were women. 
During harvest time, approximately 2 500 additional coffee 
pickers were also employed. Similar high labour intensities 
are found only rarely for staple crops, for example in the 
Philippines, where one company intends to cultivate 20 500 
ha for the production of rice and banana with 40 000 workers 
(deal #404).
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data.  
Labor intensity (workers per ha)
Coffee in Uganda (land deal #1963)
Oil palm contract farming in Sierra Leone (land deal #1817)
Soya beans, sun flower and wheat in Rumania (land deal #4412)
Oil palm plantation in Sierra Leone (land deal #1817)
Food crops and livestock in Russia (land deal #1014)
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Figure 3.1: Labour intensities for different land deals
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Due to the low transparency of the investments, the actual 
number of jobs created is not reported for all LSLAs recorded 
by the Land Matrix. To address this data gap, we compute 
the potential employment generation. We assume that deals 
are becoming operational on the full area under contract and 
use crop-specific labour intensities derived from Land Matrix 
employment data.17 Figure 3.2 shows (gross) employment 
generation linked to specific crops, grouped by region. The 
estimates represent an upper bound to gross employment 
effects as not all land deals will become fully productive, and 
some may even fail as described in Chapter 1. 
This exercise illustrates that only a few crops significantly 
contribute to local labour markets. One such crop is oil palm, 
which creates close to one million potential jobs worldwide, 
mostly in Southeast Asia, where palm oil production is 
concentrated. Rubber, another important crop in the region, 
could generate up to a further 200 000 jobs. The oil palm 
sector is also expanding in sub-Saharan Africa, potentially 
creating 200 000 jobs as well, while sugar cane stands out 
in Latin America with 300 000 potential jobs. Some other 
relatively labour-intensive crops, such as cassava, coffee, 
cotton, and tea show moderate job creation potential in 
selected regions. This also holds true for other crops with 
high labour intensities that are not listed in Figure 3.2. For 
instance, looking at the example of Kenya, Madagascar, and 
Mozambique again, Mercandalli et al. (2021) estimate that 
rose production and processing is highly labour intensive, 
with 17 permanent jobs and 2 temporary jobs generated per 
hectare. Vegetable production shows a relatively high labour 
intensity as well, with 2.1 permanent jobs and 2.25 temporary 
jobs per hectare. However, as the size of LSLAs in these 
sectors remains limited, the labour market impacts are small 
and localised. In contrast, and in line with the above results 
from Ethiopia, most staple crops, including barley, sorghum, 
teff, and wheat have limited employment effects (all less than 
50 000 potential jobs) due to their low labour intensities.18 
Besides crop-specific labour intensities, different production 
methods – which were not included in the above computations 
– can imply considerable differences in employment effects. 
A case in point is soya bean production: whereas in South 
America it is heavily mechanised and capital intensive, in India 
it is only semi-mechanised. For example, on average, only one 
worker is employed for close to 100 ha of soya bean in Brazil 
(Bustos et al., 2016), compared to India, where one worker 
is employed for about 7 ha (Byerlee et al., 2016). Likewise, 
for sugarcane, farms using mechanical harvesting create 15 
jobs for 100 ha, compared to those using manual harvesting, 
which create 70 jobs for 100 ha (Deininger & Byerlee, 2011). 
17As only a limited number of deals report data on employment, we use the median labour intensity of all deals with the respective crop, which we multiply with the area 
under contract of concluded deals. 
18We also did not find significant employment effects for the regions of Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East, or North Africa, which were thus not included.
Only a few crops significantly contribute to 
local labour markets. One such crop is oil 
















Figure 3.2: Potential employment creation through LSLAs by crop type
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Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. For the selected crops and regions, the total area is 13 168 545 ha. Only concluded deals are included, with the 
exception of abandoned deals. We only show data for crops with a potential employment creation larger than 50 000 and not less than 15 concluded deals in 
the selected regions.
Share of potential LSLA jobs








Notes: Calculations based on data from the Land Matrix and International Labour Organisation (ILO 2020). Only concluded deals are included, with the 
exception of abandoned deals.
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Due to agro-ecological conditions, certain types of cropping 
systems and their associated labour intensities are regionally 
clustered, leading to possibly strong localised labour market 
effects. Figure 3.3 puts employment generation in perspective 
by presenting the potential employment creation of LSLAs as 
a share of total employment by country. The map shows that, 
at national level, most labour markets will not be significantly 
affected by transnational LSLAs. Overall, based on our 
current sample of deals and assuming full implementation, 
less than 0.5% of the national workforce will be employed on 
the acquired land in the majority of countries. For selected 
countries with relatively small population density, effects 
will be larger, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, Laos, Namibia, and Papua New Guinea, although 
this is also seen in some more densely populated countries 
that are important targets for land deals, such as Ghana and 
Sierra Leone.
Future demographic changes are also worrying: about 375 
million young people will enter the labour market in sub-
Saharan Africa between 2015 and 2030, the majority of 
which still reside in rural areas, despite urbanisation (Losch, 
2016). These substantial demographic changes, along with 
the limited effects on the current labour market, cast doubt 
on the importance of LSLAs in decreasing unemployment in 
most countries. We caution, however, that due to the data 
limitations outlined in Chapter 1, there may be unaccounted 
deals which could downward bias our estimates for some 
countries.
So far, although we have emphasised the (potential) quantity 
of employment, we have not discussed its quality. The 
limited literature focusing on LSLA job quality indicates a 
trend towards less permanent salaried work, except for 
the few management positions (often taken up by migrant 
workers), and towards a greater reliance on casual temporary 
work (Ali, 2020; Gibbon, 2011; Oya, 2013). In particular, 
large-scale farms that cultivate grain crops can often only 
offer temporary employment during the harvest and land 
preparation seasons. Such irregular income sources can 
supplement the income portfolio of rural households, but 
they cannot substitute their own farming activities. It is also 
concerning that, in some cases, the highly seasonal labour 
demand of large-scale farms could lead to competition with 
smallholders that also seasonally depend on local labour. We 
discuss evidence on this mechanism in the following section 
on spillovers to smallholders.
Beyond the general trend of limited and low-quality job 
creation, impacts regarding LSLA job quality can vary 
dramatically. The quality of jobs provided by LSLAs, defined 
in terms of work conditions, contract duration, level of 
remuneration, and access to extra-salary benefits such as 
social insurance, depends strongly on production models, 
labour policies, and value chain organisation. It also depends 
on local factors such as overall employment opportunities 
and geographic proximity to the LSLA. In a country like 
Kenya, for example, the quality of jobs in agriculture is 
shaped by horticulture production models, long-standing 
and well-structured value chains, and relatively strong labour 
policies, as illustrated in the Nanyuki area. In the 28 LSLAs 
implemented in the area, for instance, 82% of the jobs are 
permanent (see Table 3.1). This is linked to the roses and 
vegetables production models that demand specific – often 
relatively well-qualified – labour all year round. Most of the 
permanent employment contracts are duly formalised, of 
which about half come with extra-salary benefits such as 
health insurance and vacation entitlements, and a minority 
with pensions and maternity leave of absence (Mercandalli 
et al., 2021). That said, although the contracts are still aligned 
with Kenyan agricultural minimum wages (280 to 360 KS per 
day in 2017), these wages remain less attractive than those of 
other local wage jobs (around 420 KS per day). 
No remedy for precarious labour markets: Temporary and underpaid jobs prevail
Assuming full implementation, less than 
0.5% of the national workforce will be 
employed on the acquired land in the 
majority of countries
The disconnect between LSLA job 
creation and improvement of social 
conditions of work persists 
53
September 2021
Intermediary situations can be identified in, for example, 
Mozambique, a country that is in a preliminary labour 
structuration phase, which, despite the labour trend towards 
poor job quality in the LSLA sector, has seen improvements 
in emerging and export-oriented value chains. Nevertheless, 
in analysing LSLAs in the regions along the Numpula corridor, 
Mercandalli et al. (2021),  underscore that the majority of 
jobs are casual, as is observed in 71% of the cases at the 
national level (Di Matteo & Schoneveld, 2016). For instance, 
in the Gurué and Monapo areas, with dominant tea or sisal 
production models, 62% and 73% of jobs, respectively, 
are temporary, with the large majority of them not being 
formalised with a contract. Tea cultivation, performed on 
aging plantations and oriented to regional markets, does not 
meet standard requirements either, with remuneration of 
only 80 MZN per day – well below the minimum agriculture 
wage (114 MZN per day). In all these cases, jobs often lack any 
kind of side benefits and can present dire working conditions 
(Agy, 2018; Governo de Moçambique, 2017; Mercandalli et al., 
2021), demonstrating how, in these sectors, the disconnect 
between LSLA job creation and improvement of social 
conditions of work persists (Ali & Muinga, 2016). 
In contrast, a second, but limited, trend appears in Ruacé-
Lioma, where soya-oriented production models have 
developed more recently. Table 3.1 shows that permanent 
employment prevails (60%), and is mostly formal (62%). 
Such contracts come with combinations of health insurance, 
leave entitlement, and pension rights (Baumert et al., 2019; 
Mercandalli et al., 2021). Recent studies in this area indicate 
that the wages are slightly above the monthly minimum wage, 
and are 73% higher in foreign companies than in national 
companies (Di Matteo & Schoneveld, 2016). 
At the other extreme, we find countries like Madagascar, 
where the very few LSLAs remaining reflect the only job 
opportunities in rural areas. However, the lack of alternatives, 
combined with the staple crop production models LSLAs 
generally engage in, result in extremely low labour conditions, 
as seen in the only LSLA still operating in the south of the 
country. In this maize production model, diversified with 
plants dedicated to essential oil production, about 80% of the 
workers access temporary positions, and the majority have 
no contract. Furthermore, casual workers only have access 
to a few benefits, of which the main one is access to a local 
hospital sponsored by the company, and their working day 
for the company is more demanding than daily labour for 
the local farmers, with no meals provided and working hours 
ending later in the afternoon. These casual labour conditions 
are also related to the seasonality of labour demand and 
poor standards in the sector overall. The remaining 20% are 
permanent workers, who are engaged in the more technical 
tasks. As shown in Table 3.1, they mostly benefit from formal 
contracts (65%) with extra-salary benefits such as health 
insurance, leave entitlements, and pension (Mercandalli et 
al., 2021). Moreover, the remuneration offered by the LSLA 
is up to twofold that of other job opportunities in the rural 
countryside and, consequently, its job attractiveness is high. 
About 15% of rural households interviewed by Mercandalli et 
al. (2021), however, stated that although they had tried to get 
a position, they were not recruited.












% of permanent workers 27 38 60 82 21
% of temporary workers 73 62 40 18 79
% of all workers with contract 19 37 42 80 24
% of permanent workers with contract 18 76 62 86 65
% of temporary workers with contract 24 8 18 37 2
REMUNERATION PER DAY
(LOCAL CURRENCY)
Currency: MZN Currency: MZN Currency: MZN Currency: KS Currency: MGA
Agribusiness jobs 20 80 - 320 7 500
Non-agriculture employment 80 110 220 420 3 500
Self-employment 100 90 100 250 2 900
Notes: Calculations based on Mercandalli et al. (2021). Having a contract is defined as having a contract that is formalised. Permanent work is defined as working 
more than eight months per year. Wages are reported as average wages per day, for all permanent and daily workers. 
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Assessments of the socio-economic profiles of LSLA 
employees and their households stress that the 
predominantly temporary jobs for day labourers or seasonal 
workers created on LSLAs tend to benefit the most vulnerable 
segments of the population: poor households, migrants, 
the youth, and women. Indeed, young people and migrants 
are the most frequently recruited for temporary and casual 
labour. Precarious jobs remain more open to women who, 
unlike men, find it difficult to access employment in other 
sectors of the rural economy.
However, results also show that, in the framework of 
improving labour conditions, such as in Kenya, other 
segments of the population aiming to build more sustainable 
livelihood strategies can be engaged, for example, older 
workers accessing permanent, decent opportunities. This 
illustrates how local conditions play a critical role in the 
unfolding outcomes of LSLA labour relations, livelihoods, and 
local economies. 
3.2. Spillovers to smallholder farms depend on crops and business models
The productivity of smallholder farmers unquestionably 
needs to improve, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Beegle & Christiaensen, 2019; Tian & Yu, 2019). However, 
while targeted interventions, including more and better 
extension services, are in no doubt an effective way to 
achieve this, harnessing positive spillovers from large-scale 
farms (Deininger and Byerlee 2011) holds enormous potential 
to augment the capacity of smallholder farmers. Not only 
can large-scale farms improve the availability and access to 
inputs and technologies, including fertiliser, improved seeds, 
tractors, and storage facilities, but they also open up new 
marketing channels, through the emergence of new buyers 
for example, including the farm itself. Large-scale farms 
may also explicitly or implicitly offer credit to smallholders. 
These positive spillovers can be facilitated through closer 
relationships between smallholders and large-scale farms, 
such as through contract farming arrangements, but also 
depend on a variety of conditions. First, the spillovers depend 
on the crops cultivated by both investors and smallholders, 
which will, for instance, determine whether the large-
scale farms’ technologies and management practices can 
be adapted or equipment and advanced inputs (seeds or 
chemical fertiliser) used. Second, smallholder productivity 
improvements depend on initial yield gaps; improvements 
may be smaller when large farms have lower land productivity 
than smallholders, as documented by studies on the inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity (Carletto 
et al., 2013). Lastly, the spillover effects of LSLAs and the 
feasibility of contract farming are determined by other local 
conditions, in particular on land (availability of land and land 
rights) and labour markets (availability of labour and feasibility 
of internal migration).
Negative spillovers from LSLAs may also occur, for instance 
through the increased competition for scarce resources, be it 
land, water, or labour – resulting in constrained access to these 
resources and/or higher prices for smallholders. We have 
already shown evidence that land indeed becomes scarcer, 
and we will provide evidence for increased competition over 
water in Chapter 4, where we discuss environmental impacts. 
Nevertheless, evidence on spillovers from LSLAs from newly 
established large-scale farms in grains and staples in sub-
Saharan Africa suggests that they are moderately positive 
overall, but with differences between crops (Ali et al., 2019; 
Deininger & Xia, 2016; Lay et al., 2021). For example, they 
appear to be larger in maize production, where the yield 
difference between small and large producers is significantly 
larger in comparison to millet, sorghum, or wheat (Ittersum 
et al., 2016).19 The substantial increase of about 20% 
in smallholder maize yields (on average 1.7 tonnes per 
hectare) in regions in Zambia where large-scale farms were 
established illustrates this point, although this effect could 
not be observed for “micro” smallholders with less than 1.4 
ha of land (Lay et al., 2021). 
Spillovers also depend on whether the type of crop and 
technology applied is adaptable to independent smallholder 
Positive spillovers to smallholders are rare due to inadaptability of capital intense 
and scale-dependent new technologies
19Smallholder maize yields, for example, often reach only about 20% of their yield potential, producing one to two tonnes per hectare. In contrast, maize yields on larger 
farms – as well as on smaller demonstration farms – can be as high as three to six tonnes per hectare (Ittersum et al., 2016; World Bank, 2008).
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farming, which may not be the case for flower production, 
high-value vegetables for export, or no-till farming. On the 
other hand, in the oil palm sector, one of the key drivers of 
LSLAs worldwide, smallholders, particularly in Southeast 
Asia, quickly took up a newly introduced crop and its related 
management practices. The primary reason is that oil palm 
is highly profitable even at small scales since cultivation 
is hardly mechanised and still mainly depends on manual 
labour. This partly explains the widespread use of contract 
farming arrangements in this sector – although much 
less so in sub-Saharan Africa.20 In Indonesia, for instance, 
smallholder farmers (as contract or independent farmers) 
currently account for over 40% of the total oil palm area 
(Kubitza & Gehrke, 2018). In fact, the evidence suggests 
that those households and communities that adopted oil 
palm cultivation often fare better than those that did not. 
We discuss the welfare and poverty effects in more detail 
below (Edwards, 2019; Euler et al., 2017; Kubitza et al., 2019), 
however, it is important to note that such positive spillovers 
are not uniformly distributed, particularly because not all 
households and communities have the necessary skills, 
assets, and access to additional land to take advantage of 
the new crop (Euler et al., 2016; Santika et al., 2019). Besides 
economic gains, contract farming between smallholders and 
large-scale plantations, especially in the early years of the oil 
palm boom, facilitated the adoption of the new crop among 
smallholder farmers. In Southeast Asia, the prevalence of 
contract farming in the oil palm sector is also due to the 
fact that large-scale plantations are often legally bound to 
set aside about 20% (or more) of their concession area for 
contract farming under the current regulations ( Jelsma et al., 
2017). Still, not all companies abide by the legal requirements, 
and the Land Matrix has recorded a number of major 
conflicts around the extent of contract farming between local 
communities and investors (deal #8046, for example).21
Importantly, contract farming is not limited to the oil palm 
sector. Figure 3.4 shows the number of land deals by crop 
with (some) contract farming based on Land Matrix data. In 
total, these deals account for only 15% of the total number of 
concluded deals. In Asia and the Pacific, we can see a number 
of deals with contract farming in rubber and oil palm – in line 
with current literature. In sub-Sahara Africa, a more diverse 
set of crops is linked to contract farming, including maize, oil 
palm, rubber, soya bean, and sugar cane. 
Positive effects of contract farming may be counterbalanced by unequal risk-sharing and high costs
20In the oil palm sector, incentives on both sides exist to engage in contract farming. Oil palm farmers need to sell their harvest within two days to ensure high quality oil, 
and hence rarely store their harvest to obtain higher prices later on from different buyers. At the same time, the large-scale oil palm plantations often incorporate palm 
oil mills, and to run the mills at full capacity and profitability, companies usually rely on the harvest of smallholders additional to their own production.
21Links between smallholders and large-scale plantations may also be organised in different models, which include independent farmers that are linked to processing 
plants within large-scale plantations via local agents, farmer groups, or farmer-managed cooperatives. Further, smallholders may lease their land to companies against 
financial compensation. In particular, in Malaysia, a country with a very mature oil palm sector, smallholders gradually evolved into shareholders with labour being 
sourced from poorer countries, such as Indonesia (Cramb & McCarthy, 2016).
In Asia and the Pacific, we can see a 
number of deals with contract farming 
in rubber and oil palm. In sub-Sahara 
Africa, a more diverse set of crops is 
linked to contract farming 








Latin America and the Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa












































Figure 3.4: Distribution of contract farming by crop type 
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Only concluded deals are included, with the exception of abandoned deals (n=1455). Only crops with more than 




















In general, these contract farming arrangements can 
address frequently cited constraints in the smallholder 
farming sector, including limited access to input and output 
markets as well as credit, and facilitate knowledge spillovers. 
Indeed, certain studies find positive effects of contract 
farming arrangements on income, profit, and welfare of 
smallholder farmers (Meemken & Bellemare, 2020). Yet, using 
a new dataset on contract farming participation in six low- 
and middle-income countries,22 Meemken and Bellemare 
(2020) argue that contract farming may not always be 
beneficial for smallholder farmers.23 The ambiguous effects 
of contract farming may be explained by, for example, 
knowledge transfer often being more limited than assumed 
(Chamberlain & Anseeuw, 2019), and specific characteristics 
of contracts being in favour of the company, rather than the 
smallholders. Box 7 describes different contract farming 
arrangements linked to two major land deals in Ghana and 
their impact on local livelihoods. 
22Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.
23Meemken and Bellemare (2020) argue that many studies tend to lack external validity, as they focus on small geographic areas and specific contract farming schemes. 
In fact, using their (more representative) new dataset on contract farming participation in six low- and middle-income countries, they find only moderate gains – 




Effects on local production depend on the type of 
contract farming schemes    
Contract farming arrangements between large-scale farms 
and smallholders are often considered essential to allow for 
broader rural development effects of LSLAs, and yet, overall 
empirical evidence on contract farming and smallholder 
livelihoods is considerably mixed. The specific characteristics 
of contracts might be an important source of effect 
heterogeneity, as illustrated in the case of Ghana, where 
two major oil palm companies, Benso Oil Palm Plantation 
(BOPP), a subsidiary of Wilmar International Limited (land 
deal #1346), and Twifo Oil Palm Plantation (TOPP), owned by 
Unilever (deal #6775), operate nucleus estates with large oil 
palm plantations and processing mills that were previously 
state-owned. 
After privatisation, and the subsequent upgrading of their 
respective mills’ processing capacity to 20-30 tonnes per 
hour, while both companies were incentivised to develop 
contract farming schemes to obtain oil palm fruit bunches 
from smallholder farmers, the contracts they offered differed 
substantially. Where BOPP offers simple marketing contracts 
that only specify an annual fixed price and regular pick-ups of 
the harvest at the farm gate, TOPP offers resource-providing 
contracts which specify an annual fixed price, regular pick-ups, 
and the provision of in-kind credits. These credits include an 
initial in-kind credit for the set-up of the plantation (planting 
material, agrochemical inputs, tools, and machinery) and 
additional in-kind credits for agrochemical inputs throughout 
the contract duration of 20-25 years. The in-kind credits are 
paid back by the farmers through a share of each harvest, 
until the debt is paid in full.
Unsurprisingly, a recent study found that both contracts affect 
the production and productivity of smallholders differently: 
while the more comprehensive resource-providing contract 
leads to increased adoption of agrochemical inputs, higher 
productivity, and a more specialised and larger scale of 
production, the marketing contract that offers no input 
support does not lead to production changes. Thus, it is 
important to note that while descriptive statistics on land 
deals with and without contract farming are insightful, 
researchers and policy-makers have to be aware of the large 
diversity of contract farming schemes.
Source: Ruml & Qaim (2020)
Up to this point, we have looked at the direct effects of 
LSLAs on smallholders, but important spillovers may also 
stem from their impacts on local factors (land and labour) 
and product markets. It is conceivable that the large-scale 
production of crops that are not mainly destined for export 
markets, including maize and other staples, affects local 
supplies and thus depresses crop prices. To our knowledge, 
these possible effects have not yet been examined, but there 
is some evidence on potentially adverse impacts on local 
smallholder farmers through the labour market. Hofman et 
al. (2019), for example, report a considerable drop in average 
incomes – of about 10% – for smallholders in Sierra Leone 
adjacent to a large-scale sugar plantation established in 
2010. In 2017, according to the Land Matrix (deal #1798), the 
company leased 23 500 ha of land and employed 2 400 local 
seasonal workers on the farm. Hofman et al. (2019) assume 
that this increased labour demand pushed up the wages of 
agricultural labourers, who thus gain from this development, 
with negative income effects on smallholder farmers who 
correspondingly have to afford higher wages of agricultural 
labourers during their harvest season. While more evidence 
on such spillover effects is needed, in general, crowding out of 
smallholder farms from input markets could be a substantial 
problem in malfunctioning markets, where smallholders find 
it difficult to adjust to changes caused by large-scale farms. 
3.3. Unfulfilled expectations of better social and physical infrastructure
The establishment of large-scale farms typically requires 
an extension of existing rural infrastructure, in particular of 
roads. Some companies also provide social infrastructure, 
including housing, schools, and health centres, to their 
workers and their families. These services are sometimes 
accessible to non-employees as well. Infrastructure projects 
can also be part of contracts in order to compensate 
communities for land losses (see Box 5 in Chapter 2). 
For 15% of concluded deals recorded in the Land Matrix, 
we have information on some promised benefits in terms 
of infrastructure development. Figure 3.5 shows Land 
Matrix data for promised benefits in terms of infrastructure 
development, as well as data on the actual implementation of 
benefits. In particular, health (for 7% of all concluded deals) 
and education facilities (for 9% of all concluded deals) for the 
local population were promised as benefits. 






Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data. Only concluded deals are included, with the exception of abandoned deals. Note that one deal can include several 
benefits. (n=1 455)
















































Only a limited number of deals reported 
any benefits in terms of infrastructure 
that actually materialised 
However, only a limited number of deals reported any benefits 
in terms of infrastructure that actually materialised (for 7% 
of all concluded deals), although these numbers could be 
downward biased, given a considerable number of deals have 
missing information. The Land Matrix data does not reveal 
which infrastructure projects were actually implemented, or 
if expectations of local people were met. In Box 8, we discuss 
these issues in the context of Laos, which supports the finding 
that, while high expectations concerning infrastructure 
development exist among the local population, companies 
often do not deliver. On the other hand, it is not surprising 
that profit-oriented investors do not feel obligated to build 
up infrastructure for the local population, especially in the 
case of unclear legal frameworks and weak enforcements. In 
addition, investments seem to occur in well-connected and
populated areas, where investors do not have to bear the 
costs of developing their own infrastructure (Hett et al., 2020; 




Promised but not delivered: Infrastructure 
development and land deals in Laos     
Expectations of Lao citizens regarding the provision of public 
infrastructure as an additional benefit of private sector 
investments in agriculture or mining are generally high. 
These expectations are anchored in the common practice 
of government granting land and resource concessions 
to private companies in exchange for the development of 
infrastructure since the economic opening of Laos in the 
mid-1980s. They are also reflected in the so-called “Turning 
Land into Capital” (TLIC) policy, which was supposed to foster 
local economic development and reduce state spending on 
infrastructure through the commercialisation of land.
The interest in the potential economic benefits from land 
deals was likewise generally found to be high among the local 
population. A study of 296 land deals in nine provinces of 
Laos found that during the consultation process, economic 
benefits such as employment and monetary compensation, 
as well as infrastructure, were mentioned in 41% of all cases. 
These benefits were also the most frequently negotiated 
issue among village communities, even topping land 
allocation. However, for infrastructure, the study shows that 
for almost half of the deals, the promised contributions to 
local infrastructure such as roads, schools, or clean water 
provision systems were only partially or not at all fulfilled. In 
addition, the provision of infrastructure was promised in only 
a small number of land deal negotiations in the first place, 
since the local governments and affected communities were 
often unaware of their right to negotiate the provision of 
these benefits with the investors. A case study conducted in 
one province, Luang Pranag, found that out of 21 agricultural 
deals, only a very small number mention infrastructure 
development of any kind. 
There are different reasons for the low rate of infrastructure 
development provided by land concession and lease projects 
for agricultural and mining products. First, as mentioned, 
the investors of these deals do not see it as their obligation 
to contribute to rural infrastructure. On the contrary, the 
studies suggest that investors perceive the lack of adequate 
infrastructure as a key constraint for land deals, and among 
one of the primary reasons for the clustering of deals in the 
accessible lowland and border areas of Laos. Based on a 
recent nationwide inventory of 1 038 deals, approximately 
two-thirds of all investigated deals occurred in the Mekong 
plains and lowland areas, with an average travel time of only 
two hours to the nearest provincial capital. In these locations, 
the investors therefore both minimise their transportation 
costs and the need to develop their own infrastructure. 
In addition, most investors also lack the access to capital 
for infrastructure investment. In fact, only 12% of the 296 
investigated land deals were with publicly-listed corporations, 
which usually have access to significant amounts of capital, 
whereas the majority were developed by private companies 
and family businesses with more limited financial resources.
Compliance with legal obligations is frequently also low. 
Project development agreements or concession contracts 
are available for less than half of all land deals registered in a 
national inventory, while environmental impact assessments 
are only available for 2% of all investigated deals. In addition, 
the TLIC policy was never fully formalised, and hence the 
specific legislative text and bureaucratic procedures are 
missing for an effective monitoring and enforcement system. 
The poorly conceived policy, limited compliance, clustering 
of investments in relatively well-developed regions, and lack 
of interest of investors to spend their own resources on 
infrastructure development contribute to the considerable 
mismatch between expectations and real progress regarding 
infrastructure provision as an added value to agriculture and 
mining deals. 
Sources: Hett et al. (2020); Kenney-Lazar et al. (2018); 
Nanhthavong et al. (2020)
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Generally, if companies pay taxes or lease fees or buy land 
from the government, the government in turn has more room 
to invest in infrastructure, compensate displaced households, 
and implement projects for employment generation. However, 
in reality, many countries face considerable difficulties in 
adjusting their fiscal regime to secure revenue from selling 
off their natural resources. In addition, companies are often 
exempted from custom duties, income and excise taxes, and 
sometimes even receive subsidies (Anseeuw et al., 2012; 
Fraser, Alstair & Lungu, John, 2007; Richardson, 2010). The 
oil palm sector in Indonesia illustrates further shortcomings. 
The major source of tax revenues from oil palm plantations 
is not related to annual taxation of production, but to one-
off revenues from selling licenses to clear forestland for 
plantations (Obidzinski et al., 2013).
Furthermore, it was estimated that only 11-14% of palm oil tax 
revenues were actually redistributed to local governments 
(Falconer et al., 2015). Companies often also avoid taxation. 
For example, Land Matrix data reveals that, in the case of 
Ukraine, countries such as Cyprus and Luxembourg, which 
are known for low corporate taxes, are the primary location 
of investors (Amosov et al., 2020). Besides the cited studies, 
however, little systematic evidence is available on the effects 
of LSLAs on infrastructure development and tax revenues.
3.4. How it adds up: Poverty, inequality, and food security effects
Thus far we have shown that LSLAs frequently target land that 
is used for smallholder agriculture, pastoralism, or shifting 
cultivation (see Chapter 2) – which can drastically affect local 
livelihoods – and demonstrated that (potential) employment 
effects are limited in most cases, especially in terms of the 
highly mechanised cultivation of soya bean and most grain 
crops. Nevertheless, considerable employment effects are 
possible with specific labour-intensive crops, for people 
living in close proximity to acquired land, and in countries 
with small labour markets. For spillovers on smallholder 
farms, the evidence hints at moderate crop-specific effects 
at best, but with the potential for larger positive spillover 
effects through contract farming. Based on the scarce 
available evidence, we also expect limited effects in terms 
of infrastructure development and tax revenues. Ultimately, 
these transmission mechanisms and the related changes in 
local livelihood strategies determine the effects of LSLAs on 
rural livelihood outcomes, including poverty, inequality, and 
food security. 
In their recent review, Oberlack et al. (2016) report positive 
income effects for a significant number of cases of land deals. 
However, the magnitude of the income gains and poverty 
reduction is rarely established in these studies, and there 
are only a few empirical studies that compute the effects of 
LSLAs on poverty. For example, Herrmann and Grote (2015) 
show a large and significant difference of 40% in rates of 
extreme poverty between matched plantation workers on a 
sugar cane plantation in Malawi (10% live below the poverty 
line) and non-participants (50% live below the poverty line).24 
Although Hofman et al. (2019) do not report poverty rates, 
very poor households with members working on a sugar cane 
plantation in Sierra Leone (with an average cash income far 
below the international poverty line) experience moderate 
income gains. Relatively large positive effects are reported 
from wage employment in higher value crops, on the other 
hand. Van den Broeck, Swinnen, and Maertens (2017) find 
decreasing poverty for households with workers in the 
horticultural sector in Senegal, with increases in incomes 
among the poorest half of the population by 30% and for 
the poorest 10% by as much as 53%. However, in light of the 
limited employment effects of many large-scale plantations, 
more important effects on poverty may come from land loss, 
displacement, and spillovers to adjacent smallholders. In fact, 
the study by Hofman et al. (2019) on the sugar cane plantation 
in Sierra Leone finds adverse effects on poor smallholder 
farmers due to higher labour costs that outweigh the gains of 
the plantation workers.
To capture the “net impact” of LSLAs, rather than the effects 
on specific types of households, it may be more instructive 
to look at average poverty in proximity to land deals. Such 
evidence, based on nationally representative data, comes 
from Nanhthavong et al. (2020) for Laos between 2005 and 
2015, a period of heavy investor activity in the country. 
Their study provides descriptive evidence that poverty rates 
declined more rapidly in villages affected by LSLAs compared 
to other villages. This decline was particularly pronounced 
in villages with close collaboration between smallholders 
and plantations (in the rubber sector) and in more remote 
villages with little competition for land between smallholders 
and large-scale farms. Further evidence based on nationally 
representative data on poverty rates comes from the oil palm 
sector in Indonesia. Edwards (2019) finds that the oil palm 
boom lifted around 2.6 million Indonesians out of poverty. In 
Poverty reductions in Indonesia’s oil palm sector, but the bulk of LSLAs do not deliver
24Herrmann and Grote (2015) acknowledge the limitation to their quasi-experimental approach, which may mean that they overestimate the positive impacts.
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Kalimantan, Indonesia, Santika et al. (2019) document more 
heterogeneous effects. While communities with previous 
experience in plantation agriculture benefitted from LSLAs, 
poorer communities that relied on subsistence-based 
livelihoods experienced deteriorating well-being. That Laos 
and Indonesia report relatively positive income impacts of 
LSLAs is no coincidence. Instead, this is in line with the above 
discussion on employment effects that suggest relatively 
strong employment impacts for both countries. In contrast, 
in a study from Cambodia, Anti (2021) shows a decline in 
household expenditures for households living close to as 
well as on the LSLA. Although we do not have any estimates 
on the “net” poverty effects for other countries, based on 
the evidence from the previous sections, we expect that 
the effects on poverty will be very limited if not poverty-
augmenting, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
25Several studies highlight that local leaders, like mayors or village chiefs, can have a strong influence on the distribution of costs and benefits of development projects in 
their respective communities (Beekman et al., 2014), a mechanism that also applies to LSLAs (Nolte 2014).
Laos and Indonesia report relatively 
positive income impacts of LSLAs 
The inequality impacts of LSLAs have, to date, received little 
attention, despite the fact that we can expect differential 
impacts of the discussed transmission channels on different 
population groups, including landowners, smallholders, 
workers, men and women, and ethnic groups. Furthermore, 
such effects may reinforce pre-existing inequalities, 
especially if the distribution of gains is determined by local-
level institutions.25 For instance, there are some indications 
that (richer) local elites take advantage of the redistribution 
of land or compensations (Hofman et al., 2019; Oberlack et 
al., 2016). While we know little on the distribution of benefits 
among smallholder farmers, it is conceivable that spillovers 
favour relatively richer farmers that have access to capital and 
land to implement new technologies. Indeed, Lay et al., (2021) 
find that in Zambia, only larger smallholder farms benefitted 
from neighbouring large-scale farms in terms of yield gains; 
thus possibly increasing inequality among smallholders. 
Similarly, barriers to engage in contract farming, including 
skills, land, and capital, may exacerbate inequality and foster 
the concentration of land ownership. Current evidence 
points to increasing global land inequality, in particular in 
Asia and the Pacific, with an increase by 11% from 1980 to 
today measured by the Gini coefficient (Anseeuw & Baldinelli, 
2020). Although we cannot precisely measure to which 
extent LSLAs contribute to this trend, this development is 
worrying in light of the large and detrimental influence of land 
inequality on local livelihoods. In contrast, the cited evidence 
on the employment and labour market effects that favour 
relatively poor households with little land may have positive 
distributional effects.
Some evidence is available on the gender effects of LSLAs, 
which are often related to whether labour demand is biased 
towards male or female labour. In Sierra Leone, for example, 
Bottazzi et al. (2018) find that from a random sample of 
households close to a large-scale sugar cane plantation, 
only 2% of women (but 19% of men) were employed by 
the plantation (#deal 1798). Oil palm plantations also tend 
to increase the (relative) demand for male labour, as oil 
palm harvesting is highly physically demanding. Kubitza 
et al. (2019) argue, however, that the emergence of a non-
agricultural sector that followed the oil palm boom partly 
counteracted this effect, as it increased the demand for 
female labour. Some agricultural sectors also favour women, 
such as in the Ethiopian cut-flower sector, where 71% of all 
permanent workers are women, compared to 34% in an 
average Ethiopian firm (Suzuki et al., 2018). Similarly, in Kenya’s 
Nanyuki area, of the total 8 200 employees on large-scale 
farms (the majority being specialised in horticulture), 49% 
of permanent workers and 62% of seasonal workers were 
women (Giger et al., 2020). However, research in Africa has 
also found a strong  gender-based wage  gap, with women 
earning 50% less than men,  due to the employment of men 
in higher qualified technical or managerial jobs (Mercandalli 
et al., 2021). Yet, as highlighted by Kubitza et al. (2019), the 
relevant criteria to judge inequality effects carry less weight 
even if a certain cropping system is biased towards male 
or female labour if disadvantaged population groups have 
access to other rewarding employment opportunities in a 
changing economic environment. For example, in settings 
with limited access to the non-agricultural sector or scarce 
land resources, as discussed in Chapter 4, this may often not 
be the case. 
Local elites often control the redistribution of land, thereby reinforcing inequality 
Gender-differentiated demand for labour
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Limited impact on food security – but competition for land increases
26For the case of a large-scale sugar cane plantation in Sierra Leone, for instance, Yengoh and Armah (2015) argue that perceived food security decreased as the 
number of farmers producing food crops declined by about 20% (#deal 1798). For the same LSLA, Bottazzi et al. (2018) find evidence for significant increases in food 
consumption expenditure and perceived food security of households in affected villages compared to households in unaffected villages. The authors suggest that their 
method is more robust compared to Yengoh and Armah (2015) as they compare the level of food security indicators between villages close to the LSLA and unaffected 
control villages. Hofman et al. (2019) find no significant effect on food security (measured by incidence of hunger) for the same LSLA, likewise purporting that their 
method is more robust compared to Bottazzi et al. (2018) as they also control for pre-existing differences between villages close to the LSLA and unaffected control 
villages. These three studies highlight that sampling strategies and estimation methods strongly determine the subsequent findings.
There is little doubt that LSLAs can affect food security 
through local food supply, as local smallholder production 
shifts to cash crop production or gets entirely replaced by 
export-oriented large-scale farms. The rise of oil crops, such 
as oil palm and soya bean, as well as sugarcane, where export-
oriented agricultural production is strongly associated with 
LSLAs, is a case in point as documented by Land Matrix data 
(see Figure 1.9 in Chapter 1). These export-oriented LSLAs, 
in particular when related to biofuel production, have often 
been associated with threats to food security in target 
countries as they compete with food production for scarce 
resources (Borras et al., 2010; Matondi et al., 2011; Mechiche-
Alami et al., 2021). In Brazil, for example, where the area of 
soya bean plantations tripled between 1990 and 2015, strong 
tensions exist between impoverished landless households 
that commonly engage in local food production and export-
oriented large-scale farms (Byerlee et al., 2016; Wright & 
Wolford, 2003). The negative effect of specialised cash crop 
production at the household level on local dietary diversity 
is also noteworthy, although the effect is potentially minor. 
In a recent review of 45 studies, positive and significant 
associations between on-farm production diversity and 
dietary diversity in smallholder households were reported 
for 80% of the studies, however, the effects are small in size 
(Sibhatu & Qaim, 2018). In addition, the income from cash 
crops or wage employment – even under the typical imperfect 
market conditions in developing countries – could partly 
counteract the losses in dietary diversity due to declining 
on-farm production diversity. Still, in certain settings where 
food markets are not easily accessible and income generating 
activities are rare, on-farm production diversity may remain 
important for local food security (Ecker, 2018; Koppmair et al., 
2017; S. Singh et al., 2020).
Aside from concerns for local food supply, LSLAs affect 
households’ access to food as incomes and food prices 
change. Again, the rise of oil crops over the past few decades 
is a prominent example, given that at least 25% of the increase 
in total food calories in developing countries since 1970 comes 
from vegetables oils, which became relatively cheap in most 
countries (Byerlee et al., 2016). The effect of LSLAs on income 
is likely to be mixed as argued in the previous sections. It 
comes as no surprise, therefore, that the household-level 
evidence on the impacts of LSLAs on local food security is 
inconclusive as well. Even for the same land deal, studies 
derive different conclusions (Bottazzi et al., 2018; Hofman et 
al., 2019; Yengoh & Armah, 2015).26 Box 9 discusses a case 
from Madagascar in more detail, where increases in local 
income eventually improved local food security. 
Overall, although little systematic evidence is available on the 
net livelihood outcomes from LSLAs at regional or country 
level, the available studies cast doubt on the expectations 
that sizeable positive effects for poverty and food security 
will take place across the board. Nevertheless, despite this 
rather sobering global picture, a few regions and countries 
do seem to have benefitted from the rise of LSLAs in terms of 
poverty reduction and employment. Studying the respective 





Effects of LSLAs on food security in
Madagascar differ between contract farming
and wage employment    
Madagascar is one of the primary target countries for land-
based investments in Africa, with a total of 1.4 million ha of 
concluded deals. However, the impact of these is controversial, 
in particular regarding food security.
A recent study explored the food security effects of large-
scale agricultural investments in two areas of Madagascar, 
covering two distinct agribusiness models, namely large-
scale farming and contract farming. The first, Tozzi Green 
(deal #1454), is located in Satrokala and Andiolava in the 
district of Ihosy in Madagascar. The company owns and runs 
the farming operation for growing jatropha, soya, geranium, 
and other crops on about 3 500 ha of land. The second, Malto 
(deal #8278), is a contract farming scheme that involves 
2 000 households who produce barley on their own land in 
the Amoron’i Mania region.
The study finds that only a few households reported losing 
their land rights. Households close to the companies, but 
not engaged with the agribusinesses, were also not found 
to be negatively affected in terms of food security at the 
time of the survey. However, food security status differed 
between households with employment at the large-scale 
farm and contract farmers. Households with members 
directly employed at the large-scale farm suffered from less 
hunger and fewer months of inadequate food provision 
than households that were engaged in contract farming. 
The households involved in contract farming were also worse 
off for most other food security indicators. The likely reason 
is that contract farming households received a lump-sum 
contract payment compared to the consumption-smoothing 
monthly or weekly payments of employed households. On 
the other hand, households involved in contract farming 
enjoyed diets with higher diversity than households where 
members were employed. This may arise from contract 
farming households having access to additional land to grow 
a variety of food crops for household consumption. Overall, 
certain groups were found to be disadvantaged in general, 
such as female-headed households. This may be due to 
divorced female-headed households losing their land rights 
and finding it more difficult to secure both employment and 
contracts from the LSLAs. 
The study illustrates that assessing the effect of LSLAs on 
food security is complex due to the multiple transmission 
mechanisms. In addition, the effects of LSLAs depend on the 
different strata of the society used as comparison, but also 
on the selected indicators for food security.
Source: Fitawek et al. (2020)
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Environmental impacts of LSLAs:  




LSLAs are commonly justified on the grounds that they 
establish ‘modern’, highly productive agricultural systems 
based on intensive – usually year-round – cultivation in 
contrast  to more traditional production systems (Giger et 
al., 2019). However, these systems – typically monocultures 
– often also result in land conversion from natural habitats, 
either directly caused by the land deal itself or indirectly by 
pushing local people or bringing migrants to frontier areas – 
and are associated with a number of environmental changes 
and potentially negative impacts (Haggblade et al., 2017; 
IARC, 2017; Sharma et al., 2019; WHO & IPCS, 2010). These 
range from land use change, deforestation, and biodiversity 
loss, to greenhouse gas emissions, local climate change, and 
impacts on water resources (Zaehringer et al., 2021). In this 
chapter, we discuss these environmental impacts, focusing 
on land use changes and deforestation, as well as the related 
effects on water resources.
4.1. Land conversion, biodiversity loss and climate change
Land conversion is associated with massive losses of 
biodiversity, in particular when tropical rainforests are 
affected (Drescher et al., 2016; Giam, 2017). Davis et al., 
(2021) for example, suggest that if all concluded agricultural 
deals registered in the Land Matrix database were fully 
implemented, relative species richness, an important 
biodiversity indicator, would experience substantial declines, 
with losses being markedly prominent in Africa and Asia. In 
line with these findings, the study also hints at considerable 
overlap of contracted production areas of LSLAs with areas 
defined as biodiversity hotspots or critical habitat: 39% of 
agricultural LSLAs fall at least partially within biodiversity 
hotspot areas, while a smaller percentage (13%) partly 
overlaps with at least 40% of the contracted size with likely 
critical habitat. Our own analysis of the data also shows that 
87% of these LSLAs are occurring in regions of medium-to-
high biodiversity (Giger et al., 2021).
In addition to biodiversity losses, the conversion of forests 
can contribute to climate change by directly releasing a large 
amount of carbon into the atmosphere (Liao et al., 2020), an 
effect that is particularly pronounced when forests or peatland 
are being burnt.27 Moreover, LSLAs impact – mostly negatively 
– water, soils, the local climate, and biogeochemical cycles, as 
well as energy and nutrient fluxes. The impact of LSLAs on 
water has received notable attention, even being referred to 
as “water grabs” – rather than “land grabs”, highlighting the 
increased appropriation of freshwater resources (Rulli et al., 
2013; Tejada & Rist, 2017).
While it is widely acknowledged that agricultural expansion has 
long been an important driver of deforestation, we argue in 
this chapter that this threat to natural habitats remains highly 
relevant now and for the future, particularly since many of 
the concessions and areas under contract have not yet been 
converted or put under cultivation (see Chapter 1). However, 
as some studies tend to underscore, the establishment of 
highly productive agricultural systems resulting from LSLAs 
may also reduce pressure on environmental resources. 
Higher productivity could as such have a land sparing effect, 
by requiring potentially less land to be cultivated for the same 
amount of production. Through this effect, remaining natural 
ecosystems could be saved from conversion into agricultural 
land (Feniuk et al., 2019; Folberth et al., 2020; Grau et al., 2013; 
Phalan et al., 2014; Villoria, 2019). It is also important to note 
that not all unfavourable land use practices with negative 
external impacts, such as soil erosion, nutrient mining, or 
carbon emissions, are connected to LSLAs. Many of these, 
such as slash-and-burn practices with short fallow periods in 
between, are pre-existing and unrelated. 
As recognised in the literature on land sparing, however, there 
are some caveats to this line of argument. First, agricultural 
productivity on or within close proximity to LSLAs might not 
necessarily be substantially higher compared to regions 
without LSLAs. Furthermore, they may not be able to sustain 
higher productivity in the long run due to soil depletion or 
over-use of water (see Section 4.4).  Second, much of the 
literature on land sparing (Folberth et al., 2020) relates to 
increasing productivity on existing cropland, and not to 
27Liao et al. (2020) find a total of 18.9 million ha of forest being at threat of being cleared because of LSLAs which would lead to 3.5 Gt of additional CO2 emissions as a 
result of direct and indirect land use changes. This would account for about 10% of the global energy-related CO2 emissions in 2019.   
39% of agricultural LSLAs fall at 
least partially within biodiversity 
hotspot areas
Since many species are endemic to 
regional environments, biodiversity in one 
region cannot be offset with higher levels 
of biodiversity in another region 
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4.2. LSLAs persist as a key deforestation threat
LSLAs are a key driver of land use change, thus contributing 
substantially to deforestation, habitat destruction, and land 
degradation (Davis et al., 2015, 2020; D’Odorico et al., 2017; 
Magliocca et al., 2019; Zaehringer, Wambugu, et al., 2018), as 
reflected in Land Matrix data on former land cover of acquired 
land. For example, globally, as Figure 4.1 shows, the majority 
of LSLAs (63%) are implemented on existing cropland, often 
leading to intensified land use, as is the case in Europe and 
Central Asia, while in the other regions, there is considerable 
cropland expansion which eats away at forests and natural 
vegetation cover, such as shrub, pasture, and marginal land.
In particular, LSLAs threaten tropical forests and their 
extraordinary biodiversity, and there is overwhelming 
evidence that LSLA-related agricultural expansion is a major 
determinant of large-scale deforestation in the humid tropics 
(Curtis et al., 2018; DeFries et al., 2010; Gibbs et al., 2010; 
Meyfroidt et al., 2014). For instance, Pendrill et al. (2019) 
demonstrate that in the period from 2005 to 2013, 62% 
(corresponding to 5.5 million ha per year) of forest loss could 
be attributed to expanding commercial cropland, pastures, 
and tree plantations. Henders et al. (2015) likewise show 
that the production of beef, soya bean, palm oil, and wood 












Notes: Individual deals list up to four different types of former land covers. The Land Matrix does not provide information on the share of area for each type of 
former land cover; hence, for this analysis, we have divided the area under contract and attributed equal shares to each former land cover. N (deals) = 620, N 
(former land cover) = 1 560.
Calculations based on Land Matrix data.



























Figure 4.1: Primary land cover type targeted by land deals and region (share by aggregate contract size)
opening new cropland on previously uncultivated land, as is 
the case for an important fraction of LSLAs. Third, global land 
sparing is complex when it comes to biodiversity (Carrasco 
et al., 2014; Grau et al., 2013), and, since many species are 
endemic to regional environments, biodiversity in one region 
cannot be offset with higher levels of biodiversity in another 
region (Carrasco et al., 2014). For example, sparing land in 
regions with relatively low biodiversity, such as rapeseed 
in Germany, by expanding production with higher land 
productivity in regions with higher biodiversity, such as palm 
oil in Liberia, does not necessarily save biodiversity. These 
considerations highlight the importance of understanding 
the role of LSLAs as a direct and indirect driver of land use 
change and deforestation, which we address next.
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(Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, 
and Paraguay) account for 40% of total global tropical 
deforestation observed between 2000 and 2011. In Brazil, 
home to the world’s largest tropical rainforest, deforestation 
has accelerated considerably under the Bolsonaro 
administration (Escobar, 2020) and it may well be that the – 
increasingly intensive – cattle ranching and soy production 
are the key economic drivers of frontier deforestation 
(Schielein & Börner, 2018). Similarly, in Indonesia, which 
has the world’s third largest area of rainforest after the 
Amazon and Africa’s Congo Basin, massive deforestation 
continued throughout the 2010s, driven by large-scale oil 
palm and timber plantations, in particular at the new frontiers 
on Kalimantan. 
While some of the countries mentioned have been hotspots 
for deforestation for decades, global land investments have, 
in the past 15 years, opened new deforestation frontiers 
worldwide. This grim assessment is supported by our 
own analysis that combines Land Matrix data on international 
LSLAs with Hansen’s forest data. Specifically, we use the 
geographic point location of the LSLA registered in the 
Land Matrix and draw circular buffers around each deals’ 
location corresponding to the respective contract size. 
Data on forest cover is derived from Hansen’s tree cover in 
the year 2000 using two different thresholds of initial forest 
cover set to 25-100% and 50-100%, respectively, and the 
reported yearly losses until 2019 (Hansen et al., 2013).
global land investments have, in the past 15 years, opened new 
deforestation frontiers worldwide. 


































390 6 396 817 2 145 056 1 798 447 346 609 33.53 28.11
Latin America 
and Caribbean
161 4 722 053 1 267 715 1 049 453 218 262 26.85 22.22
Asia and  
Pacific
414 8 150 117 5 993 934 4 713 072 1 280 867 73.54 57.83
Total 965 19 268 987 9 406 704 7 560 972 1 845 738 48.82 39.24




390 6 396 817 3 631 400 3 130 189 501 211 56.77 48.93
Latin America 
and Caribbean
161 4 722 053 1 836 054 1 513 049 323 005 38.88 32.04
Asia and  
Pacific
414 8 150 117 6 348 887 5 015 229 1 333 658 77.90 61.54
Total 965 19 268 987 11 816 341 9 658 467 2 157 874 61.32 50.12
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data and Hansen (2013). Concluded international deals within the tropical humid, moist or dry forest and tropical 
mountain regions. Deals with location precision only at country level were excluded.
There is overwhelming evidence that LSLA-
related agricultural expansion is a major 
determinant of large-scale deforestation in 
the humid tropics
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East Asia shows continued forest loss 
Tropical rainforests are at risk in sub-Saharan Africa
Nevertheless, East Asia is also the region with the highest loss 
of forest cover. According to our estimates, about 1.3 million 
ha were lost between 2000 and 2019 within the contract area 
of LSLAs, corresponding to a loss of 16 percentage points. 
In a previous, very similar study, zooming in to the country 
level, Davis et al., (2020) show that forest loss within LSLAs 
was particularly high in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
Looking at the specific case of Cambodia, Magliocca et 
al., (2019) found that between 2000 and 2016, the country 
lost roughly 1.6 million ha of forest, corresponding to 22% 
of the country’s total forest cover. Worth mentioning, 30% 
of these deforested areas are located within economic 
land concessions granted by the state to foreign and 
national investors. 
In Southeast Asia, these developments are largely driven by 
rubber and oil palm plantations (Austin et al., 2017; Chiarelli 
et al., 2018; Rulli et al., 2019), as shown by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database 
(FAOSTAT), which reveals that the area cultivated with rubber 
in this region increased from 5.7 to 9.5 million ha (66%) 
between 2000 and 2019 (FAOSTAT 2021). Hurni and Fox 
(2018) further found that rubber plantations increased by 8%, 
covering an area of 7.5 million ha, in the mainland Southeast 
Asia countries alone between 2003 and 2014. Of note, 70% 
of this expansion came at the expense of natural forests, 
with deforestation greatest in Cambodia and Laos, but also 
significant in parts of China and Vietnam. However, Indonesia 
and Malaysia host the vastest area of oil palm plantations, 
at about 18 million ha collectively (Index Mundi, 2021), much 
of which has likewise been established to the detriment of 
primary and secondary forests (Austin et al., 2017; Hunt, 
2010). In fact, between 2001 and 2016, oil palm expansion 
directly caused 23% of the nationwide deforestation in 
Indonesia (Austin et al., 2019). Furthermore, a significant 
share has been implemented on carbon-rich peat swamp 
forest, which has considerable implications for global climate 
change (Fuller et al., 2011).
In contrast to East Asia, deforestation in the proximity to LSLAs 
in sub-Saharan Africa was substantially slower, covering just 
350 000 ha between 2000 and 2019 (Table 4.1) with a decline 
in forest cover of only about 5%, from 33.53% to 28.11%.29 This 
concurs with the slow implementation of LSLAs in the region, 
as discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. It may also mean 
that the temporal patterns of forest loss and agricultural 
expansion are different. Deforestation within African LSLAs 
appears to frequently occur several years before the deals 
are concluded (Davis et al., 2021), suggesting that land deals 
in this region may have benefitted from previous land clearing 
(such as for pasture or smallholder farming). 
Even with these caveats, tropical forests in Africa are under 
risk. Partly drawing on Land Matrix data and extrapolating 
recent trends in commodity production, Ordway et al., (2017) 
analysed the risk of agricultural expansion at the cost of 
forests in sub-Saharan Africa and found that it is undeniably 
increasing pressure on tropical forests, in particular in four 
Congo Basin countries as well as in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone. In these countries, high forest cover 
coincides with low proportions of potentially available 
cropland outside forest areas, but the authors also hint at 
an important role played by foreign large-scale investment in 
selected commodities, most notably palm oil, even though, 
overall, agricultural expansion is driven mainly by small- 
Looking at data from 964 geo-located land deals in tropical 
regions with a total contract area of 19 million ha, the first 
half of Table 4.1, which uses a 50% tree cover threshold, 
shows that, about 9.4 million ha were still covered with forest 
in 2000. With a lower tree cover threshold, as used in the 
second half of Table 4.1, it is almost 12 million ha. However, 
there is significant regional variation, which is important to 
note: In Asia and the Pacific (with almost all selected deals 
being located in East Asia), about 74% of the area around the 
location of the deals was still covered with forest in 2000, 
which is considerably larger than the 26% and 33% in Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa, respectively.28 
28This is in line with evidence presented by Davis et al. (2021), who used a smaller sample of deals in the Land Matrix database (with a contract size of 4 million ha).  
29Note that lowering the threshold for tree cover to 25% considerably elevates the LSLA-area covered (although more sparsely) by trees in 2000 to more than 56%.
East Asia is also the region with the 
highest loss of forest cover. According to 
our estimates, about 1.3 million ha were 
lost between 2000 and 2019 within the 
contract area of LSLAs
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Old and new agricultural frontiers in Latin America
The data from Latin America gives mixed signals. On the 
one hand, Table 4.1 suggests that about 39% of the LSLA 
area was forest in 2000 (25% tree cover threshold), which is 
less than in other regions. Deforestation within the contract 
size-buffered deal locations also appears relatively slow, 
albeit with a 7% loss in forest cover. On the other hand, 
these findings are at odds with the evidence that shows 
substantial deforestation linked to agricultural expansion in 
the region (Curtis et al., 2018). These apparent contradictions 
are not easily reconciled, however, partial data coverage of 
LSLAs, in particular of domestic investors – which are more 
important in Latin America than elsewhere but have received 
less attention than international deals – may be one reason 
for this.30 Yet, for them to bias the percentages presented in 
Table 4.1, the non-covered deals would need to target more 
forested areas, which is not necessarily the case. In fact, we 
surmise that the data on LSLAs for Latin America is likely 
more partial than it is for other regions, in light of domestic 
investors not being the main focus of the Land Matrix to date 
(see Chapter 1).
Partial data coverage31 is also likely to explain why we 
underestimate – when using Land Matrix data – deforestation 
in the Gran Chaco, which hosts the largest dry forest in South 
America. This area has seen rapid deforestation since 2000, 
with 7.8 million ha of the Chaco’s forests converted into 
farmland or grazing land for soy and livestock production 
between 2001 and 2012, according to Fehlenberg et al. 
(2017). The soya bean area alone increased by 126%, from 2.3 
million ha to 5.2 million ha, during the same period, and while 
livestock farming and feedstock production can of course be 
complementary, at the same time, displacement effects can 
occur when the expansion of soy production pushes livestock 
farmers to seek new grazing land at the frontier. This behaviour 
has frequently been observed in Brazil, where rangeland is 
converted to cropland by large-scale investments, resulting 
in livestock farmers converting surrounding forest into new 
grazing land in turn (Cohn et al., 2016; Hermele, 2013).
In addition, the Land Matrix data clearly reveals – in line with 
other studies – that there are “new” threats to forests on the 
horizon, such as oil palm plantations, which until recently 
have not been a common driver of deforestation in the 
region. Indeed, as suitable land for new oil palm plantations in 
Southeast Asia is depleting, companies have begun to look to 
new production frontiers, such as Colombia and Peru, which 
have experienced the highest growth rates in recent years. In 
the Peruvian Amazon, for example, oil palm has become an 
important strategy for development, which Vijay et al. (2018) 
warn is a major deforestation risk. This is supported by the 
findings of Bennett et al. (2018), which show that between 
2000 and 2015, 40 000 ha of primary forest were cleared for 
large oil palm plantations in Peru alone.
These examples clearly illustrate that LSLAs – notwithstanding 
some regional variation – pose a major threat for further 
destruction of the world’s remaining natural habitats. 
Whereas in Africa, the large share of yet-to-be implemented 
deals foreshadows a significant threat, in particular to the 
Central African rainforests, massive deforestation has 
never really slowed down in Southeast Asia, and LSLAs 
are now even targeting new frontier regions. Similarly, in 
Latin America, LSLAs have been adding new frontiers to 
the unresolved problems of deforestation in the Amazon 
for some time. Distressing as this is, perhaps what is most 
sobering is the fact that, overall, our own analysis (Table 4.1) is 
likely significantly underestimating (potential) LSLA-induced 
forest loss – at least in relative terms (share of land previously 
covered by forest), and certainly in absolute terms.
and medium-scale farms rather than industrial plantations 
( Jayne et al., 2016). This is borne out by Gasparri et al. (2016), 
who show that there are indeed initiatives to facilitate and 
increase foreign investment, which typically come in the form 
of large-scale projects. A case in point is Cameroon, where 
the government’s goal is to triple cocoa production (230 000 
tonnes in 2010) and double oil palm production (600 000 
tonnes in 2010) by 2035 (Ordway et al., 2017). The threat 
these plans entail for tropical forests, with approximately 
17.3 million ha (68%) of land suitable for agriculture currently 
still being covered by dense tropical forest (Chamberlin et al., 
2014) is cause for grave concern.
30Domestic deals represent almost 60% of all land deals and almost 40% of the acquired area in the complete Land Matrix database for Latin America. 
31Among the countries with agricultural expansion at scale with many investors, Indonesia stands out in terms of publicly reporting single projects.
In Africa, the large share of yet-to-be 
implemented deals foreshadows a 
significant threat, in particular to the 
Central African rainforests
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4.3. Indirect land use change and the loss of remaining fragments
4.4. The building pressure on water resources
There are two other mechanisms that drive LSLA-related 
land use change that bear mentioning. First, there is growing 
evidence that LSLAs are also responsible for indirect land 
use change, adding to the observed direct land use change 
(Oberlack et al., 2021). Indirect land use change is considered 
a spillover effect whereby former small-scale land users, 
displaced by the implementation of the LSLA, make new land 
arable, mostly through small-scale deforestation, elsewhere. 
This has been observed in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South 
America. For example, in their study on deforestation in and 
around land concessions in Cambodia, Magliocca et al., (2019) 
find that an additional 49 000-174 000 ha (depending on low 
or high estimates) of forest are lost around the concessions 
due to indirect land use change (3-10.7% of all forest lost 
in Cambodia by 2016). Similar observations were made in 
case studies from Mozambique, where small-scale mosaic 
croplands were acquired by LSLAs, forcing the affected small-
scale farmers to clear forest for new arable land (Zaehringer, 
Atumane, et al., 2018).
Second, LSLAs not only escalate deforestation, but also 
contribute to forest fragmentation – with potentially strong 
negative effects on biodiversity of remaining forest patches 
(Davis et al., 2021; Zaehringer, Wambugu, et al., 2018). 
Beyond that, Hansen et al. (2020) recently pointed out that 
the remaining forest fragments decrease at a greater rate 
compared to large forest blocks, with clearing for agricultural 
production as a critical factor. This calls for as much attention 
to be paid to forests that are being fragmented as those that 
are being cleared.
The potential impact on water resources is an important 
dimension of the environmental consequences of land 
acquisitions. Since increasing land-based production is 
generally achieved through greater use of water, if the water 
demand cannot be met by rainfall, irrigation of “blue water” 
(see below) becomes necessary. Indeed, the link between 
LSLAs and increased water demand becomes patently 
clear when viewed in light of the fact that 54% of the land 
deals recorded in the Land Matrix database are intended to 
produce crops with high water use, such as oil palm, sugar 
cane, jatropha, cotton, and rubber.32  
Another important potential effect of increased water use is 
that it can reduce the availability of water for the surrounding 
areas and downstream users  (Chiarelli et al., 2018; Dell’Angelo 
et al., 2018; D’Odorico et al., 2017), which has implications for 
their livelihoods and food security. LSLAs can also impact 
water quality through increased run-off of nutrients and 
pesticides in the surrounding water bodies and environment 
(Giger et al., 2019; Muriithi & Yu, 2015; Oberlack et al., 2016; 
Zaehringer, Wambugu, et al., 2018).
Looking at Figure 4.2, which illustrates different water 
demand categories (high and low) in relation to global 
dryland zones, we note that water demand and availability 
according to the climate does not coincide everywhere. In 
Southeast Asia, for example, oil palm – a crop with high water 
demand – is produced in a region with mostly abundant 
rainfall. Conversely, for instance, in the Nile region but also 
in other places, other high water demanding crops (fodder, 
cotton, sugarcane, potatoes, and vegetables) are produced in 
an extremely dry area, requiring intensive irrigation. Our data 
show that 34% of deals take place in dryland zones where 
water resources are scarce by definition, with 10% of them 
producing crops that require large amounts of water. Crops 
with low water demand, like cereal, are often found in areas 
that are outside drylands and have sufficient water to produce 
these crops, such as those found in high concentration in 
Eastern Europe and parts of Latin America and Africa.
32Tn=1 568. Categories based on Johansson et al. (2016). High: > 8 500 m3/ha; Low: <= 8 500 m3/ha; NA: Crop demand not classified.
LSLAs not only escalate deforestation, 
but also contribute to forest 
fragmentation – with potentially strong 
negative effects on biodiversity of 
remaining forest patches 
54% of the land deals recorded in the 
Land Matrix database are intended to 
produce crops with high water use
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In the absence of publicly available project documents, let 
alone environmental impact studies, data around water 
and irrigation is generally difficult to obtain. However, the 
Land Matrix database does have some information on 
water abstraction for a limited subset of 269 land deals, 
which account for an area of about 5.7 million ha and may 
be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate to the number of 
deals associated with water abstraction and corresponding 
adverse socio-environmental impacts. Surface water (water 
that comes from above the ground, including rivers, lakes, 
streams, wetlands, and reservoirs), is the most cited source 
of water (46% of deals), but groundwater (water that is found 
below the ground) is also mentioned (12% of deals). Both 
these sources of water are known as “blue water”, as opposed 
to “green water”, defined as rainfall that is subsequently 
stored in soils and consumed by plants (Falkenmark & 
Rockström, 2006; Johansson et al., 2016). Blue water thus 
represents the amount of water needed to meet production 
ends in addition to the water provided by rainfall. While 
green water is considered better or less problematic in the 
Outside 
dryland area

































Figure 4.2: Water demand categories of crops cultivated in LSLAs and dryland zones
Notes: Water demand categories based on Johansson et al. (2016) (High: > 8 500 m3/ha; Low: <= 8 500 m3/ha; NA: Crop demand not classified). Map background 
showing different dryland zones (in grey). LSLAs: n=1 568.
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BOX 10:
Blue water use in stressed contexts    
One extreme example of the use of blue water in a water-
stressed context (Deal #1172 covering 42 000 ha) comes 
from Egypt, where Gulf companies (from different countries) 
have invested in the country’s Western Desert in Toska, 
transforming the desert land to agricultural land by diverted 
water from the Nile to produce alfalfa. This animal feed, 
requiring extremely high amounts of water to grow, is partly 
for domestic use, but is also exported to the Gulf, including to 
Saudi Arabia which imports fodder to produce milk and meat 
due to a production ban on animal feed that has been in place 
since 2017. The project has attracted much criticism regarding 
its contractual agreements (below market prices for water 
and land) and low number of jobs created. Moreover, the 
strategy of reclaiming desert land for high water demanding 
crops has been slated for reducing the availability of water for 
Egyptian farmers in the Nile valley to produce rice, wheat, and 
fruits, which are profitable and more water efficient crops, 
but currently need to be imported (Arafat and El Nour, 2020).
Another example of blue water irrigation that causes 
adverse local impacts has been reported from Sierra Leone 
(deal #1798). Here, intensive sugar cane production has 
necessitated the installation of large irrigation structures, with 
the water being pumped from a local river flowing through 
the concession area and subsequently resulting in the nearby 
swamps falling dry. These swamps were previously used for 
rice production by the community, and especially by women 
farmers to produce vegetables during the dry season. The 
project’s large-scale monoculture has also destroyed a 
highly diverse cultural landscape, significantly changing the 
quality of and access to land, water, and non-timber forest 
products which were of specific importance for marginal 
groups, including women and land users not originally from 
this region (Bottazzi et al., 2018; Marfurt et al., 2016).
While blue water matters for some crops and contexts, 
D’Odorico et al., (2017) point out the important fact that only 
a tiny fraction of total water used by LSLAs is from surface 
water or groundwater. Green water is thus likely to remain 
the major water source for most LSLAs. Nevertheless, the 
increased use of green water can create equally negative 
environmental impacts, depending on the context in which 
this water use arises. In Southeast Asia, for example, oil palm 
plantations, which are typically rain-fed, alter hydrological 
cycles with the conversion of rainforests to agricultural land 
(Merten et al., 2016), as young plantations increase run-off 
and temperatures, while established plantations increase 
evapotranspiration compared to natural forests. These 
combined effects, found in crop-modelling studies (Manoli 
et al., 2018), confirm perceptions of oil palm being a “water 
greedy” crop. However, some of these effects can be mitigated 
through current best practices using cover crops during the 
establishment phase. 
Analysing the hydrological consequences of rubber expansion 
in Southeast Asia, which also relies on green water, Chiarelli et 
al. (2020) found evidence that the higher evapotranspiration 
of rubber plantations compared to shrubs, pastures, or less 
water-demanding crops, could reduce run-off, especially 
in dry seasons, and negatively impact water availability for 
downstream farmland. Chiarelli et al. (2020) also point to 
context of LSLAs, using blue water is not necessarily “bad” if it 
does not increase water demand beyond the capacity of the 
agro-ecological33 environment.  In reality, however, there are 
many LSLAs that do cause blue water demand to increase 
substantially, placing considerable pressure on already water-
stressed areas. Examples of land deals that have a very high 
proportion of blue water demand and take place in severely 
water-scarce areas can be found in Egypt, Namibia, and 
Sudan, for instance. 
Using Land Matrix data for Africa in a crop-modelling 
exercise, Johansson et al. (2016) demonstrate that, based on 
current national irrigation efficiencies, 35% of all deals would 
take place in blue water use hotspots (that is, areas where 
their blue water demand is more than 50% of their total 
water demand). Furthermore, they found that even under 
more efficient sprinkler or drip irrigation technologies, up to 
20% of the total deals in production would still fall in such 
hotspot areas. 
33Some irrigation systems in selected tropical areas, although using large amounts of water (paddy rice), are considered water management systems (regulating 




LSLAs and pandemic risk    
A recent report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2020) 
has drawn attention to the complex – sometimes ambiguous 
– relationship between biodiversity loss and pandemic risk 
(Dobson et al., 2020; Gibb et al., 2020; IPBES, 2020; Jones et al., 
2013; Tollefson, 2020). For instance, deforestation in tropical 
regions is considered among the most important factors 
leading to the emergence of zoonotic diseases. While such a 
link has been discussed by specialists for decades (Borsky et 
al., 2020; Jones et al., 2013; Perrings et al., 2018; Wallace, 2016; 
Wallace et al., 2014), mainstream debates on land acquisitions 
have so far neglected to address this. 
Based on the IPBES report, several mechanisms 
accompanying agricultural deals may contribute to increased 
risk of zoonotic disease outbreaks. First, continued 
expansion of the agricultural frontier and associated 
loss of biodiversity could reduce the buffering effect of 
biodiverse ecosystem niches by decimating the variety of 
animals that act as buffering species, slowing or stopping 
pathogen transmission (Keesing et al., 2006, 2010). Second, 
monocultures could modify zoonotic host diversity, 
increasing the share of host species. Third, implementation of 
LSLAs and related infrastructure in or near highly biodiverse 
natural habitats could increase forest fragmentation and 
bring more people in close contact with potential hosts of 
pathogens. Fourth, displacement could push people deeper 
into more remote areas, bringing them into contact with new 
reservoirs of pathogens. Fifth, conversely, risks of zoonosis 
might be mitigated if people’s livelihoods change in ways that 
reduce hazardous human-wildlife interactions, for example, 
by increasing people’s incomes and reducing their reliance on 
consumption of bushmeat.
To date, the risks of zoonotic disease emergence are seldom, 
if ever, factored in when assessing the benefits and costs of 
agricultural investments. However, initial estimates indicate 
that the costs of  a change in policies by creating incentives 
that reduce deforestation and wildlife trade – and thus the 
risk of pandemics – could be low compared to the cost of a 
pandemic (Dobson et al., 2020). 
Until now, zoonosis risks have not been taken into account 
by any of the mainstream global guidelines on responsible 
agricultural investment and land governance either (FAO, 
2012; FAO et al., 2010). The call by the authors of the IPBES 
report for developing and incorporating pandemic and 
emerging disease risk health impact assessments in major 
land-use projects should therefore certainly apply to land 
acquisitions as well. Furthermore, agricultural policies should 
be reviewed along with LSLAs in view of preventing forest 
fragmentation and the further intrusion of land investments 
into biodiverse ecosystems. Importantly, avoidance of 
competition of land and displacement of people needs to be 
addressed even more urgently. 
Finally, increased transparency on land acquisitions will 
be instrumental in advancing investigations into their 
relationship with zoonotic disease emergence. 
Source: The box is based on a commentary published in 
One Earth, May 2021. Giger Markus, Eckert S., Lay J. (2021). 
Large-scale land acquisitions, agricultural trade, and zoonotic 
diseases: overlooked links. One Earth, 4(5), 605-608. 
the “grey water consumption” – the amount of water that 
is required to dilute to below acceptable standards the 
concentration of pollutants – used in the production of rubber. 
Rubber plantations using fertilisers and pesticides contribute 
to downstream water pollution as well. Indeed, this is true for 
most LSLAs:  increased economic activity through intensified 
agricultural production and processing of goods will create 
the possibility of increased pollution of water resources, 
which needs to be prevented or mitigated. The exact terms of 
the water rights granted with land concessions or purchases 
are rarely made public, which makes is difficult to assess the 
impact on water. It is nevertheless important to take into 
consideration not only the quantity of the water consumed 
by LSLAs, but also the many other factors involved, including 
the local context and availability of water sources. Conducting 
environmental impact studies is therefore critical, as is 
making the results of the studies available to the public and 
concerned stakeholders.
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From aspiration to practice:   





This report clearly shows the urgent need to rethink LSLAs. 
On the one hand, there is a need to turn the current practices 
of large-scale agricultural investments into responsible 
and sustainable contributions to economic and social 
development that respect human rights and the environment. 
On the other hand, it becomes essential to look into other 
production models, as alternatives or alongside LSLAs, that 
include smallholder farmers or increase positive spillovers to 
them, to promote broad-based rural development and more 
endogenous growth patterns. Both require fundamental 
changes in the conduct of domestic and international 
businesses alike, and dedicated and targeted efforts by 
investor and host country governments. Although progress 
has already been made, for example through the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGTs) 
and Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and 
Food Systems (RAIs), much remains to be done at all levels, 
from global to local, to effectively ensure that land rights are 
protected, social development in target regions is enhanced, 
and the environment is respected. We see five priority areas 
for action that we discuss in this chapter.
First, while policies in a number of countries have responded 
to the weaknesses of land governance that were exposed 
by the pressure that LSLA put on land and international soft 
law instruments, most notably the VGGTs, have increasingly 
been used as a basis for land policy scrutiny and reform, 
land governance needs further reforms, particularly to 
address key risks associated with LSLAs. In particular, as we 
will discuss below, despite progress at the policy level, more 
has to be done to effectively protect the land rights of those 
affected by LSLAs, especially smallholders, pastoralists, and 
indigenous groups.
 
Second, policies are needed that pro-actively guide, regulate, 
and monitor land-based investments to ensure their 
contribution to sustainable rural development in line with 
national development strategies and local needs given that, 
as the report has demonstrated, opening up (land) markets to 
international investment cannot create jobs, infrastructure, 
and rural development alone. In addition, despite the 
capacity challenges in target countries and at the local level, 
transparency and consultation will be key elements of more 
careful planning of projects and screening of investors.
Third, these policies will have to be complemented by efforts 
to change the global rules of the game. As this report has 
shown, many LSLAs involve multinational companies and are 
linked to global production networks. As such, international 
investment treaties as well as the regulations that govern 
production in global value chains will have to pay more 
attention to social and environmental sustainability in 
general, with LSLAs providing a case for immediate action. 
Fourth, the environmental destruction caused by LSLAs 
must be stopped. Our report adds to the overwhelming 
evidence that agricultural commodity production continues 
to be a major environmental threat, in particular to the 
world’s remaining tropical forests. We have shown that 
much of the area granted to investors has not yet been put 
under production and that new agricultural frontiers are 
emerging. These new frontiers, for example in Central Africa, 
the Andean countries, Cambodia, and Laos, do not replace 
“mature” frontiers in Brazil and Indonesia, where forests and 
forests remnants remain under threat – they add to them. It is 
therefore critical that these hotspots are placed at the centre 
of policy attention.
Fifth, related and transversal to the preceding priority areas, 
we reinforce our call for increased transparency. Despite 
relentless efforts by the Land Matrix and other initiatives to 
bring to light the actors involved in and the impacts of LSLAs, 
many land deals remain opaque. As we demonstrate below, 
both governments and the private sector are reluctant to 
share and publish information. We believe that regulatory 
action is required, which includes transparency as an element 
for more comprehensive sustainability due diligence. 
We elaborate on these priority areas and present concrete 
policy recommendations below. Above all, as LSLAs continue 
to ignore people’s land rights, threaten the rural livelihoods 
of smallholders, and cause environmental harm that will be 
very difficult or even impossible to reverse, swift and decisive 
action is urgent. 
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5.1. Improving land governance: The long road from aspirational policy
 frameworks to securing effective land rights
The last 10 years have seen the development and 
implementation of innovative legal, regulatory, and guiding 
frameworks to strengthen land governance at both national 
and international levels. These range from actions to 
operationalise international soft law instruments, more 
notably the VGGTs and RAIs, to globally recognised legal 
and financial instruments framing international investments, 
such as the complaint mechanisms for development finance 
institutions (DFIs) (Cotula et al., 2019; Daniel et al., 2016). 
The global land frameworks have increasingly been used as 
a basis for land policy scrutiny and reform. This has led to 
steps forward at the regional, national, and local levels and 
in both policy and practice. A case in point is the rolling out 
of the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, 
which has helped African Union member states to develop 
or review their land policies and to implement and evaluate 
these policies (ALPC, 2010). Similarly, the 2018 Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) guidelines on promoting 
responsible investment in food, agriculture, and forestry can 
be considered a step in this direction (ATWGARD, 2018).
At national level, several examples of land-related policy 
reform exist, varying considerably in their nature and scope 
– from new national constitutions that, for the first time, 
entrench rights for the landless, to national legislation that 
covers wide-ranging policy areas, such as support for the 
collective registration of community, indigenous, or pastoral 
lands, as well as legislation focusing directly on LSLAs. These 
include, among others, legislative measures, for example, 
the reforming of land laws in relation to LSLAs in Malawi 
and Mali; LSLA-related legislation, for example the update 
of FPIC in Senegal; the “Forest Law” enacted in Argentina in 
2007 to protect native forests and regulate the expansion 
of large-scale agriculture; and a range of moratoria, as seen 
in Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Niger, and Ukraine 
(see Box 12).
Notwithstanding the progress made in terms of land 
governance, a lack of policy being put into practice is evident, 
as shown throughout this report. This is well illustrated when 
VGGT implementation is assessed. Indeed, a scorecard 
exercise in which Land Matrix variables were aligned 
with VGGT articles and chapters confirms that effective 
implementation of the VGGTs remains low in practice. In 
Africa, for example, almost one-third of the deals assessed 
do not comply with the VGGTs and its principles at all, and 
only 25% can be considered to have achieved the minimum 
compliancy (Box 13). Additional analyses on transparency of 
land deals in other regions show a similar picture.
This priority area clearly demonstrates that many challenges 
remain when it comes to effective land governance: 
Competition over land exacerbates the fundamental 
problems of weak land governance, and we still observe 
too many cases of displacements, poor consultation, and 
little or no compensation. In such cases, vulnerable groups 
are usually hit the hardest. Despite a number of attempts 
to strengthen land governance systems as well as related 
voluntary guidelines and monitoring initiatives by the 
international community, substantive improvements still 
need to materialise. Governments often fail to protect the 
interests of affected populations, and the responsibility for 
what is happening on the ground frequently gets diffused 
in long and opaque investor chains. Worse still, emerging 
evidence suggests that in numerous cases, previous progress 
in land governance has been reversed in the context of the 




Land moratoria in Ukraine and Kazakhstan     
The cases of land moratoria in Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
illustrate stark differences in terms of efficiency. Whereas 
Ukraine is lifting its moratorium on the sale of agricultural 
land which has not been successful in preventing the 
accumulation of land by large private companies and has 
also been criticized for limiting the rights of Ukrainian 
citizens, Kazakhstan has recently implemented a moratorium 
preventing Kazakh citizens from buying agricultural land and 
foreigners from leasing it.
In the case of Ukraine, the government introduced a 
moratorium on the sale of agricultural land in 2001, and only 
lease agreements were allowed. The moratorium was intended 
to prevent land ownership being dominated by a select few, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
privatisation of land. In reality, however, the moratorium 
– to the detriment of the majority of Ukraine’s farming and 
rural population – encouraged the emergence of large-scale 
companies that leased land from rural households, who were 
often forced to rent out their land, usually for trifling sums, 
because of a lack of capital and agricultural expertise and the 
fact that the plots were too fragmented for them to cultivate 
themselves. Ultimately, this led to a considerable part of the 
41 million ha of agricultural land becoming concentrated 
under the control of investors, especially in the form of 
agroholdings. Based on statistics from 2019, for example, 
4.7 million ha (11%) of agricultural land is cultivated by 28 788 
officially registered farmers, while the five largest companies 
cultivate 1.4 million ha of land alone.  On 31 March 2020, the 
moratorium was finally lifted, giving Ukrainians the right to 
buy and sell land from 2021. The economic consequences 
are likely to be manifold but will depend on land prices and 
transparent and fair negotiations between landowners, small 
farms, and large-scale companies.
 
In contrast, in Kazakhstan, another post-Soviet country, the 
government implemented land moratoria to forestall the 
accumulation of land among few investors. To date, Kazakh 
citizens have been able to acquire land as private property, 
but foreigners have only had the option to lease land for a 
duration of 10 years. Loopholes have nevertheless allowed 
some foreign firms to acquire land under private titles, 
and policies were inconsistent. While the lease period was 
extended to 25 years in order to attract foreign investments 
in land (amendments and additions to the Land Code of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan) in 2015, the introduction of a 
moratorium in 2016 (in force until the end of 2021), again 
prevented foreigners from leasing land but also Kazakh 
citizens from acquiring any new land under private ownership 
(Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 
May 6, 2016, No. 248). The moratorium was a direct reaction 
to Kazakh citizens’ fears regarding foreign involvement in 
agriculture, of which there are several examples, such as 
the joint venture formed in 2010 between Oriental Patron 
and China Investment Corporation with the aim of leasing 
agricultural land. Another case is the creation of the MaZhiKo 
Holding LLP by the Kazakh government in 2012, which looked 
for foreign partners to help develop soya bean production 
and processing. It was also announced that more than 50 
projects with Chinese participation would be implemented. 
This increased anti-Chinese sentiment and sparked a wave of 
protest across the country.
It is worth noting, however, that although the minister of 
agriculture claims that agricultural land is not currently leased 
to foreigners, our attempts to obtain information on foreign 
agricultural projects uncovered massive problems with 
transparency in the country. The latest official information 
on foreign investments in agricultural land dates from 2016, 
a month before the moratorium was implemented. Despite 
the minister’s assertions, the population’s fears surrounding 
foreign-controlled land persists, and in September 2020, 
organised rallies were held in four cities in Kazakhstan.
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Based on the analysis of Land Matrix data for LSLAs in 
23 countries34 in Africa, we find that almost one-third 
of the deals received a VGGT score of 0, meaning that 
none of the VGGT articles assessed were implemented, 
and around 75% show an unsatisfactory level of VGGT 
uptake and implementation, that is, a score under 50. The 
remaining 25%, while scoring above 50, nevertheless can 
still only be considered as complying to a minimum, as 
seen in Figure 5.1.
A similar picture emerges when these results are 
aggregated at country level, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
The large majority (19 out of 23 countries, accounting 
for 83%) present unsatisfactory results regarding VGGT 
implementation (score lower than 50), with Mauritania, 
Sudan, and Guinea presenting the worst practices. Only 
four countries, representing a mere 17%, have a score 
above 50, with South Africa and Gabon presenting the 
best results. Aggregating these results at continental 
level, the average country VGGT score is 37.2, reflecting 
a dire situation with regard to responsible governance of 
land tenure in Africa.






Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data.
Figure 5.1: VGGT implementation at deal level in Africa
BOX 13:
The overall low implementation of global frameworks and guidelines – the case of the VGGTs in Africa
34These 23 countries were selected on the basis of data availability for this policy assessment. Among 733 deals in Africa, 226 did not show any information relevant to 
the monitoring of VGGTs. Only countries with at least two deals that have at least two VGGT-related variables with data are retained. 
Notes: Calculations based on Land Matrix data.
























Taking a deeper dive into the thematic areas related to 
land acquisitions in the respective sections of the VGGTs, 
results show that, at a continental level, land deals in Africa 
are the worst performing with regard to i) consultative 
processes (chapter 12, paragraph 12.9); ii) respect of 
national law and legislation, including investment and 
land legislation (12.12); and iii) respect of legitimate 
tenure rights, including informal tenure (chapter 10) of 
local communities (chapter 4) and indigenous peoples 
(chapter 9) (Figure 5.3).
Against this backdrop, measures to ensure the respect of 
human rights and provision of impartial and competent 
judicial and administrative bodies to timely, affordable, 
and effective means of resolving disputes over tenure 
rights, including alternative means of resolving such 
disputes, remain limited (Chapter 21). This is also the 
case for aspects related to safeguards (chapter 7) and 
unlawful expropriation and the application of agreed-
upon compensation measures (both chapter 16). Public 
provision of information on large-scale land transactions 
(chapter 11 on markets and chapter 18 on valuation) 
is the one (and only) area with better results. Some 
countries, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, stand out in this regard, for instance, in the forestry sector, where more and 
more information is becoming available. This is also strongly related to transparency initiatives, such as OpenLandContracts 
and the Land Matrix. Governments and investors, however, still have a long way to go to more transparency.
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Notes: Calculations based on Land MatrIx data.
Figure 5.3: Performance of Africa with regard to the implementation of the VGGTs (by chapter)
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BOX 14:
Retrograding – instead of progressing – responsible 
governance of land tenure in the context of 
COVID-19     
Beyond its public health implications, the COVID-19 pandemic 
represents a major threat to land rights, especially for those 
without secure tenure, having already halted, or even undone, 
some of the progress made in this area to date. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, for 
example, expressed serious concerns about the way states 
of emergency related to COVID-19 are further marginalising 
indigenous communities (and local communities), while 
governments and companies force through agribusiness, 
mining, and infrastructure megaprojects on ancestral lands 
(Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
2020). Furthermore, exploiting reduced public scrutiny during 
the pandemic, governments have implemented a number of 
business-friendly policies, often on the pretext of economic 
recovery, that may facilitate land-based investments, 
including deregulation, streamlining of licensing, and tax 
incentives. While some of these policies were met by protests, 
resistance was weakened by lockdown regulations restricting 
social contact (ILC, 2020).
In Indonesia, for example, the Omnibus law, enacted in 
May 2020 and accompanied by the Presidential Regulation 
(Perpres) No. 66 2020 on Land Procurement for Public 
Interest Development Projects, re-introduced provisions of a 
controversial draft Land Bill with regard to a Land Bank, which 
is likely to dramatically accelerate land acquisitions, including 
environmentally-protected areas (AIPP et al., 2020). Similarly, 
in Brazil, the environmental minister called for environmental 
deregulation (Cotula, 2020). In addition, threats and attacks 
against land rights defenders have accelerated during the 
COVID-19 crisis, for instance in Colombia, Indonesia, Niger, and 
the Philippines (Global Witness, 2020). These developments 
can exacerbate longstanding problems and reverse hard-
fought gains. 
Related to the results presented in this report and the above 
observations on land governance, we thus make the following 
policy recommendations: 
Recommendation 1
All governments need to pursue and fast-track 
land governance reforms and their effective 
implementation based on the VGGTs.
There is an urgent need for land governance reforms, and, more 
specifically, for their effective implementation. These should be 
aimed at sustainable, equitable, and inclusive land investments 
which minimise the possible negative impacts of LSLAs, avoid 
conflict, and halt the deepening land inequality trends. This calls 
for all countries (as they have ratified them at the CFS) to effectively 
implement the VGGTs in the context of national food security as a 
necessary and prerequisite step. In addition, implementation and 
follow-up of the VGGTs should become a prerequisite imposed 
by all donors and investor countries for land- and agricultural-
related financial support or investments.
Recommendation 2
Governments should utilise national and local 
multi-stakeholder engagement platforms to 
ensure policy compliance with regard to land 
management and investment.
In order to follow up on the implementation – and compliance 
– of land policies at LSLA level, permanent mechanisms to 
regulate and control land use and investments are imperative. 
It will be necessary for governments, together with a broad and 
representative panel of land actors, to establish institutions, based 
on agreed upon rights and duties, that can establish and follow-
up on decisions with a certain degree of autonomy. As such, the 
overarching objective should be the construction of institutions 
and mechanisms to control and assure policy compliance, in 
line with the achievement of the VGGTs and approved policy 
frameworks. While governments need to lead and enforce 
reforms, it is necessary for more inclusive institutions, such as 
national and local multistakeholder engagement platforms 
which include CSOs and other actors, to lead the way in following 
up on implementation, tracking compliance, and demanding 
rectifying actions and change. The strengthening of institutions 
and organisations that defend broader social and public interests 
in relation to land policy and investment is absolutely essential. 
As part of the push for land reform and the implementation of 




5.2. Giving local development and smallholder inclusion centre stage
Assuring that agricultural investments benefit local and 
national development in target regions and countries will 
require the prioritisation of local development from the 
earliest planning stages through to implementation, and, in 
many cases, with an emphasis on the inclusion of smallholder 
farmers.
As this report highlights, the initial phases of LSLAs, that 
is, project development and preparation, are particularly 
important. It is in this critical phase that potential development 
benefits and harm – to local land rights, livelihoods of local 
populations, and the environment – will have to be carefully 
assessed. For instance, unlike investments in the service or 
industry sector, LSLAs often have negative effects on local 
livelihoods by displacing smallholders and sparking land 
conflicts. One key element of project development should 
thus be the consultation of affected people and communities. 
Indeed, the achievement of FPIC should be non-negotiable. 
Although investors may think that support by a national 
government implies local acceptance and support, in 
practice, the interests of local populations and farmers may 
often not conform with or be reflected in plans and policies 
by national governments. Examples of this abound, with local 
communities rejecting plans for large-scale plantations by 
national governments in all parts of the world (see Chapters 
1 and 2). 
Of course, the best plans and intentions are of little value 
if they are not implemented. This report clearly shows that 
projects are often implemented with considerable delays 
and with major deviations from initial plans. As such, 
the implementation of plans that take into account local 
development needs and respect the environment – in line 
with international investment guidelines – must be monitored 
and investors held accountable: stringent contracts with 
well-developed conditions, specifications, and thresholds 
are necessary, and better and continuous screening and 
monitoring of investors and investment projects is crucial 
(see also recommendation 10 below). 
Recommendation 3
Land deals and their related projects need 
to comply with RAI principles and put local 
development centre stage.
Investors should fully adhere to international investment 
guidelines, such as the RAI principles and VGGTs. In addition, 
they should prioritise local development, giving local populations 
centre stage. The effective achievement of FPIC is essential and 
should be requested by investor countries, as well as national and 
international investor and commodity platforms, such as RSPO. 
Further, land-based investments must comply with applicable 
laws and i) uphold human rights, including basic rights such as the 
right to food, water, health, and possibly land; ii) act in accordance 
with the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and other international legislation when applicable; and iii) 
include grievance mechanisms based on international investment 
guidelines.
Moreover, agricultural investments should go beyond just 
minimising the possible negative impacts of LSLAs – they 
should also promote investment practices and models that 
maximise opportunities for local farmers, and smallholders 
in particular. It is evident from this report that the benefits 
resulting from LSLAs, in particular to local populations, all too 
often remain marginal. True, the crop production associated 
with LSLAs may respond to increasing global demand, such 
as for vegetable oils and livestock feed, but the implied 
production and land use patterns do not have the capacity 
to sustainably transform agriculture in target countries 
and respond to the poverty, vulnerability, productivity, 
employment, and food security challenges in these contexts. 
The potential of LSLAs has been overestimated and there 
have been clear examples of formidable misconceptions, for 
example, regarding the “wonder crop” jatropha. 
In addition, although large-scale farming can be one element 
of a rural development strategy, it has distinct limitations, 
since it hardly “trickles down”: most LSLAs invest in production 
systems that are (at least partly) mechanised, only need 
small amounts of local labour, and may even displace labour-
intensive smallholder farming systems. Positive spillovers to 
smallholders are likewise limited, and are not materialising 
at scale. On the other hand, this is not unexpected, given 
such positive spillovers may be limited by default – mainly 
because technologies of these farming systems are so 
different. Outgrower schemes are also no panacea for rural 
development, even though some sectors in some countries 
were more successful in including smallholder farmers, for 
example, palm oil in Indonesia.
Recommendation 4
Governments need to develop and implement 
a strategic approach for land-based 
investments that pays more attention to 
 positive spillovers for broad-based rural 
 development, particularly through spillovers 
 to and inclusion of smallholder farmers. 
Considering the limitations of LSLAs, it becomes apparent that 
a more integrated approach that (also) promotes other production 
models and emphasises development spillovers is needed. A system 
of pluralistic agricultural support and advisory services (Birner et 
al., 2009) that goes beyond a “one-size-fits-all” approach (in terms 
of farm models, agricultural extension services, credit schemes, 
infrastructure, and so forth) and involves the private sector, NGOs, 
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35UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (United Nations 2011).
5.3. Changing global rules: Human rights in investment treaties and in  
 global value chains
Local and national efforts to secure land rights and promote 
sustainable development models are unlikely to achieve 
results at scale unless fundamental global economic and 
governance conditions are also addressed. For example, 
changes in international regulatory frameworks can 
contribute to the required change in the conduct of business 
towards respecting human rights and the environment 
through two leverage points: Bi- and multilateral investment 
treaties; and the emerging rules of sustainability due 
diligence.
LSLAs are often governed by international investment 
treaties, although the way they deal with land varies 
significantly. As Cotula (2015) highlights, in some instances 
(due to the most-favoured-nation clauses or “pre-
establishment” investment treaties), they can require states 
to remove restrictions on the acquisition of land rights that 
treat foreign investors differently from local nationals, thereby 
fostering commercialisation of land relations in places where 
land has important social, cultural, and spiritual value. In 
other cases, such as the ASEAN’s investment treaty, land is 
even excluded from the application of the treaty’s protection 
against expropriation (Cotula, 2015). In particular, in poorer 
countries with weak state capacity, the legal protections 
enshrined in investment treaties risk compounding 
shortcomings in national land governance. This may result 
in protecting and enabling investors, while exposing target 
country governments to liability for promises that public 
officials made to investors before consulting communities. 
For this reason, LSLAs provide a rationale for incorporating 
provisions into international investment treaties that reflect 
the specific risks related to the environment and the land 
rights of affected populations; and yet, responsible investment 
provisions remain rare, and are often underdeveloped 
relative to other clauses in investment treaties (with some 
recent exceptions referring to compliance with international 
standards of corporate social responsibility). Moreover, 
these provisions are not typically mandatory, nor are they 
assisted by effective enforcement mechanisms, with many 
of the international instruments being directed at states 
rather than investors. Public attention might, however, bring 
change. Until now, trade and investment treaties were often 
negotiated with little public and parliamentary oversight, but 
spaces for citizen engagement are evolving rapidly as people 
become more aware of the stakes and avenues for influence 
(Cotula, 2021).
Recommendation 5
Human and other basic rights (right to food, 
right to water, right to land), as well as aspects 
related to the environment, need to be 
included in international investment treaties. 
Such reforms should redesign investment protections, affirm 
investor obligations, particularly with regard to human rights and 
the environment, and exclude from protection investments that 
fail to comply. To achieve this, broad actions and restructuring at 
various levels will be necessary. At target country level, engaging 
national multistakeholder platforms in the development and 
follow-up of such treaties and frameworks is recommended. At 
international level, multilateral bodies, such as the G20 (through 
its Trade and Investment Working Group) or parliamentary 
bodies (for instance, specific working groups of the Pan-African 
Parliament or the European Parliament) should become fora 
through which investment treaties and trade agreements are 
discussed and monitored. Lastly, the ongoing negotiation of a 
multilateral treaty on business and human rights could also help 
rebalance rights and obligations.
The report shows that LSLAs are often aimed at producing for 
global value chains which may directly involve multinationals 
but also smaller firms and individuals at local level. It is 
important, therefore, that attempts to change business 
conduct to comply with internationally agreed principles35 
encompass all these investors. On the other hand, the 
environmental and social sustainability of production in global 
value chains is increasingly being questioned – and LSLAs and 
their impacts, as illustrated in this report, provide important 
evidence why this is so. Recently, private sustainability 
standards, in particular in selected agricultural commodities, 
have been complemented by regulatory action. Mandatory 
due diligence standards with varying scope have been enacted 
or are discussed in the European Union, Germany, Great 
Britain, France, and the US, and such legislation – possibly 
in combination with voluntary sustainability standards – has 
great potential to hold investors (and buyers) accountable for 
the adverse impacts of LSLAs.
and farmer organisations, will better provide for context-specific 
solutions, support, and services through a mix of instruments and 
formats, including group-based and participatory approaches. 
This therefore requires context-specific balances between state 
intervention and private sector initiative based on careful and 
inclusive planning that cannot rely on simple assumptions alone, 
for example, regarding the potential of LSLAs, contract farming, 
or of specific crops.
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5.4. Halting environmental destruction by LSLAs
Our analysis has shown that LSLAs are a key driver of 
deforestation and environmental degradation. This process 
is associated with massive losses of biodiversity, in particular 
when tropical rainforests are affected. The conversion of 
forests also contributes to climate change by directly releasing 
a large amount of carbon into the atmosphere. Considering 
that not all LSLAs have been implemented yet, and that the 
LSLA process will continue in the foreseeable future, urgent 
policy changes are needed to halt this destructive process. 
In Southeast Asia, for example, massive deforestation is 
ongoing, and LSLAs are now even targeting new frontier 
regions, like the island of Papua. In Latin America, LSLAs have 
been adding new frontiers to the unresolved problems of 
deforestation in the Amazon for some time as well. In Africa, 
the large share of yet to be implemented deals is a significant 
threat, in particular to the Central African rainforests, but also 
to remaining forests in West Africa. By setting the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the international community has 
committed to strong action to combat both biodiversity loss 
and climate change. Achieving these goals will not be possible 
without also changing policies regarding LSLAs.
The impact on water resources is another important 
dimension of the environmental consequences of land 
acquisitions. We have shown that more than half of the deals 
in the Land Matrix aim to produce crops with high water use, 
such as cotton, jatropha, oil palm, rubber, and sugar cane. 
Moreover, a significant fraction of them take place in water-
scarce environments, adding to already strong competition 
for water. In this context, LSLAs contribute to overuse of water 
resources – to the detriment of smallholders, pastoralists, 
and other local water users. Basic human needs and rights on 
water and food therefore need to be adequately respected 
by investors and protected by governments. In addition, 
the more intensive production used by LSLAs increases the 
use of fertiliser and pesticides, a development which, if not 
carefully controlled, can be damaging to water resources and 
endanger human and environmental health in general. 
Finally, the current COVID-19 pandemic has suddenly placed 
global health issues at the top of the agenda across the 
world, and yet the likely link between land use changes, 
deforestation, and the emergence of pandemics and zoonotic 
diseases has gone largely ignored in mainstream LSLA 
debates. However, as recently highlighted by an IPBES report, 
this threat provides additional and urgent motivation to halt 
large-scale destruction of forests and other natural habitats, 
and needs to be factored in when assessing benefits and cost 
of land use changes induced by LSLAs.
While remote sensing can monitor land conversion, the 
impacts on water and the environment in general can 
usually only be monitored on site and with specialised 
methods. Unfortunately, for the overwhelming number of 
LSLAs, neither environmental impact studies nor detailed 
concession agreements regarding water rights, environmental 
safeguards, or monitoring and verification agreements are 
made public. Transparency and stakeholder participation are 
key elements when it comes to environmental management 
of large investment projects, and these principles should also 
be upheld when LSLA projects are planned and implemented.
Recommendation 7
LSLAs that lead (or might lead if implemented) 
to deforestation, the destruction of other 
valuable natural resources or habitats, or 
damage to important carbon stores need to 
 be stopped.  
Such policy changes have already been made in various target 
countries, albeit only for a restricted time (in the form of 
moratoria). These changes should be generalised for all target 
countries, extended in time, and actively enforced at local level. 
On one hand, the global donor community needs to support 
these changes by creating incentives for governments of target 
countries to commit to such changes. Climate policies and climate 
funding can support this, and need to be aligned with measures 
to reduce or avoid deforestation through LSLAs. On the other 
Recommendation 6
Mandatory human and other basic rights due 
diligence legislation should be introduced and 
affected populations should be empowered 
 to effectively use such legislation in the context 
 of LSLAs.   
Human rights due diligence legislation should be enacted in all 
investor countries to hold investors (and their suppliers) based in 
those countries accountable with regard to investments abroad. 
Here again, the G20 should encourage its members states to apply 
this. In addition, local populations and affected communities 
need to be empowered to partake in the due diligence processes 
and make use of the legislation (possibly with the help of NGOs 
based in investor countries).
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hand, as highlighted in Recommendation 5, strong policies to 
halt deforestation and destruction of natural habitats through 
LSLAs need to be part of bilateral and multinational investment 
treaties and trade agreements. It will be important to accompany 
such agreements with strong safeguards and monitoring 
mechanisms to avoid environmental damages by a new wave of 
LSLAs. Countries involved should also agree on targets limiting 
or stopping deforestation and destruction of other important 
biomes. Finally, duties to respect safeguards and monitoring 
requirements should apply for companies in both host and 
investor countries.
Recommendation 8
Governments should develop comprehensive 
landscape plans that address the trade-offs 
between environmental, economic, and social 
objectives, and in which the purpose, role, 
 and dimensions of LSLAs are clarified.   
These comprehensive plans, coordinated by governments 
at national and local level in collaboration with investors, 
civil society, and land users, should consist of the following 
elements: First, they should include LSLA environmental impact 
assessments and environmental management plans to be carried 
out by investors and complying with requirements applicable 
under the law of the home state or the host state, whichever 
is more rigorous. They should also maintain appropriate 
environmental management systems. In water-scarce 
environments in particular, water governance issues related 
to LSLAs need to be carefully reviewed, and human rights for 
water and social, economic, and environmental utility of water 
at various spatial and temporal scales considered. Second, they 
should include emerging disease risk (including zoonotic diseases) 
and health impact assessments related to land use change 
and deforestation. Third, these environmental plans should be 
contextualised in broad land use plans at landscape level, also 
taking into consideration economic and social development 
objectives. Such landscape plans should be made public for 
independent expert and stakeholder review. Further, in alignment 
with Recommendation 11, this should be complemented with 
long-term monitoring of the land use and ensure the sustainability 
of land deals, as well as the longer-term sustainability of 
development trajectories. These should be monitored by 
the national and/or local multistakeholder land institutions 
(Recommendation 2).
In addition, climate policies aimed at mitigation through 
afforestation or reforestation need to respect the VGGTs, 
in particular regarding land tenure. This is important since 
alienation of land use rights when land is acquired for 
climate protection or the promotion of renewable energies 
(afforestation, deforestation, solar farms, wind farms, mining 
for lithium, and so forth) may have detrimental impacts 
on local land users. The sobering track record of LSLAs for 
the production of biofuels provides important lessons in 
this regard.
5.5. Increasing transparency around LSLAs by target countries and investors alike
Throughout the report, we highlight issues related to the 
persistent lack of information and opaque nature of LSLAs. 
This is illustrated by the admittedly imperfect and partial 
statistics from the Land Matrix database as well (see Box 
1). Indeed, despite our continuous and rigorous efforts 
over the last 10 years, the shortcomings in our data confirm 
that there is a dearth of reliable information around the 
processes of LSLAs, in all countries in general. This is all the 
more disconcerting given that transparency is a fundamental 
building block of responsible investments and one of the 
principle guidelines of the related global frameworks, for 
example, chapter 12 of the VGGTs dealing with investments, 
and principle No 3 of the RAIs.
In Africa, for instance, of the countries we monitor, 
only two have 30% of the required data to monitor the 
implementation of the VGGTs, while all others fall below 
(see Figure 5.4). Data is particularly scarce on investment 
processes (including consultations, realisation of FPIC, 
compensations, and displacements), as well as on socio-
economic and environmental impacts (such as job creation, 
quality of employment, contribution to local production, 
and biodiversity loss). Although better technologies and 
methodologies are allowing us to collect more georeferenced 
data, these are still fairly limited to date (see Box 2). 
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These data deficiencies not only apply to the other regions, 
but also to many investor countries, including the bigger 
and most developed ones. For example, even though 
some publicly accessible information regarding LSLAs is 
provided by companies and governments from G20 member 
states, detailed analysis of Land Matrix data shows that the 
operating company is known in less than 20% of the deals, 
the exact location of land investments is communicated to 
the public in only 15% of all G20 deals, and less than 10% 
of investors publish the purchase price or leasing fee 
(Flachsbarth et al., 2020). Regardless of prior efforts by 
the G20, to date, its member states are on average no 
more transparent than non-G20 investing and target regions 
(Box 15).
Figure 5.4: Data availability in the Land Matrix for Africa
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BOX 15:
Transparency around land deals in and by G20 
countries     
The US and several EU countries (including the Netherlands 
and Luxemburg) do not only rank among the most important 
global investors, but also among the most opaque. In around 
90% of their investments, the operating company, exact 
location, and information on leasing or purchase fees are 
unknown. This holds with little variation for Canada, France, 
Germany, and the UK as well.
In contrast, the operating company is known in about 40% 
of Chinese and Saudi Arabian foreign land deals, although 
this information is generally target country generated and is 
mainly from non-official sources. Very few deals that involve 
investors from Saudi Arabia can be precisely located, and 
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investors from China hardly make available information 
on purchasing prices or leasing fees public (Flachsbarth et 
al., 2020). For other relevant variables, such as social and 
environmental impact assessments and consultation of local 
population or FPIC there is even less reliable information 
available. Again, looking at the G20 investor countries, 
information is particularly scarce for Argentina, Canada, 
other EU countries, Germany, and the US. Even where  some 
information is available for certain deals, it appears that 
Canadian, German, and South African investors (almost) 
never consulted the local population beforehand. The data 
also indicate that for Saudi Arabian or Chinese investors, local 
communities — when consulted — rejected the deals in all 
or most of the known cases, respectively (contrary to what is 
promoted in Chapter 12 of the VGGTs). This reveals that it is 
not just information about the deals that is lacking, it is also 
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Figure 5.5: Transparency around land deals in G20 and non-G20 investing and target regions 
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The results presented in this report clearly demonstrate 
that the objectives of transparency, as promoted in global 
frameworks such as the VGGTs and RAIs, have not been 
achieved so far. While the Land Matrix Initiative, through its 
regional partners, cannot review all deals in detail, it is plain 
that it is the profound lack of transparency on the side of 
governments and investors that impedes data collection. 
Even with extensive field visits and data campaigns in specific 
countries, it is difficult or even impossible to get more detailed 
information when neither governments nor investors are 
forthcoming. Three related recommendations are therefore 
applicable here.
Recommendation 9
All actors engaged in large-scale agricultural 
investment projects must increase 
transparency; indeed, when public capital is 
involved, it should be made compulsory.   
Donor and investor countries should make it compulsory for 
public entities to be fully transparent, and releasing information 
should be mandatory for investments and projects that receive 
public support (such as development finance) or public capital 
(such as public investment funds). Furthermore, donor and 
investor country governments should strongly encourage (private) 
projects and companies to release information. They could do so 
directly by reaching out to companies or via investor platforms, 
such as the Interlaken Group. The same recommendation applies 
to recipient countries, particularly if LSLAs concern public or 
collective/community lands under public authority. In these cases, 
recipient countries should make land-based contracts transparent 
on dedicated official websites or via independent open-data and 
monitoring initiatives. This could be requested by donors to their 
partner countries in the framework of the implementation of the 
VGGTS and the RAIs. In addition, the request for transparency 
should be extended to commodity fora/roundtables and should 
apply across the different segments of the commodity value 
chains. Moreover, investor countries should link transparency 
initiatives to voluntary standards and certification schemes for 
key crops. For example, anchoring these within the RSPO and 
the Roundtable for Responsible Soy (RTRS) would already cover 
one-third of all foreign land-based investments in major target 
countries.
Recommendation 10
Donor countries should provide a mandate to 
and support independent transparency and 
monitoring initiatives.    
Donor countries should support independent monitoring of 
LSLAs. Specifically, project- and company-level information 
on large-scale agricultural projects should become publicly 
available on open data platforms, such as the Land Matrix, 
OpenLandContracts, and Global Forest Watch, and include 
information on processes and impacts to ensure that the project’s 
contribution (or not) to sustainable development processes (from 
a socio-economic as well as environmental perspective) can be 
assessed. Open data on LSLAs for agricultural purposes will 
have an impact on the sustainability of these investments and 
investor responsibility if the information can be used by relevant 
stakeholders, in particular, to hold investors to account. In 
addition, donor countries should support the establishment of 
an independent multistakeholder working group, co-led with 
intergovernmental agencies, to monitor the progress of investors 
and target countries in implementing the guidelines on land 
tenure and responsible agricultural investments.
Recommendation 11
All countries should, at the local level, 
continuously monitor land ownership and 
control, land transactions, and land-use 
change.    
All countries should support continuous monitoring of land 
transactions and land use change. Investments should be made in 
modern land administrations, including up-to-date cadastres and 
land use monitoring tools. These should be linked to decentralised 
multistakeholder institutions in order to promote evidence-based 
decision-making and intervention. This will also allow LSLAs to 
be monitored on a continuous basis, including their compliance 
with general investment conditions and more specific plans and 
contractual obligations.
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